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INTRODUCTION 
To put the patent decisions from the year 2003 in some 
perspective, the prior year, 2002, will be remembered by the patent 
world for the impact of two Supreme Court decisions and four 
Federal Circuit patent decisions. 
The Supreme Court, in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Systems, Inc.,1 limited the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to those 
cases where the initial well-pleaded complaint raised an issue under 
the patent laws, thereby changing the calculus employed by 
defendants when contemplating counterclaims.  In Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.2 (“Festo VIII”), the Supreme Court 
criticized the Federal Circuit, while significantly narrowing the 
doctrine of equivalents (“DOE”). 
Also in 2002, the Federal Circuit, in CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick 
Corp.3 and Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,4 ushered in the 
era of the “strong presumption” that claim terms must be construed 
as broadly as their plain and ordinary meaning permits and brought 
dictionaries to the forefront of the claim construction fray in what 
has become the ongoing battles of competing dictionary definitions.  
Further eroding the doctrine of equivalents, and heralding its 
treatment of DOE cases for 2003, a divided Federal Circuit held in 
                                                          
 1. See 535 U.S. 826, 830, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1803 (2002) (explaining 
that, under the well-pleaded-complaint rule, a plaintiff must plead a patent issue on 
the face of an initial complaint, not a counterclaim). 
 2. See 535 U.S. 722, 737, 740-41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712-15 (2002) 
(rejecting the court of appeals rule that prosecution history per se bars future claims 
under the doctrine of equivalents and holding that prosecution history creates a 
presumption that an amendment surrenders any equivalents but stating that a 
patentee could rebut this presumption by showing that, at the time of the 
amendment, it was unreasonable to craft a claim to describe the equivalent literally). 
 3. See 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1659, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(discussing the presumption that claim terms have ordinary meanings, which may be 
defined in dictionaries, and applying a presumption to interpret the claim term 
“member”). 
 4. See 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1817-18 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (stating that dictionaries and encyclopedias are objective sources to establish 
claim terms). 
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Johnson & Johnston Associates, Inc. v. R.E. Service Inc.5 that unclaimed, 
disclosed subject matter cannot be captured as an equivalent, but 
rather is dedicated to the public.6  Finally, in what may be the final 
death blow to so-called submarine patents, the Federal Circuit, in 
Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical,7 reinvented the equitable 
doctrine of prosecution laches, a defense that will likely be subject to 
some elaboration by the Federal Circuit in 2004 as a result of the 
recent decision rendered by the district court on remand in the 
Symbol Technologies case.8 
In 2003, no new Supreme Court jurisprudence arose, but the 
Federal Circuit was very active in the patent area.  Its en banc decision 
in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.9 (“Festo IX”) 
changed the landscape insofar as litigating doctrine of equivalents 
issues, and it may start a new type of district court proceeding focused 
on whether, as a matter of law, a patentee is entitled to assert 
doctrine of equivalents; a so-called “Festo hearing.”  In Moba, B.V. v. 
Diamond Automation, Inc.,10 a panel of the Federal Circuit heralded 
possible en banc review of the law of written description.11  However, 
the two areas where the Federal Circuit was most active in 2003 was in 
claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents.  The claim 
construction case law often arrived at breathtakingly broad 
constructions, thereby capturing more accused infringers under 
literal infringement.  Ruling on cases from the district courts, as well 
as those remanded from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit 
narrowed the application of the doctrine of equivalents with its 
decision in Festo IX. 
                                                          
 5. See 285 F.3d 1046, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 6. See id. at 1054, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230 (stating that allowing a patentee 
to use the doctrine of equivalents to recapture unclaimed, disclosed subject matter 
would conflict with the notion that the claim made in the patent determines the 
scope of protection). 
 7. See 277 F.3d 1361, 1364-66, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1515, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that even where a patentee acts in good faith, patent claims issued after 
unreasonable prosecution delays may be subject to prosecution laches). 
 8. See 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1157, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1738, 1745 (D. Nev. 
2004) (finding the asserted claims unenforceable because “ample evidence of 
intervening rights” existed that fully demonstrate the injury that can result from “an 
unreasonable delay in prosecuting patent claims”). 
 9. See 344 F.3d 1359, 1363, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(remanding the case to the district court to decide whether Festo could show that 
equivalents were unforeseeable at the time the claim was amended, and therefore 
rebut the presumption that Festo surrendered the equivalent subject matter). 
 10. 325 F.3d 1306, 1327, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 11. See id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429, 1443 (Radar, C.J., concurring) (urging 
the court to review and correct erroneous constructions of the Patent Act and, 
specifically, stating that the court erred in interpreting the Patent Act to require 
disclosure of DNA structures in biotechnology patent cases). 
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In 2004, we look for the court to continue to be active in the area 
of claim construction and doctrine of equivalents.  We also expect 
that cases involving the written description requirement of § 112 will 
refine the law in that area.12  Finally, in the face of what many in the 
patent community regard as a wholesale attack by plaintiffs on the 
defendant’s attorney-client privilege, the en banc court contemplates 
the case of Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmBH v. Dana 
Corp.,13 and may once again consider the twenty-one year-old duty to 
obtain advice of counsel in the face of an infringement allegation as 
imposed in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,14 as well as 
the adverse inference rule of Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc.15 
The following summary looks at some of the more notable cases 
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 2003. 
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
This has been an interesting procedural year.  In the course of 
2003, the Federal Circuit addressed procedural issues including 
Federal Circuit jurisdiction, standing, personal jurisdiction, waivers, 
collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, final judgments, judgment as a 
matter of law (“JMOLs”), claim preclusion, and Rule 11 sanctions. 
A. Federal Circuit Jurisdiction 
Applying the standard announced by the Supreme Court in Holmes 
Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,16 the Federal Circuit 
found that it had appellate jurisdiction over a case because the 
plaintiff-appellant’s complaint sought declaratory relief of patent 
non-infringement.17 
In Golan v. Pingel Enterprise, Inc.,18 the plaintiff and the defendant 
were competitors in after-market motorcycle fuel valves for Harley-
                                                          
 12. See Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The specification shall contain a 
written description of the invention and of the manner and process of making and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and 
use the same . . . .”). 
 13. 344 F.3d 1336, 1336-37, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 14. See 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569, 576 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(imposing a duty to seek legal advice if an activity might infringe on an existing 
patent). 
 15. See 793 F.2d 1565, 1580, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 160, 160 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(presuming that an alleged infringer’s silence as to whether he sought legal advice 
indicated that he had either ignored counsel’s advice that a particular act would 
infringe or acted without seeking legal advice). 
 16. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002). 
 17. See Golan v. Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1911, 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 18. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911. 
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Davidson motorcycles.19  The defendant, Pingel, an assignee of 
patents for the fuel valves, sent a cease-and-desist letter to Golan.20  
The defendant also sent letters to Golan’s customers stating that 
Golan’s fuel valves infringed Pingel’s patents and trademarks.21  
Golan sued, asserting U.S. federal and state antitrust claims,22 federal 
and state unfair competition claims,23 state business tort claims,24 and 
sought declaratory relief of patent non-infringement.25  Subsequently, 
Pingel successfully moved for summary judgment on the antitrust, 
unfair competition, and state tort claims.26  Golan appealed to the 
Federal Circuit.27 
Construing Vornado broadly, the Federal Circuit held that 
declaratory relief claims arise under federal law if the cause of action 
that the declaratory relief claims seeks to aver would arise under 
federal law.28  The court held that a claim for declaratory relief of 
patent non-infringement seeks to aver a claim of patent infringement 
and, therefore, arises under the patent laws.29 
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction Based on State Law Claims 
In Silent Drive Inc. v. Strong Industries, Inc.,30 a factually complex case 
involving a complaint for declaratory judgment, the Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court’s dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.31 
The parties were competing manufacturers of trailing axles.32  
Strong, a Texas company, obtained an injunction in an earlier state 
court case in Texas for misappropriation of trade secrets, which 
specifically enjoined Silent Drive.33  Silent Drive, an Iowa company, 
was not a party to that earlier Texas case.34  It was, however, involved 
in the joint development of the product involved in that case.35  
Strong also obtained a patent that it claimed was infringed by the 
                                                          
 19. Id. at 1363, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1912. 
 20. Id. at 1363-64, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 21. Id. at 1364, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 22. Id. at 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 23. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 24. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 25. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1913. 
 26. Id. at 1365-66, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
 27. Id. at 1366, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1914. 
 28. Id. at 1367, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915. 
 29. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915. 
 30. 326 F.3d 1194, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 31. Id. at 1197, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
 32. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
 33. Id. at 1197-98, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603-04. 
 34. Id. at 1198, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 35. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
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product that Silent Drive jointly developed with the party to the 
earlier Texas state court case.36 
Strong wrote letters to Silent Drive and to its customers outside of 
Iowa, notifying them about, and attaching copies of, the state court 
injunction and the patent.37  Strong also issued a press release, which 
a potential customer of Silent Drive in Iowa received, describing the 
injunction and the patent.38  In the press release, Strong indicated it 
would not be possible for anyone to make a certain kind of axle 
without infringing its patent.39 
Based on these letters, Silent Drive filed a declaratory judgment 
action in a federal court in Iowa seeking, among other things: (1) a 
declaration that the Texas state court injunction could not be 
enforced against Silent Drive; (2) a declaration of patent invalidity 
and non-infringement of the Strong patent; and (3) a finding of 
tortious interference with contractual relationships.40  The district 
court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction despite 
finding that Strong intentionally sent the letters, which directly 
related to the patent claim, to the forum state.41 
The Federal Circuit applied the law of the regional circuit to the 
personal jurisdiction issue.42  Although the court agreed that the 
letters sent by Strong did not confer personal jurisdiction by 
themselves over Strong on the patent count, and found that federal 
subject matter jurisdiction did not exist over the tortious interference 
count, the court never reached the question of personal jurisdiction 
on that count.  Instead, the court found that Silent Drive properly 
asserted both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over the claim 
regarding the Texas state court injunction.43  The Federal Circuit 
hinted that the issue of whether the Texas injunction could be 
enforced against Silent Drive required a federal due process 
analysis.44  As part of that analysis, the court noted that the letters sent 
by Strong constituted an attempt to enforce the injunction against 
Silent Drive in Iowa, which subjected Strong to personal jurisdiction 
in Iowa.45  Thus, the court concluded that the exercise of 
                                                          
 36. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604. 
 37. Id. at 1198-99, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-05. 
 38. Id. at 1199, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 39. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 40. Id. at 1199-200, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 41. Id. at 1200, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. 
 42. Id. at 1200-01, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606. 
 43. Id. at 1202-03, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607-08. 
 44. Id. at 1203-04, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.  
 45. Id. at 1204-05, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608-09. 
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supplemental jurisdiction over the other federal counts was proper 
and reversed the dismissal of the complaint.46 
C. Personal Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts for Declaratory Judgment 
In Electronics for Imagining, Inc. v. Coyle,47 the Federal Circuit 
reversed a district court dismissal of an action filed in California.  It 
held that the district court incorrectly found that it did not have 
personal jurisdiction over patent owner Kolbet Labs, a Nevada 
corporation, and its alleged alter ego, Jan Coyle, in a declaratory 
judgment suit filed by Electronics for Imaging (“EFI”), a Delaware 
corporation doing business principally in California.48 
EFI sued Kolbet Labs and Coyle for declaratory and injunctive 
relief of non-infringement, as well as for state law claims for non-
breach of contract and non-misappropriation of trade secrets.49  The 
Northen District of California granted the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.50 
The court applied Federal Circuit law for purposes of claims arising 
out of the patent law, such as a claim for declaratory judgment of 
patent invalidity, and applied regional law, in this case Ninth Circuit 
law, for claims arising under state law.51  On the patent invalidity 
claim, the court analyzed whether Coyle had “purposefully directed” 
contacts at California and noted that defendants made telephone 
calls to EFI regarding the technology covered by the defendants’ 
patent application; sent two representatives to visit EFI’s facility to 
demonstrate defendants’ technology; and hired an attorney in 
California who periodically reported on the status of the defendants’ 
pending patent application.52  The court found those contacts were 
not “random, fortuitous or attenuated,” but rather “the totality of 
these contacts sufficiently” made out EFI’s prima facie case that Coyle 
“by ‘engaging in significant activities’ in California . . . purposefully 
directed [its] activities to California.”53 
This case appears to be a rare instance in which a court has 
considered the act of retaining counsel in a jurisdiction as a factor in 
establishing the “minimum contacts” necessary for the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction. 
                                                          
 46. Id. at 1206, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610. 
 47. 340 F.3d 1344, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 48. Id. at 1346-47, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 49. Id. at 1348, 1352, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942, 1945. 
 50. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 51. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 52. Id. at 1350-51, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 53. Id. at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
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D. Waiver of Defenses 
In Pandrol U.S.A., LP v. Airboss Railway Products, Inc.,54 (“Pandrol II”) 
a case involving invalidity defenses and counterclaims, the Federal 
Circuit ruled that the defendant’s failure to raise invalidity 
counterclaims against a summary judgment motion on infringement 
did not operate as a waiver of those validity defenses or 
counterclaims.55 
For purposes of the first appeal to the Federal Circuit in this 
matter,56 the parties stipulated that defendants’ counterclaims were 
dismissed without prejudice and with permission to assert those 
claims if the case were remanded back to the district court after the 
appeal of the infringement ruling.57 
Based on the claim construction in Pandrol U.S.A. LP v. Airboss 
Railway Products, Inc.58 (“Pandrol I”), the parties filed cross motions for 
summary judgment on the infringement issues.59  Defendants did not, 
however, raise their affirmative validity defenses or counterclaims.60  
The district court granted plaintiff’s motion and found that the 
defendants had waived their validity defenses by failing to raise them 
in defense of plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on 
infringement.61  The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded again.62  
The court noted that both Supreme Court and Federal Circuit 
precedent make clear that infringement and validity are separate 
issues63—and that of the two—“validity has the greater public 
importance.”64  Failure to raise the affirmative defense or 
                                                          
 54. 320 F.3d 1354, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985 (Fed. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter 
“Pandrol II”]. 
 55. Id. at 1357, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1985, 1986-87. 
 56. Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prods., Inc., 10 Fed. Appx. 837, 841-42 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) [hereinafter “Pandrol I”] (vacating the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,110,046). 
 57. Pandrol II, 320 F.3d at 1359, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1988. 
 58. Pandrol I, 10 Fed. Appx. at 841-42.  
 59. Pandrol II, 320 F.3d at 1360, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989. 
 60. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989. 
 61. Id. at 1360-61, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1989. 
 62. Id. at 1369, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1995. 
 63. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 102-03, 26 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721, 1730 (1993) (holding that a finding of noninfringement has 
no bearing on the soundness of a counterclaim for patent invalidity); Carman Indus., 
Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 936 n.2, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 484 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(finding that the district court erred because it combined the validity analysis with 
the infringement issue); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 
1583, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 111 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that resolving the 
infringement issues, as well as the validity issue is the “better practice”). 
 64. Pandrol II, 320 F.3d at 1365, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1992 (quoting Cardinal 
Chem. Co., 508 U.S. at 100, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729). 
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counterclaim of invalidity in the context of a summary judgment 
motion on infringement is not a waiver of those issues.65 
E. Offensive Collateral Estoppel 
In vacating a final judgment of patent infringement supported by 
offensive collateral estoppel, the Federal Circuit remanded Dana v. 
E.S. Originals, Inc.66 for a finding of whether a plaintiff “could easily 
have joined” an earlier action and “therefore should be denied the 
benefits of a favorable outcome in that case because he chose not to 
expose himself to the risk of an unfavorable one.”67 
Dana, the prior owner of a patent for flashing disco shoes, sought 
damages for alleged pre-assignment infringement.68  The district 
court in Florida granted partial summary judgment in his favor, 
finding that the defendants were collaterally estopped from 
contesting the issues of infringement and validity due to earlier 
orders issued by a sister court in California.69  The California court 
granted partial summary judgment in favor of Dana’s assignee, 
holding that the patent was enforceable, the claims were not invalid, 
and that the defendants infringed under the doctrine of 
equivalents.70  Shortly thereafter, the California parties entered into a 
settlement agreement memorialized by a consent decree.71 
Applying the law of the Eleventh Circuit to this “procedural issue,” 
the Federal Circuit held that the plaintiff, as the party seeking 
collateral estoppel, successfully satisfied the legal requirements of 
collateral estoppel.72  Specifically, the court held that the issues of 
infringement and patent validity were identical to issues critical and 
necessary to the California orders, and the defendants had a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate these issues in the prior proceeding.73  
Using the Eleventh Circuit’s flexible approach that accords collateral 
estoppel effect to “orders that do not constitute final, appealable 
judgments if they are ‘sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive 
effect,’”74 the Federal Circuit noted that the California parties were 
aware of the potential preclusive effect of the rulings in which the 
                                                          
 65. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1993. 
 66. 342 F.3d 1320, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 67. Id. at 1327, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 68. Id. at 1321-22, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 69. Id. at 1322, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 70. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 71. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 72. Id. at 1325, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 73. Id. at 1324-25, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141-42. 
 74. Id. at 1325, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141 (quoting Christo v. Padgett, 223 
F.3d 1324, 1339 n.47 (11th Cir. 2000)). 
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California court conducted hearings on both infringement and 
validity75 and set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
fully reasoned opinions that made clear that the orders fully and 
finally resolved the matters addressed.76 
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit invoked “equitable factors 
weighing against the offensive use of collateral estoppel” in 
determining that the Florida judgment of infringement was an abuse 
of discretion,77 even though the Federal Circuit agreed that neither 
party established that the defendants’ exposure to damages would 
redundantly include its exposure in the California action.78  
Therefore, the California orders were not inconsistent with any 
previous judgments and the defendants would gain no previously 
unavailable procedural advantages in the second action.79 
The court emphasized the free rider problem implicated by the 
opportunistic nature of offensive collateral estoppel by stating: 
Because potential plaintiffs are not bound by any decision 
favorable to the defendant in earlier lawsuits, but can seek to take 
advantage of any decision favorable to another plaintiff, the 
availability of offensive collateral estoppel creates a ‘no–lose’ 
incentive for plaintiffs to hold back and await developments in 
other plaintiffs’ cases.80 
As it was uncontroverted that Dana was aware of the California 
litigation, the Federal Circuit remanded for a finding of whether he 
“could easily have joined” that action, thereby precluding reliance on 
offensive collateral estoppel.81 
F. Collateral Estoppel on Claim Construction 
In RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Technologies, Inc.,82 the Federal 
Circuit found no collateral estoppel resulted from a partial summary 
judgment in a prior litigation and reversed and remanded yet 
another case for what it considered to be an unduly restrictive claim 
construction.83 
The district court’s construction employed elements identical to 
those used in a claim construction ruling on partial summary 
judgment in a previous litigation in which the plaintiff, RF Delaware 
                                                          
 75. Id. at 1323, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 76. Id. at 1324, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. 
 77. Id. at 1325, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 78. Id. at 1327, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 79. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 80. Id. at 1326, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142. 
 81. Id. at 1327, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1143. 
 82. 326 F.3d 1255, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 83. Id. at 1262, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
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(“RFD”), asserted the same patents against a different defendant.84  
Pacific Keystone argued that, irrespective of the reliability of the 
claim interpretation analysis by the district court, the prior district 
court’s claim construction should be given collateral estoppel effect.85 
Because the earlier action ended in an extra-judicial settlement 
without complete adjudication even as to liability, the Federal Circuit, 
applying regional law to this purely procedural issue, held that there 
was no collateral estoppel.86  Citing the Eleventh Circuit, the court 
held that “collateral estoppel does not apply in the present case 
because no judgment, much less final judgment, was ever entered in 
the Virginia district court case.”87 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit held that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by refusing to judicially estop RFD and found the 
Virginia district court’s claim interpretation binding on it because of 
its admission in a preliminary injunction proceeding.88  Among other 
things, the court observed, RFD did not succeed in urging its 
position, as its motion for a preliminary injunction was denied, and 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents only those who successfully 
urge a position from thereafter changing it.89 
G. Judicial Estoppel on Claim Construction 
In a second appeal of Middleton, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & 
Manufacturing, Co.,90 the Federal Circuit reversed a summary 
judgment ruling, rejecting the very claim construction it appeared to 
embrace during the prior appeal.91  In a further exercise of careful 
parsing—drawing distinctions certain to impress even seasoned 
patent attorneys—the Federal Circuit also held that argument by the 
inventor in connection with a narrowing amendment to a parent 
application did not necessarily estop the patent holder from seeking 
a broader construction of that same term in a continuation patent.92 
In Middleton, the patent at issue claimed a material improved the 
finishing for the top surface of floors.93  The key limitation of the 
                                                          
 84. Id. at 1259, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1595. 
 85. Id. at 1260-61, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 86. Id. at 1261, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 87. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 88. Id. at 1262, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
 89. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
 90. 311 F.3d 1384, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 91. Id. at 1390, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142; see id. at 1386, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1139 (noting that the district court had adopted the Federal Circuit’s 
definition of the word “uniform” from the prior appeal). 
 92. Id. at 1388-89, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138, 1141. 
 93. Id. at 1385, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
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claims required that the finish be “uniform.”94  The district court 
construed “uniform” to require “a uniform thickness, and 
exclude[ed] material in which there are any variations in thickness.”95  
In a previous appeal, the Federal Circuit noted, 
We understand the district court’s interpretation [of the term 
‘uniform flexible film’] to mean that the film must have the same 
thickness throughout, except that normal manufacturing 
tolerances are allowed.  Thus, while the film cannot have a 
thickness of 1 mil at one location and 25 mils at another, it may 
have variations in thickness due solely to the practical realities of 
the film manufacturing process.  We note that at oral argument, 
the parties did not appear to dispute this reading of the district 
court’s claim construction.96 
However, in the present appeal, the Federal Circuit upbraided the 
district court for mistaking this passage as endorsement of the claim 
construction.97  Considering the matter, de novo, the court construed 
“uniform” to apply to materials that are “uniform” in any number of 
ways, not just thickness.98 
The court also considered the prosecution history of the patent in 
suit to determine whether the patentee “clearly and unambiguously 
‘disclaimed or disavowed’” an interpretation of the term “uniform” 
that could embrace the accused product.99  During prosecution of the 
parent patent, the inventor had distinguished over a prior art 
reference by arguing that the relevant “uniformity” was a uniformity 
of thickness.100  The court held that this argument, in connection with 
a bowling alley floor, did not constrain the patent holder from 
seeking a broader construction in relation to other sorts of floors.101 
H. Retroactive Corporate Standing Cannot Save Original Case Filing 
In Paradise Creations, Inc. v. UV Sales, Inc.,102 the Federal Circuit 
refused to recognize standing to bring a lawsuit based solely on a 
state corporate revival statute that purported to confer standing 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 1387, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 95. Id. at 1386, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139. 
 96. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139 (quoting Middleton Inc. v. Minnesota 
Mining & Mfg. Co., No. 99-1201, 1999 WL 1072246 at *4 (Fed. Cir.  Nov. 16, 1999)). 
 97. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1139-40. 
 98. Id. at 1386, 1389, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140, 1142. 
 99. Id. at 1388, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. 
 100. Id. at 1388-89, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141. 
 101. Id. at 1389, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141-42. 
 102. 315 F.3d 1304, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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retroactively where it did not exist at the time that the complaint for 
patent infringement was filed.103 
Paradise Creations was incorporated under Florida law in 1985.104  
In 1996, Paradise Creations was administratively dissolved.105  It 
remained administratively dissolved until 2001.106  While Paradise was 
in dissolution, they purportedly obtained “the exclusive, unlimited, 
irrevocable, worldwide right and license” to the patent in issue and 
filed a complaint for patent infringement against UV Sales.107 
UV filed a summary judgment motion, arguing that Paradise 
lacked the capacity to sue under Florida law and did not have 
standing to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.108  After obtaining 
reinstatement as a corporation, Paradise filed its opposition, arguing 
that under Florida law, when a corporation that was administratively 
dissolved is reinstated, the reinstatement is retroactive to the date of 
dissolution and the corporation operates as though the dissolution 
had not occurred.109 
The district court rejected Paradise’s argument, finding that 
standing must exist at the time the action is brought and that Florida 
law cannot retroactively create jurisdiction that did not exist when the 
action was filed.110 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, and applied the rule in Enzo APA & 
Son, Inc. v. Geapag A.G.111 that a contract could not retroactively 
confer standing on an exclusive licensee who did not have all 
substantial rights to the patent at the time that it brought suit.112  In 
applying Enzo, the Federal Circuit saw “no meaningful distinction 
between a contract provision that purports to vest title retroactively in 
the plaintiff and a state law that is alleged to vest enforceable title 
retroactively.”113 
The Federal Circuit distinguished the facts in Paradise from its 
holding in Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc.,114 where it 
had held that a defect standing was curable where an exclusive 
licensee with less than all substantial rights in the patent filed a 
                                                          
 103. Id. at 1310, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297. 
 104. Id. at 1306, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 105. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 106. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293. 
 107. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1293-94 (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 108. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 109. Id. at 1307, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 110. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294. 
 111. 134 F.3d 1090, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 112. Id. at 1093-94, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370-71. 
 113. Paradise Creations, 315 F.3d at 1310, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296. 
 114. 240 F.3d 1016, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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motion to join the patentee as a plaintiff, reasoning that as an 
exclusive licensee, Mentor, had a cognizable injury at the time of the 
inception of the suit.115  In contrast, Paradise did not have 
enforceable rights in the patent when the suit was filed, thus it lacked 
the cognizable injury necessary for Article III standing.116 
I. Claim Preclusion/Res Judicata 
In Media Technologies Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co.,117 the Federal 
Circuit overturned a summary judgment that the suit by Media 
Technologies Licensing (“Media”) for patent infringement was 
barred by claim preclusion.118 
A previous action on the same patent brought by Telepresence, an 
entity with common ownership to Media, had been dismissed with 
prejudice for lack of standing on a finding that Telepresence did not 
have sufficient ownership of the patent at the time the suit was 
filed.119  After that loss, the owner of Telepresence created the new 
entity, Media, and took steps to get all relevant patent rights into 
Media’s hands.120  He then caused Media to sue the same 
defendant.121  Based on purported privity between Media and 
Telepresence, the district court held the claim was barred by the 
previous dismissal with prejudice.122 
Applying regional law, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that 
the earlier dismissal was not an “adjudication on the merits,” a 
necessary condition to the application of claim preclusion.123 
The Federal Circuit expressly rejected the get-you-coming-and-
going reasoning of the district court.124  It pointed out that given the 
fact that the first action was dismissed due to a “deficient assignment 
between the inventor and Telepresence” it would hardly be just to 
dismiss the second action because of “a virtual representation 
relationship between Telepresence and Media.”125  According to the 
Federal Circuit, a suit by Media is not the equivalent of Telepresence 
                                                          
 115. Id. at 1018-19, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821. 
 116. Paradise Creations, 315 F.3d at 1310, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296-97. 
 117. 334 F.3d 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 118. Id. at 1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 119. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 120. Id. at 1368-69, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-76. 
 121. Id. at 1369, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 122. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 123. Id. at 1369-70, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376-77. 
 124. Id. at 1370, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 125. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
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taking “a second bite of the apple”; rather, it is a suit by “the entity 
with all the interest in the [patent in suit] that was lacking before.”126 
J. Final Judgments—Decision on Motion in Limine not Reviewable 
Indicating that it is not interested in reviewing non-final 
judgments, the Federal Circuit, in Ultra-Precision Manufacturing Ltd. v. 
Ford Motor Co.,127 dismissed an appeal of an in limine evidentiary ruling 
certified by the district court pursuant to Rule 54(b), and held that 
absent a final judgment on at least one claim, such a ruling could be 
appealed only pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).128 
The case arose out of a dispute between Ford and Ultra-Precision 
Manufacturing, from whom Ford sought technical assistance in the 
late 1980s in connection with problems associated with Ford’s air 
conditioning technology.129  Ultra-Precision alleged that its 
technicians were co-inventors of a patent for its air conditioning 
compressor, which was subsequently obtained by Ford.130 
Ultra-Precision sued for, among other things, correction of 
inventorship and unjust enrichment.131  Ford sought summary 
judgment on these claims, as well as filed two motions in limine to 
exclude evidence of damages for any uses of technology disclosed in 
Ultra-Precision’s patents that were not claimed and evidence of 
damages for any use of the patent in issue because under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 262, as a co-inventor, Ford could not be liable for damages.132  The 
district court granted both in limine motions, denied summary 
judgment, and granted Ultra-Precision’s request that the rulings be 
certified under Rule 54(b) for immediate appeal.133 
The Federal Circuit focused on the distinction between appeals 
allowed under Rule 54(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), explaining that 
Rule 54(b) permits a court to enter a final judgment as to fewer than 
all pending claims only upon the express determination that there is 
not a just reason to delay the appeal of the claim.134  On the other 
hand, under § 1292(b) an appeal may be permitted when a district 
judge issues an order that is not otherwise appealable because it is 
not finally adjudicated, but believes that the order involves a 
                                                          
 126. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 127. 338 F.3d 1353, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1790 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 128. Id. at 1359-60, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794. 
 129. Id. at 1354, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1790. 
 130. Id. at 1355, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791. 
 131. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791. 
 132. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791. 
 133. Id. at 1355-56, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1791. 
 134. Id. at 1357, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792. 
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controlling question of law where there is substantial grounds for 
differing opinions and an immediate appeal from the order may 
advance the litigation’s conclusion.135  The court may so state in 
writing and the appellate court has discretion to entertain an 
interlocutory appeal from such an order.136 
Because the district court’s ruling related only to the exclusion of 
damages evidence, there was no final disposition of a claim.137  Thus, 
the court found that certification of the appeal under Rule 54(b) was 
improper and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.138 
Similarly, in Nystrom v. TREX Co.,139 the Federal Circuit confirmed 
its long-standing position that claim construction rulings are not 
appealable as a matter of right.140 
In Nystrom, after the district court entered its ruling on claim 
construction and granted summary judgment of non-infringement, it 
entered an express final judgment of invalidity as to certain of the 
asserted patent claims.141  However, the district court stayed certain 
other counterclaims of invalidity and unenforceability.142  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit held that the pendency of these remaining patent 
claims precluded the district court from effectively certifying an 
appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b).143 
In dismissing the appeal, the Federal Circuit reiterated that the 
purpose of the “final judgment rule”144 is to prevent piecemeal 
litigation.145  The Federal Circuit restated the four possible avenues of 
appeal as a matter of right: (1) a trial on the remaining counterclaims 
or otherwise a final disposition on the merits of those counterclaims; 
(2) a dismissal of the remaining counterclaims without prejudice 
(with or without finding that they were mooted by the summary 
judgment of non-infringement); (3) “’an express determination that 
there is no just reason for delay’ and then [an express direction of] 
entry of final judgment on fewer than all of the claims under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b)”; or (4) a certification of interlocutory 
judgments and orders of the district court pursuant to § 1292(b) or 
                                                          
 135. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1792-93. 
 136. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793. 
 137. Id. at 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1793. 
 138. Id. at 1359-60, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1794. 
 139. 339 F.3d 1347, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1858 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 140. Id. at 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 141. Id. at 1349, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 142. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 143. Id. at 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 144. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). 
 145. Nystrom, 339 F.3d at 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
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(c)(1).146  Noting that a stay order is generally not a final order, the 
Federal Circuit dismissed the present appeal because the district 
court did not choose one of the above approaches.147 
In dismissing the appeal, the Federal Circuit observed that claim 
construction rulings are often “determinative of either infringement 
or invalidity, but seldom both.”148  However, such an appeal of one of 
these issues before determination of the other might serve judicial 
economy.149  As the court noted, lower courts are obliged to follow the 
“final judgment rule” until the rule is changed.150 
K. Motion for JMOL Must Be Specific to Preserve Issue for Appeal 
In Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc.,151 the Federal Circuit applied 
its own “nascent” law, and took a more exacting view than the 
regional circuits might have done, ruling that a motion for judgment 
as a matter of law (“JMOL” or formerly called “directed verdict”) at 
the close of evidence on the issue of inequitable conduct was not 
sufficient to preserve the right to seek review of the jury’s verdict that 
the art purportedly withheld from the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) rendered the patented invention 
obvious.152 
Duro-Last sued Custom Seal for infringement of its patent of 
roofing products used to cover roof protrusions such as vent pipes 
and air conditioning units.153  At the close of evidence, Duro-Last 
moved for JMOL under Rule 50 on Custom Seal’s defense of 
inequitable conduct.154  When the jury later returned a verdict of 
invalidity under § 103,155 apparently on the basis that the art 
purportedly withheld from the PTO rendered the patent invalid for 
obviousness, Duro-Last sought JMOL that the patent was not 
obvious.156 
                                                          
 146. Id. at 1350-51, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860-61. 
 147. Id. at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 148. Id. at 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 149. See id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860 (stating “because claim construction is 
subject to de novo review as a matter of law, immediate appeal of an interlocutory 
claim construction ruling without resolution of all of the factual issues of 
infringement of validity dependent thereon is often desired by one or both of the 
parties for strategic or other reasons”). 
 150. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 151. 321 F.3d 1098, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1025 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 152. Id. at 1106, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 153. Id. at 1102-03, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1026. 
 154. Id. at 1104, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28. 
 155. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter, 33 U.S.C. § 103. 
 156. Duro-Last, Inc., 321 F.3d at 1104-05, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028. 
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To win review of the factual basis of the jury’s verdict by the district 
court, Duro-Last argued that its JMOL motion on inequitable 
conduct had implicitly put in issue the question of obviousness.157  
According to Duro-Last, the question of whether the reference it was 
accused of concealing was material necessarily raised the underlying 
question of obviousness.158 
While acknowledging that Duro-Last’s analysis might have 
prevailed under the law of some of the regional circuits, the Federal 
Circuit held that the sufficiency of a JMOL motion at the close of 
evidence to preserve the right to seek post-verdict JMOL on 
obviousness was a matter of Federal Circuit law; and, under that body 
of law, Duro-Last’s post-evidence motion was insufficient.159  The 
court specifically held that “the various unenforceability and 
invalidity defenses that may be raised by a defendant—inequitable 
conduct, the several forms of anticipation and loss of right under 
§ 102, and obviousness under § 103—require different elements of 
proof.”160  Each must be raised specifically in a post-evidence JMOL if 
it is to be preserved.161 
L. Decision on JMOL Cannot Involve Post-Jury Instruction Claim 
Construction/Doctrine of Equivalent Proofs 
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Systems, Inc.,162 the Federal Circuit 
held that it was improper for the district court to modify its claim 
construction after the instruction of the jury as to the meaning of 
claim terms.163  The Federal Circuit refused to remand for a new trial 
on the doctrine of equivalents issues because the patentee had made 
no record to establish equivalency.164  On a validity related issue, the 
court also held that an in-court demonstration of a prior art device 
was sufficient corroboration of oral evidence to support a finding of 
invalidity.165 
The two patents in suit involved optical scanner technology, in 
which images and text from a document are converted into 
electronic data.166  The jury was instructed that a claimed “scan speed 
                                                          
 157. Id. at 1107, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 158. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029. 
 159. Id. at 1106-07, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029-30. 
 160. Id. at 1107-08, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 161. Id. at 1108, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1030. 
 162. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys. Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1825 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 163. Id. at 1321, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829-30. 
 164. Id. at 1322-23, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830-31. 
 165. Id. at 1325-26, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832-33. 
 166. Id. at 1317, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1826. 
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indicating means” required a user selectable scan speed device.167  
Neither party objected to the instruction.168  At trial, the jury found 
that Mustek literally infringed.169  The jury did not address 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.170 
In a JMOL motion, Mustek challenged the finding of infringement 
urging that the claims require the user to select a specific scanning 
speed and the accused scanners, while permitting the user to select 
scan resolution, do not permit the user to select scanning speed.171  In 
denying Mustek’s motion, the district court elaborated on the claim 
construction provided to the jury and found, based on a more 
general definition, that the element was present, at least under the 
doctrine of equivalents.172  Mustek appealed.173 
Hewlett-Packard (“H-P”) argued that under the claim construction 
used by the district court in its decision on Mustek’s JMOL motion, 
infringement was present.174  The Federal Circuit held that H-P could 
not challenge in post-trial motions the claim construction with which 
the jury was instructed: “[w]hen issues of claim construction have not 
been properly raised in connection with the jury instructions, it is 
improper for the district court to adopt a new or more detailed claim 
construction in connection with the JMOL motion.”175  The court 
further found that using the claim construction with which the jury 
was instructed, the jury’s verdict of literal infringement was not 
supported by substantial evidence.176  Citing Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Space System/Loral, Inc.,177 the court noted that “[l]iteral infringement 
of a § 112, ¶ 6 claim requires that the relevant structure in the 
accused device perform the identical function recited in the claim 
and be identical or equivalent to the corresponding structure in the 
specification.”178  The court held that “it was improper for the district 
court to expand [H-P’s] opposition to Mustek’s motion for JMOL of 
                                                          
 167. Id. at 1319, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828. 
 168. Id. at 1320, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828. 
 169. Id. at 1318, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 170. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 171. Id. at 1320, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830. 
 172. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829 (defining the issue as whether evidence 
showed that the selection of scan speed and the selection of resolution were 
identical). 
 173. Id. at 1318, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1827. 
 174. Id. at 1321, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829-30. 
 175. Id. at 1320, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
 176. Id. at 1321, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1829. 
 177. 324 F.3d 1308, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 178. Hewlett-Packard Co., 340 F.3d at 1321, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830 (quoting 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 324 F.3d at 1320, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679). 
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noninfringement to grant JMOL of infringement under the doctrine 
of equivalents in favor of [H-P].”179 
The Federal Circuit also found that a new trial was not appropriate 
because H-P “did not make a sufficient record with respect to the 
equivalents claim,” which would require “particularized testimony 
and linking argument . . . on a limitation-by-limitation basis.”180 
As to validity, the jury found that Mustek proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that certain patent claims were invalid based in 
part on testimony of prior public use, corroborated with a re-
enactment of such use through an in-court demonstration using a 
prior art device.181  H-P argued that the evidence did not support the 
finding of obviousness, challenging the use of “uncorroborated” 
testimony regarding the use of the Mustek scanner.182  The Federal 
Circuit concluded that the testimonial evidence was sufficiently 
corroborated by the operation of the device itself, which was “made 
contemporaneously with the alleged prior invention.”183 
II. PATENTABILITY ISSUES 
A. Anticipation by Inherency Does Not Require Recognition of Results 
In Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,184  a case of first 
impression,185 the Federal Circuit affirmed a lower court’s finding of 
anticipation of a drug metabolite where the prior art patent disclosed 
only the drug.186  Finding that an enabling disclosure for use of the 
drug anticipated its metabolic product produced in the human 
body,187 the Schering decision invalidated a patent for the first time 
where inherency supplied the entire anticipatory subject matter.188 
Claritin® is a non-drowsy antihistamine formulation marketed by 
Schering Corp. (“Schering”).189  Its active component, loratadine, was 
covered to Schering by U.S. Pat. No. 4,282,233 (“the ‘233 patent”) 
which is now expired.190  Ingestion of loratadine results in the 
                                                          
 179. Id. at 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830. 
 180. Id. at 1322-23, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830-31. 
 181. Id. at 1325-26, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833. 
 182. Id. at 1326, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833. 
 183. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833. 
 184. 339 F.3d 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 185. Id. at 1378, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668. 
 186. Id. at 1374, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 187. Id. at 1381-82, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670-71. 
 188. Id. at 1378-79, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668-69. 
 189. Id. at 1375, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 190. Id. at 1374-75, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
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breakdown product descarboethoxyloratadine (“DCL”).191  Schering’s 
subsequent patent, U.S. Pat. No. 4,659,716 (“the ‘716 patent”), covers 
the loratadine metabolite DCL.192  The ‘233 patent is prior art to the 
‘716 patent, but does not expressly disclose DCL or refer to 
metabolites of loratadine.193 
Schering sued generic drug makers of loratadine for infringing the 
‘716 patent.194  The district court construed the claims to cover all 
forms of DCL, including forms “metabolized within the human body” 
and granted summary judgment of invalidity because DCL was 
formed as a metabolite through the process disclosed in Schering’s 
‘233 patent.195 
The Federal Circuit strongly rejected the patentee’s contention 
that recognition of an inherent disclosure before the critical date of 
the ‘716 patent was a requirement for anticipation.196  Precedent 
required only the missing feature to be necessarily present in the 
single prior art reference for anticipation.197  Later recognition that 
loratadine was metabolized into DCL did not preclude the inherent 
characteristics in Schering’s ‘233 patent that DCL would be formed 
following ingestion of loratadine.198 
The issue before the court was whether anticipation could be 
found where all of the claimed subject matter was present only by 
inherency in the prior art.199  Mindful that its prior cases involved 
inherent disclosure of only some of the claimed features, the court 
concluded that the extent of the inherent disclosure does not limit its 
anticipatory effect.200  Inherency places subject matter in the public 
domain to the same extent as does an express disclosure and applies 
equally to entire inventions as well as to single limitations.201  
Affirming summary judgment of invalidity, the court held that the 
‘233 patent was anticipatory prior art because it discloses how to 
make DCL by disclosing administration of loratadine to patients, and 
                                                          
 191. Id. at 1375, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665. 
 192. Id. at 1374-75, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665-66. 
 193. Id. at 1376, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666. 
 194. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666. 
 195. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666-67 (quoting Schering Corp. v. Geneva 
Pharm., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1032, 1039 (D. N.J. 
2002)). 
 196. Id. at 1377, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667. 
 197. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (citing In re Cruciferous Sprouts Litig., 301 
F.3d 1343, 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1202, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 198. Id. at 1381, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 199. Id. at 1379, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669. 
 200. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669. 
 201. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1669. 
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substantial evidence showed DCL was necessarily formed upon 
digestion.202 
The court stressed that while the claims in issue were anticipated 
for encompassing all forms of DCL, the holding did not preclude 
patentability of drug metabolites in general.203 
B. Anticipation—The Relationship Between Enablement and Inherency 
In a case involving a patent for transgenic rodents, the Federal 
Circuit reversed and remanded the grant of summary judgment of 
anticipation by inherency where the patent was found to be 
anticipated by a reference that prophetically contemplated the 
claimed rodents.204  The Federal Circuit held that invalidity based on 
anticipation requires that the reference must enable the subject 
matter of the claims at issue without undue experimentation.205 
The district court granted the Mayo Foundation’s motion for 
summary judgment of patent invalidity on the grounds that Elan’s 
two patents in suit, both entitled “Transgenic Animals Harboring APP 
Allele Having Swedish Mutation” (collectively “the Elan patents”), 
were invalid as anticipated by a prior art patent to Mullan entitled 
“Nucleic Acids for Diagnosing and Modeling Alzheimer’s Disease” 
(“the Mullan reference”) under the principles of inherency.206 
Alzheimer’s disease is associated with abnormally high amounts of 
beta-amyloid peptide in the brain.207  This peptide is formed by 
cleavage of amyloid precursor protein (“APP”) by two enzymes 
resulting in ATF-beta-APP and beta-amyloid peptide.208  It is unknown 
why certain individuals are prone to increased beta-amyloid peptide 
deposition.209  However, Mullan showed that individuals expressing a 
mutant form of APP, the “Swedish mutation,” have a substantially 
increased likelihood of developing the disease.210 
The Mullan reference not only discloses the Swedish mutation, but 
it also contemplates creating a transgenic mouse for expressing an 
                                                          
 202. Id. at 1381-82, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671. 
 203. Id. at 1381, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670. 
 204. Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found., 346 F.3d 1051, 1057, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 205. Id. at 1054, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 206. Id. at 1052, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374 (citing Elan Pharm. Inc. v. Mayo 
Found., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214-15 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 207. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374. 
 208. Id. at 1053, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374-75. 
 209. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (noting, however, that “[h]umans who do 
not develop Alzheimer’s disease are believed to break down the APP in a manner 
that does not form significant amounts of betaAP in the brain.”). 
 210. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
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APP containing it.211  To this end, Mullan provided a survey of a range 
of protocols for the genetic manipulation of rodents.212  However, no 
guidance was given as to which method would best succeed.213  The 
inventors of the Elan patents ultimately used one of the cited 
protocols to create a rodent as contemplated by the Mullan 
reference.214 
The claims at issue related to transgenic rodents comprising a 
transgene encoding an APP having the Swedish mutation.215  In order 
to distinguish the claimed subject matter from the Mullan prior art, 
the inventors amended the claims during prosecution to include the 
recitation that the mutant APP is processed to ATF-beta-APP in a 
sufficient amount to be detectable in the rodent’s brain.216 
In support of its summary judgment motion, Mayo argued, and the 
district court agreed, that the claims were invalid because the Mullan 
reference inherently taught the claimed subject matter.217  On appeal, 
the Federal Circuit noted that, in the course of the summary 
judgment proceeding, the factual basis of Elan’s argument related to 
whether Mullan’s disclosure was enabling.218  Thus, the Federal 
Circuit held that enablement, not inherency, was at issue.219  Citing In 
re Donohue,220 the Federal Circuit held that to be anticipating, the 
disclosure of a reference must be adequate to enable the possession 
of the claimed subject matter.221  It is insufficient for the reference to 
simply name or describe the claimed subject matter, if, based on the 
reference disclosure, it cannot be produced without undue 
experimentation.222 
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a 
factual determination of anticipation based on enablement, taking 
into account whether the uncertainty and difficulty of producing a 
transgenic animal constitutes undue experimentation when 
presented in the context of a compilation of known methods of gene 
                                                          
 211. Id. at 1055-56, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 212. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 213. Id. at 1056, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 214. Id. at 1053, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375 (noting that the Elan patents were 
“directed to transgenic rodents whose genetic makeup has been modified to include 
the Swedish mutation.”). 
 215. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 216. Id. at 1054, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 217. Id. at 1056-57, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377 (Elan Pharm. Inc. v. Mayo 
Found., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214-15 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). 
 218. Id. at 1054, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375-76. 
 219. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1375. 
 220. In re Donohue, 766 F.2d 531, 226 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 619 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 221. Elan Pharm., Inc., 346 F.3d at 1055, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
 222. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376. 
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transfer.223  For guidance in making such a determination, the court 
cited Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc.224 for the proposition that 
enablement is determined by whether undue experimentation would 
have been required to make and use the claimed invention at the 
time of filing the claimed subject matter.225  Accordingly, the issue on 
remand was whether the Mullan reference would have enabled a 
person of ordinary skill, at the time of filing the applications for the 
Elan patents, to practice the Elan patent claims without undue 
experimentation.226 
This case is indicative of the tug-of-war in biotechnology between 
providing protection for disclosed prophetic ideas and rewarding 
those who later actually reduce those ideas to practice.227  Because of 
the incremental and sometimes unpredictable nature of the 
technology, subject matter that might appear to be obvious on its face 
may have proven difficult to implement based on prior art disclosures 
alone and is, therefore, rendered patentable as the prior art did not 
enable what is later claimed.228  Thus, it seems inevitable that the 
protracted “battle of the experts,” to determine what constitutes 
undue experimentation at a given point in time, will continue.229 
C. Section 102(b) on Sale Bar 
In Minton v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc.,230 the Federal 
Circuit upheld a summary judgment that Minton’s patent for a 
computerized securities trading method was invalid because the 
invention was “on sale” more than a year before patent filing.231  
Before the critical date of his patent application, Minton leased a 
computer program that performed the patented process.232  Minton 
argued, based on the In re Kollar233 decision, that the lease was not a 
“sale” for patent law purposes.234  The court distinguished In re Kollar, 
                                                          
 223. Id. at 1057, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378. 
 224. 188 F.3d 1362, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 225. Elan Pharm., Inc., 346 F.3d at 1056-57, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377. 
 226. Id. at 1057, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377-78. 
 227. See KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 171 
(1995) (stating that regarding biological inventions, it is widely recognized that 
enabling anyone to make living organisms through written descriptions is difficult).   
 228. See id. at 172 (adding that with genetic engineering techniques allowing 
skilled artisans to create and reproduce new life forms, courts have been forced to 
alter their principle that such enablement was often not possible). 
 229. See id. at 181-82 (discussing several irreconcilable decisions in cases where 
courts have had to determine undue experimentation standards). 
 230. 336 F.3d 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 231. Id. at 1374, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615. 
 232. Id. at 1375, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1616. 
 233. 286 F.3d 1326, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 234. Minton, 336 F.3d at 1376, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617. 
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where the patent owner transferred technical information and, under 
a know-how agreement, licensed a process that required more 
development before commercialization.235  The court also 
distinguished the license of a potential patent right, which is not a 
sale under § 102(b), from a license or a lease of a product or device, 
which may be a sale under § 102(b).236 
Judge Gajarsa’s concurrence questioned the meaning of In re Kollar 
and said that if a process is ready for patenting under Pfaff v. Wells 
Electronics, Inc.,237 the transfer of the right to perform the process is a 
sale.238 
In another 102(b) case, the Federal Circuit ruled in Lacks 
Industries, Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc.239 that a 
determination of whether a patent barring offer for sale has been 
made must be based on contract law principles, but also must be 
predicated on standard practices within the applicable industry.240 
In that case, Lacks Industries accused McKechnie of infringement 
of claims directed to automobile wheel chrome-plated cladding.241  
The district court adopted a special master’s finding that the claims 
were invalid due to an offer for sale, which triggered an on sale bar.242  
The district court also granted summary judgment of invalidity of 
other claims based on the publication of a foreign counterpart of a 
related U.S. patent having common inventorship with the patent in 
suit.243  The Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment 
based on § 102(b) but remanded the on sale issue for determination 
of industry practices.244 
More than one year before its patent filing date, Lacks Industries 
engaged in sales promotion activities, none of which evidenced an 
offer to sell a particular article for a particular price.245  The special 
master, quoting RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp.,246 decided this activity 
constituted an offer for sale.247  The Federal Circuit noted that the 
incorrect legal standard was used because RCA Corp. was decided 
                                                          
 235. Id. at 1377-78, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. 
 236. Id. at 1378, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618. 
 237. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998). 
 238. Minton, 336 F.3d at 1382, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring). 
 239. 322 F.3d 1335, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1083 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 240. Id. at 1348, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093. 
 241. Id. at 1339, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1085. 
 242. Id. at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087. 
 243. Id. at 1340, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086. 
 244. Id. at 1351, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095. 
 245. Id. at 1348, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 246. 887 F.2d 1056, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 247. Lacks Indus., Inc., 322 F.3d at 1341, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087. 
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before the “totality of the circumstances test” was replaced in 1998 by 
the two-prong test of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.248 that looked to a 
“commercial offer for sale” coupled with an invention ready for 
patenting.249  While Pfaff did not provide guidance on the meaning of 
a “commercial offer for sale,” the court noted that the legal standard 
was clarified by the Federal Circuit in Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark 
Cards, Inc.,250 to require a communication, “which the other party 
could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance (assuming 
consideration).”251  In Group One, Ltd., the Federal Circuit also held 
that Federal Circuit law, and not state contract law, would control 
such a determination and that the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) would be used for guidance.252  In Lacks Industries, Inc., the 
court remanded the on-sale issue for reconsideration based on the 
standard articulated in Group One, Ltd., whether there had been a 
“formal offer under contract law principles.”253  The panel majority 
further suggested that evidence of the practice in the pertinent 
industry be considered to determine whether the commercial activity 
in question was an offer.254 
Judge Newman’s partial dissent noted that the opinion in Group 
One, Ltd. recognized the need for nationwide uniformity when 
analyzing on sale bar activities.255  Judge Newman criticized the 
majority opinion as working against uniformity by allowing the 
analysis to depend on the practices of a particular industry.256  Thus, 
in Judge Newman’s view, the majority opinion reverted in the 
direction of the imprecise “totality of the circumstances” standard 
rejected in Pfaff.257 
D. Section 102(e) Prior Art Cannot Be Work of Named Inventor(s) 
In Riverwood International Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co.,258 the Federal 
Circuit held that listing an earlier-issued patent in an Information 
                                                          
 248. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998). 
 249. Lacks Indus., Inc., 322 F.3d at 1347, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. 
 250. 254 F.3d 1041, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 251. Lacks Indus., Inc., 322 F.3d at 1347, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092 (quoting 
Group One, Ltd., 254 F.3d at 1048, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126). 
 252. Group One, Ltd., 254 F.3d at 1047, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126. 
 253. Lacks Indus., Inc., 322 F.3d at 1348, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092-93. 
 254. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093. 
 255. Id. at 1352, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095 (Newman, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 256. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095 (Newman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 257. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1095 (Newman, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 258. 324 F.3d 1346, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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Disclosure Statement (“IDS”) does not automatically result in finding 
that such earlier-issued patent is § 102(e) prior art to the later 
application.259  Where there is at least one inventor common to both 
the earlier-issued patent and the later application, one can avoid a 
determination of “prior art by admission” by showing that the 
inventor submitting the later application also invented the relevant 
portion of the subject matter disclosed in the earlier-issued patent.260 
In this case, Riverwood sued Jones for infringing the ‘806 patent 
and two later patents, all directed to methods and machines for use 
in the packaging industry.261  All three patents shared one common 
inventor, but did not have completely overlapping inventive 
entities.262  During prosecution of the application for the two later 
patents, the inventors identified the ‘806 patent as prior art in an 
IDS.263  The district court deemed this an “admission” and so 
instructed the jury, which found the two later patents invalid as 
obvious in light of the ‘806 patent.264 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that although a reference may 
constitute prior art based on admissions in an IDS, such is not the 
case when the reference is the inventor’s own work.265  If the relevant 
portion of the ‘806 patent was invented by the same inventive entity 
responsible for the allegedly obvious matter in the later patents, 
inclusion of the ‘806 patent in the IDS would not be an admission of 
prior art status.266  The Federal Circuit remanded the case for a 
determination of whether both the portion of the ‘806 patent relied 
on as prior art and the subject matter of the claims at issue were the 
work of a common inventive entity.267 
E. Section 103 Obviousness 
1. Prima facie obvious—claimed range is within prior art 
In In re Peterson,268 the Federal Circuit held that a prior reference 
that discloses a broad range, which encompasses the narrower 
claimed range, is sufficient to establish prima facie obviousness.269 
                                                          
 259. Id. at 1355-56, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 260. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 261. Id. at 1349, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333. 
 262. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333. 
 263. Id. at 1350-51, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1334. 
 264. Id. at 1351, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1335. 
 265. Id. at 1354-55, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337-38. 
 266. Id. at 1355, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338. 
 267. Id. at 1359, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340-41. 
 268. 315 F.3d 1325, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 269. Id. at 1332, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384. 
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Peterson’s application included the claims directed to a nickel-base 
alloy.270  The claims required about one to three percent rhenium, 
about fourteen percent chromium, and other specified ranges of 
specific elements.271  The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of 
the claims as obvious in view of a prior art reference that disclosed a 
similar alloy but taught broader ranges.272  The prior art disclosed a 
preferred alloy containing no rhenium, as opposed to a range of 
small amounts of rhenium in the Peterson alloy.273 
On appeal, Peterson argued that the prior art taught broad ranges 
and that the Board failed to appreciate the criticality of, and the 
unexpected results achieved by, the combination of the claimed 
range of rhenium with the claimed amount of chromium.274 
In affirming the Board’s decision, the Federal Circuit made a 
direct comparison of each component of Peterson’s claim and the 
prior art disclosure, showing that each claimed range lay within a 
corresponding range disclosed in the prior art.275  The court cited a 
consistent line of decisions holding that cases involving overlapping 
ranges, even a slight overlap establishes a prima facie case of 
obviousness.276  The court reasoned that “[s]electing a narrow range 
from within a somewhat broader range disclosed in a prior art 
reference is no less obvious than identifying a range that simply 
overlaps a disclosed range.”277  When prior art completely encompasses 
the claimed ranges, as was the case here, the conclusion is even 
stronger that there is a prima facie case of obviousness.278 
The court also addressed the issue of motivation to select the 
claimed ranges by noting that “[t]he normal desire of scientists or 
artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides 
the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage 
ranges is the optimum combination of percentages.”279 
2. Prima facie obvious and the substantial evidence standard 
In the context of an interference between a patent and an allowed 
patent application, both directed toward the production of human 
fibrinogen protein in non-human milk, the Federal Circuit in 
                                                          
 270. Id. at 1327, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. 
 271. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. 
 272. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380-81. 
 273. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380-81. 
 274. Id. at 1328, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381. 
 275. Id. at 1329, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 276. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 277. Id. at 1329-30, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
 278. Id. at 1330, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382-83. 
 279. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382. 
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Velander v. Garner280 affirmed the decision of the Board that the claims 
were obvious, as being supported by “substantial evidence.”281  Even 
though a determination of obviousness is a question of law to be 
decided de novo, the Federal Circuit deferred to the underlying 
factual determinations made by the Board regarding reasonable 
expectation of success in support of its obviousness determination.282   
Fibrinogen is synthesized by the liver and utilized in the blood to 
form a clot.283  The production and isolation of recombinant 
fibrinogen provides a potentially unlimited source where a deficiency 
exists.284  The count in interference related to mammals capable of 
producing “recoverable amounts” of biocompetent human 
fibrinogen protein in the milk of transgenic non-human mammals 
carrying heterologous DNA segments encoding each of fibrinogen’s 
Aα, Bβ and Gγ chains and methods of making biocompetent 
fibrinogen therefrom.285 
Garner moved for a finding that Velander’s claims were obvious 
over a reference disclosing the commercial desirability of producing 
human serum proteins in non-human milk (published as the 
“Hennighausen Review”) in view of a reference disclosing methods 
for the production of heterologous protein in the milk of transgenic 
mammals (published as the “Meade patent”).286  Velander admitted 
that the combination of prior art references contained all the 
limitations in its claims and one of skill in the art would be motivated 
to combine them.287  Thus, the only issue for the Board to decide was 
whether one of ordinary skill in the art would glean from the prior 
art a reasonable expectation of success to make and use the claimed 
mammal.288 
The Board heard from a number of Velander’s expert witnesses 
who generally opined that a skilled artisan would not have been 
reasonably expected to succeed.289  However, the Board discounted 
those expert opinions because they were not corroborated by any 
published references.290  The Board also discounted other opinions 
                                                          
 280. Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 281. Id. at 1361, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 282. Id. at 1374, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 283. Id. at 1361, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 284. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770. 
 285. Id. at 1362, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770-71. 
 286. Id. at 1364, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772. 
 287. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 288. Id. at 1365, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 289. Id. at 1366, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 290. Id. at 1366-68, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774-75. 
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specifically relating to issues of heterologous protein and hormone 
purification from, and expression in, milk, as not sufficiently calling 
into question whether the claimed “recoverable amounts” of 
fibrinogen could be expressed.291  The Board noted that “absolute 
predictability is not a requirement for obviousness.”292 
On appeal the Federal Circuit dismissed Velander’s argument that 
the Board had erred by placing the burden on Velander to prove an 
expectation of failure beyond Garner’s alleged expectation of 
success.293  The court determined that the Board was aware of the 
proper legal standard, but was simply not swayed by Velander’s 
arguments.294  The court noted that the arguments were either 
uncorroborated opinions or failed to consider problems relevant to 
the invention as claimed.295  Rather, the court found that in 
discounting Velander’s experts, the Board acted as a proper trier of 
fact, determining the weight and credibility to be given to 
uncorroborated, conclusory statements.296  The court indicated that 
under the “substantial evidence” standard, it would not reverse the 
Board in situations where the evidence supports several reasonable, 
but contradictory, conclusions.297 
In support of its conclusion, the court considered Garner’s citation 
of several new references not relied on by the Board that went to the 
issue of whether several proteins with similar structural characteristics 
had successfully been produced in transgenic milk systems.298  The 
court relied, at least in part, on these new references in refusing to 
second guess the Board’s assessment of the evidence.299 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gajarsa argued that the court’s 
review of substantial evidence should be limited to the record relied 
on by the Board.300  Judge Gajarsa asserted that the Board had not 
taken into account the new references relied on by Garner in the 
appeal and that without these references, the Board’s opinion was 
not supported by substantial evidence; the Board’s opinion made 
unwarranted assumptions with regard to differences between the 
prior art and the claims at issue as seen by a person of skill in the 
                                                          
 291. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774-75. 
 292. Id. at 1368, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 293. Id. at 1370, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777. 
 294. Id. at 1370-71, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-78. 
 295. Id. at 1370, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777. 
 296. Id. at 1371, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778. 
 297. Id. at 1374, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780. 
 298. Id. at 1378-79, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1783-84. 
 299. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1784. 
 300. Id. at 1380, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
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art.301  By considering such evidence, Judge Gajarsa asserted that the 
Federal Circuit was simply substituting the grounds for administrative 
action as those the court would consider to have a more adequate 
and proper basis.302 
3. Suggestion or motivation to combine—substantial evidence standard 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision by the Board rejecting 
the appellants’ application for “Mutated Recombinant Collagens” as 
obvious in In re Berg.303  The court applied the substantial evidence 
standard with some care and gave a high degree of deference in this 
complicated art to the “persons of scientific competence” at the 
PTO.304 
Collagen is a natural protein found in humans that can be 
produced as a recombinant protein.305  In order to synthesize 
collagen, one typically starts with the precursor known as 
procollagen.306  Procollagen consists of collagen with additional 
peptide extensions at either end of the collagen chain, the N-
terminus or the C-terminus.307  The extensions are then removed by 
enzymes that cleave, or cut off, the extensions at specific sites to 
produce collagen that can successfully be used in humans.308  Berg 
claimed a procollagen chain, which included a non-natural cut-off 
site between the collagen chain and the natural C-terminal extension, 
allowing the extension to be removed by using a specific enzyme that 
reacts with the non-natural site, leaving just the collagen.309 
The issue was how broadly the teachings of a prior art suggestion to 
combine would be read.310  The examiner and the Board viewed the 
prior art reference broadly, as disclosing that two proteins can be 
fused together for a variety of reasons, and once those proteins are 
expressed they can be chemically or enzymatically separated at 
                                                          
 301. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting). 
 302. See id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (quoting SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)) (“If those grounds [relied on by the 
agency in reviewing an administrative decision] are inadequate or improper, the 
court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers 
to be a more adequate or proper basis”). 
 303. 320 F.3d 1310, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2003 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 304. Id. at 1315, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2007. 
 305. Id. at 1312, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 306. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 307. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 308. Id. at 1312, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 309. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004. 
 310. Id. at 1314, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006. 
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specific sites on the protein chain.311  Berg predictably urged a 
narrower reading.312 
The Federal Circuit gave considerable deference to the examiner 
and the Board, parroting the Board that it would have been 
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to create a 
recombinant DNA system for the production of procollagen in 
which the recombinant procollagen chain consisted of a natural 
collagen polypeptide and a first natural propeptide, with a first 
non-natural site-specific proteolytic agent recognition site located 
between them.313 
4. Motivation may be found in general knowledge of one of                
ordinary skill in the art 
In an appeal from a PTO obviousness rejection, the Federal 
Circuit, in In re Huston,314 affirmed the Board’s rejection finding that a 
claimed invention of displaying position specific advertising to a 
golfer on a golf course to be obvious, based in part on the known 
benefit of global positioning satellite (“GPS”) technology.315 
Huston filed a continuation-in-part application claiming the use of 
a GPS to display advertising messages to a golfer on a golf course.316  
The Board affirmed an obviousness rejection based on a GPS 
reference combined with a prior art, location-specific, golf course 
information reference.317  The Board found that it would have been 
obvious to use GPS or “differential GPS” for the purpose of sending 
location-specific advertising to a golfer on the golf course despite the 
applicant’s challenge that there was no motivation to combine the 
prior art references.318 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Board that motivation to 
combine was found, in part, in the knowledge generally available to 
one of ordinary skill in the art, i.e., the known improvement in 
location accuracy of GPS over fixed position radio locationing.319  
Additional motivation was found in the prior art’s teaching of the 
benefit, such as greater accuracy, of “differential GPS” over GPS.320 
                                                          
 311. Id. at 1314-15, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006-07. 
 312. Id. at 1314, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006. 
 313. Id. at 1313, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005. 
 314. 308 F.3d 1267, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 315. Id. at 1279, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809. 
 316. Id. at 1270, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802. 
 317. Id. at 1274, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805. 
 318. Id. at 1273-74, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804-05. 
 319. Id. at 1281, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 320. Id. at 1282, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811. 
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5. Process not obvious from product 
In TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharmaceutical, Inc.,321 the Federal 
Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s summary 
judgment of obviousness, holding that a process claim is not 
rendered obvious by the lack of novelty of its products, even where 
the patentee argued during prosecution that the product’s novelty 
justified the non-obviousness of the process.322 
The patent in suit was directed to a process for producing 
“improved” Form 1 Ranitidine, which is used to treat ulcers.323  The 
improved Form 1 Ranitidine is denser than prior preparations with 
desirable filtration and drying characteristics.324  The patent claims 
required that the process involve a three- or four-carbon alcohol 
solvent and that it yield Form 1 Ranitidine in an improved form with 
specific density characteristics.325 
During prosecution, the patentee added the density characteristics 
to overcome obviousness rejections over the patents disclosing Form 
1 Ranitidine preparations.326  The patentee also argued that the 
improved Form 1 was novel.327  TorPharm owned a separate product 
patent for the improved product.328  Following the prosecution of the 
process patent, TorPharm’s product patent was found invalid for 
prior sale by a company unrelated to TorPharm.329  There was no 
evidence that the process of the patent was used to produce the 
invalidating material.330 
When TorPharm sued Ranbaxy for infringement, Ranbaxy filed a 
motion for summary judgment arguing that TorPharm should be 
precluded from claiming non-obviousness because it acquiesced to 
the examiner’s obviousness rejection during prosecution by changing 
the claims to specify improved Form 1 that TorPharm claimed was 
novel.331  The district court granted Ranbaxy’s motion, stating that the 
claims of the patent would not have been granted but for the novelty 
of the product.332 
                                                          
 321. 336 F.3d 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1511 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 322. Id. at 1324, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 323. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 324. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 325. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512. 
 326. Id. at 1325, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512-13. 
 327. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
 328. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
 329. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
 330. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
 331. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513. 
 332. Id. at 1326, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1513-14. 
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In reversing, the Federal Circuit held that while a process for a 
novel product is itself novel, the contrapositive is not necessarily true, 
because even if a product is not novel that does not mean that the 
process that produced it is not novel.333 
As for the assertion that the process patent would not have been 
issued but for the novelty of the product, the court refused to 
speculate as to what an examiner would have done in light of the new 
information.334 
As to acquiescence, the court noted that whether a patentee chose 
to dispute the examiner’s view of matters is relevant to claim 
interpretation, not future litigation.335  While a patentee’s 
acquiescence to an examiner’s narrow view of a claim’s meaning 
narrows that meaning, a patentee’s decision to forgo a particular 
validity argument during prosecution does not preclude use of that 
argument in later litigation.336 
6. Secondary consideration of success discounted in the face of “massive 
marketing” 
In McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co.337 the Federal Circuit discounted 
alleged secondary considerations of non-obviousness338  and affirmed 
a district court’s holding that subsequent patent claims aimed at 
extending the period of exclusivity for a best selling, brand name 
drug are obvious over prior art, but reversed the lower court’s finding 
that the accused infringer was entitled to an award of attorney’s 
fees.339 
Faced with the expiration of its patent covering the best-selling 
antidiarrheal drug Imodium® A-D, McNeil filed two sets of patent 
applications aimed at extending its market leader position.340  The 
first set of patents, the “Garwin patents,” were subsequently issued 
with composition and method claims directed to an allegedly 
synergistic combination of the original Imodium® A-D’s active 
ingredient, antidiarrheal loperamide, with a second active ingredient, 
simethicone.341  A second set of patents, “the Stevens patents,” were 
issued covering methods and tablets having a polymeric barrier 
between the two active ingredients, based on the discovery that a 
                                                          
 333. Id. at 1327, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514. 
 334. Id. at 1329-30, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516. 
 335. Id. at 1330, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 336. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1517. 
 337. 337 F.3d 1362, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1649 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 338. Id. at 1370, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 339. Id. at 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 340. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 341. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
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decrease in biavailability results if simethicone directly contacts 
loperamide.342 
McNeil sued the generic drug maker, Perrigo, for infringement of 
the Garwin and Stevens patents.343  The district court held that the 
patents in suit were invalid as obvious344 and awarded Perrigo 
attorney’s fees, finding exceptional conduct based on “McNeil’s 
repeated erroneous representations, failure to disclose relevant prior 
art, and overall persistence in prosecuting exceedingly obvious 
‘inventions.’”345 
The Federal Circuit agreed that patent claims directed to 
combinations of loperamide and simethicone were rendered obvious 
by the prior art, which disclosed the use of various antidiarrheal 
compounds and simethicone.346  The court discounted the alleged 
secondary indicia of non-obviousness, indicating that massive 
marketing and advertising obscured evidence of commercial success, 
while finding evidence of unexpected results statistically insignificant 
and inconsistent.347 
The patents directed to a polymeric barrier to separate the two 
active ingredients were also held invalid as obvious.348  Here, the 
Federal Circuit pointed to the Garwin patents, which disclosed the 
separation of loperamide and simethicone into different layers of a 
tablet, viewed in light of a prior patent disclosing separation of 
simethicone from other ingredients in combination products 
through use of a polymeric barrier.349  The Federal Circuit discounted 
McNeil’s contention that the prior art patents did not identify the 
problem of loperamide’s short shelf life in combination tablets with 
simethicone, and found sufficient motivation to combine in the 
teaching of an impermeable barrier to prevent simethicone 
migration to an adjacent pharmaceutical-containing layer.350 
However, the Federal Circuit reversed the award of attorney fees, 
noting that short of inequitable conduct or litigation misconduct, 
McNeil was entitled to file patent applications on what it considered 
                                                          
 342. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650. 
 343. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651. 
 344. Id. at 1365-67, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652. 
 345. Id. at 1367, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652 (quoting McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. 
Perrigo Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 356, 374, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1493 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 346. Id. at 1369-70, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 347. Id. at 1370, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654. 
 348. Id. at 1370-71, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55. 
 349. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55. 
 350. Id. at 1370-71, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654-55. 
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patentable inventions, regardless of the motive to extend protection 
on an expiring patent.351 
F. Section 112 Written Description 
1. Possible en banc review of Lilly rule 
Heralding a possible en banc consideration of the written 
description rule from the 1997 Regents of the University of California v. 
Eli Lilly & Co.352 (“Eli Lilly” or “Lilly”), and further eroding that rule, 
the Federal Circuit in Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc. affirmed 
denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) of a jury 
verdict of validity in a case where claims to an egg sorting machine 
were construed to cover a conveyor design that was not illustrated or 
described in the written description of the patent in suit.353 
The patent in suit is directed to an egg sorter.354  Food Processing 
System, Inc. (“FPS”) contended that if the conveyer element of the 
patent claims was construed to encompass lifting eggs from a moving 
conveyor, the claims would be invalid as no such conveyor 
mechanism is disclosed in the patent.355  Two prior Federal Circuit 
decisions were distinguished in this case:  Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline 
Corp.356 and Eli Lilly.357 
As explained by the court, in Eli Lilly “this court invoked the 
written description requirement in a case without priority issues” to 
require “a precise definition of a DNA sequence in the patent 
specification.”358  This has become known as the Lilly rule. 
Here, in a per curium panel decision, the Federal Circuit found that 
there was “substantial evidence” to support a jury verdict that the 
patent in suit was “not invalid for lack of an adequate written 
description,” dismissing FPS’ contention that the patent in suit did 
not adequately disclose a mechanism for lifting eggs from a moving 
conveyor as an attempt to “merely revive[] its non-infringement 
argument in the cloak of a validity challenge.”359  Without directly 
distinguishing the 1997 Lilly decision, the court, citing to its 2002 
                                                          
 351. Id. at 1373, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656. 
 352. 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 353. Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1317, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1429, 1436 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 354. Id. at 1309, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431. 
 355. Id. at 1319, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1437. 
 356. 134 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 357. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398. 
 358. Moba B.V., 325 F.3d at 1320, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438. 
 359. Id. at 1321, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
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decision in Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.,360 simply noted that 
“[i]n more recent cases . . . this court has distinguished Lilly.”361 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Radar took on the Lilly rule 
directly, characterizing it as a precedent-defying, statute-distorting 
mistake362 and arguing that it turned a “routine claim construction 
argument [into] a validity challenge under [a] non-statutory 
doctrine.”363  Judge Radar urged “en banc correction” of the Lilly 
rule.364  Judge Bryson, who was a member of the panel that decided 
the Lilly case, also wrote a concurring opinion.365  Judge Bryson traced 
the Lilly rule back to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(“CCPA”) decision in In re Ruschig,366 in which CCPA found the 
written description and enablement requirements to be separate 
requirements of § 112, ¶ 1.367  In Judge Bryson’s opinion, if Ruschig is 
correct, “it is difficult to find a principled basis for restricting that 
requirement to cases involving priority disputes” as urged by Judge 
Radar.368  Thus, in Judge Bryson’s view, en banc review may be 
appropriate for the “entire line of cases stemming from Ruschig.”369 
2. Written description process does not satisfy written description               
for product of process 
In the context of a priority dispute or interference, the Federal 
Circuit in Chen v. Bouchard370 held that even though a product is 
inherently produced by a disclosed process, the written description 
requirement for claims directed to the product is not satisfied when 
one of skill in the art, reading the application, would not have been 
aware that the product is produced.371 
Chen’s 1992 patent application disclosed a process to produce 
taxol derivatives and precursors of taxol.372  The disclosed method did 
not explicitly state that cyclopropataxols were produced as required 
by the interference count.373  Chen argued that cyclopropataxols were 
                                                          
 360. 323 F.3d 956, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 361. Moba B.V., 325 F.3d at 1320, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1438. 
 362. Id. at 1326-27, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443 (Radar, J., concurring). 
 363. Id. at 1323, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440 (Radar, J., concurring). 
 364. Id. at 1327, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443 (Radar, J., concurring). 
 365. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1443. 
 366. 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 118 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 367. Moba B.V., 325 F.3d at 1327, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 (Bryson, J., 
concurring). 
 368. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 369. Id. at 1328, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 370. 347 F.3d 1299, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 371. Id. at 1307, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11. 
 372. Id. at 1301, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 373. Id. at 1307, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
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inherently described since the process described in examples will 
“invariably” result in those compounds.374 
The Federal Circuit concluded that Chen was not entitled to the 
benefit of his earlier applications.375  The Federal Circuit noted that 
there was no explicit description of the claimed product in the 1992 
patent application and, as the patent did accurately describe another 
product, fluorotaxol derivatives, made by the process, there was no 
error in the disclosure.376  The court noted that the 1992 patent 
application did not describe any physical characteristics of the 
claimed product and that there was no evidence that a person of 
ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the product of 
the count would have been produced from the disclosed process.377 
G. Section 112 Enactment—Enablement in Biotechnology 
In two biotech cases decided early in 2003, the Federal Circuit 
discussed the written description and enablement requirements of 
§ 112.  The court upheld a district court’s finding that a written 
description of a particular embodiment was sufficient to support 
broad patent claims to a pharmaceutical composition.378 
In the first case, Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,379 the 
Federal Circuit relied upon the plain meaning of the claim terms at 
issue to determine the scope of the claim.380  The court found that the 
claim limitation “erythropoietin glycoprotein” should not be 
construed as also requiring “exogenous DNA sequences” based upon 
the plain language of the claims and the presence of that very 
limitation in other claims of the patent.381  The court so held despite 
statements in the specification that the invention is “uniquely 
characterized by being the product of . . . exogenous DNA 
sequences . . .”382 and despite statements by the examiner that a 
related patent “teaches and enables only cells transformed with 
exogenous DNA.”383  The Federal Circuit distinguished the 
examiner’s statement because it was based upon then-pending claims, 
                                                          
 374. Id. at 1305, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 375. Id. at 1312, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 376. Id. at 1305, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 377. Id. at 1307, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710. 
 378. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1334, 65 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1385, 1399-1400 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  See also Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. 
DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 379. 314 F.3d 1313, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 380. Id. at 1326, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 381. Id. at 1325, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 382. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393. 
 383. Id. at 1325-26, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393-94. 
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which also required high production levels of the erythropoietin 
(“EPO”).384 
The Amgen patent related to the production of erythropoietin, an 
endogenous hormone that regulates red blood cell formation.385  In 
part, Hoechst argued the patent specification failed to satisfy the 
written description requirement in the support of a claim to a 
“pharmaceutical composition . . . of erythropoietin . . . purified from 
mammalian cells grown in culture”386 because the patent failed to 
sufficiently describe “all vertebrate and mammalian cells as 
engineered in the claimed invention.”387  The Federal Circuit upheld 
the district court’s finding of validity stating “the descriptions 
adequately described to those of ordinary skill in the art in 1984 the 
use of the broad class of available mammalian and vertebrate cells to 
produce the claimed high levels of human EPO in culture.”388 
The Federal Circuit distinguished its Regents of the University of 
California v. Eli Lilly and Co.389 and Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.390 
discussions regarding the written description of claims encompassing 
genetic material.391  In Eli Lilly, claims to a human cDNA sequence of 
an insulin gene were held invalid where only the insulin gene of a rat 
complementary deoxyriboncide acid (“cDNA”) sequence was 
disclosed.392  In Enzo Biochem, the court clarified that the written 
description requirement may be satisfied where one of skill in the art 
would have knowledge that a functional description of genetic 
material is correlated to a particular, known structure.393  In Amgen, 
the court found that “the claim terms at issue here are not directed to 
new or unknown biologic materials that ordinarily skilled artisans 
would easily miscomprehend.”394  Rather, the claims simply recite 
“types of cells that can be used to produce recombinant human 
EPO.”395  Therefore, according to the majority of the panel, while 
Hoechst might have been justified in challenging the “adequacy of 
disclosure of the vertebrate or mammalian host cell,” the court found 
                                                          
 384. Id. at 1326-27, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394. 
 385. Id. at 1335, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 386. Id. at 1347, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410. 
 387. Id. at 1332, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 388. Id. at 1331, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397. 
 389. 119 F.3d 1559, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 390. 323 F.3d 956, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 391. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1332, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 392. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1566-67, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406. 
 393. Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 964, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1613. 
 394. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1332, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 395. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
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it was not warranted in challenging the adequacy of the disclosure of 
the “human DNA itself.”396 
Hoechst also challenged the district court’s finding that a skilled 
artisan could have used various cultured vertebrate and mammalian 
cells to produce EPO.397  Here, the district court credited Amgen’s 
witnesses stating “any challenge which one of ordinary skill in 1984 
may have encountered in attempting to make and use the claimed 
invention using other cultured mammalian cells could be resolved by 
experimentation falling short of undue.”398 
There was a vigorous dissent on this point.399  Judge Clevenger, 
citing precedent, including Eli Lilly, called into question the written 
description, stating that “disclosure of a species may not suffice to 
describe a genus”400 and citing In re Mayhew401 to assert that “claims 
failing to recite a necessary element of the invention fail for lack of 
an enabling disclosure.”402  Judge Clevenger called into question the 
enablement by stating that “[a]t the very least, the absence of 
structural limitations in the patent [claims] raises questions of its 
enablement . . . .”403 
In the second case, Plant Genetic Systems, NV v. DeKalb Genetics 
Corp.,404 much to the patentee’s chagrin, the Federal Circuit did not 
apply such deference to the predictability of cell transformations in 
the plant kingdom.405  In this case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s holding that the asserted patent claims were invalid 
for lack of enablement.406 
Plant Genetic Systems, now known as Aventis, had claims that were 
drawn to genetically engineered, herbicide-resistant plant cells, which 
Aventis contended applied broadly to dicot and monocot plants.407  
The Federal Circuit concluded that the full scope of the invention, as 
claimed by Aventis, was not enabled.408  While the specification 
disclosed transformation of dicots, the court affirmed the district 
                                                          
 396. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 397. Id. at 1334, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1400. 
 398. Id. at 1337, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402. 
 399. Id. at 1358, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1419 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). 
 400. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1361, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421 (Clevenger, J., 
dissenting) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568-
69, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398, 1405-06 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 401. 527 F.2d 1229, 1233, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
 402. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1360, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1420 (citing In re Mayhew, 
527 F.2d 1229, 1233, 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356, 358 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
 403. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1421. 
 404. 315 F.3d 1335, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1452 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 405. Id. at 1345-46, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1460-61. 
 406. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1461. 
 407. Id. at 1337-38, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1454. 
 408. Id. at 1344, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
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court decision which had stated that DeKalb proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that “practicing stable gene transformation for 
monocots cells [at the time of patent filing] in 1987 required undue 
experimentation.”409  Based on In re Hogan410 the court held that if “an 
inventor [claims] what was specifically desired but difficult to obtain 
at the time the application was filed,” the claims were enabled only 
“[if] the patent discloses how to make and use it.”411  While 
transformed monocots were desired, as of the filing date “stably 
transformed monocot cells were difficult to produce and the [patent] 
gave no instruction how.”412  Further, the court found that the district 
court properly used a post-filing date report, indicating the first 
transformation of corn cells, to support its holding.413 
The court also rejected Aventis’ argument that the district court 
erred in not making a finding regarding the pioneering nature of the 
invention.414  The court explained that “pioneer inventions” are not 
deserving of a lower standard of enablement and that any statement 
in Hogan to the contrary was dicta.415 
H. Section 112 Indefiniteness 
1. What does “a” mean? 
Unwilling to permit the word “a” to be construed to mean “and,” 
the Federal Circuit held that unless a certification of correction has 
been issued by the PTO under §§ 254 or 255, a district court may only 
correct an error in a patent if the correction is not subject to 
reasonable debate and if the prosecution history does not suggest a 
different interpretation.416 
Novo Industries sued Micro Molds for infringement of its patent on 
a carrier assembly for window blinds that permits realignment of 
misaligned slats.417  The claim at issue reads, in part, “stop means 
formed on a rotatable with said support finger and extending 
outwardly there from into engaging relation with one or two spaced 
                                                          
 409. Id. at 1338, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1554 (citing Plant Genetic Systems N.V. 
v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 246, 265 (D. Conn. 2001)). 
 410. See 559 F.2d 595, 605, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 527, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (finding 
that enablement is determined as of the effective filing date of the patent). 
 411. Plant Genetic Sys., 315 F.3d at 1340, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
 412. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456. 
 413. Id. at 1343-44, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1459. 
 414. Id. at 1341, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456-57. 
 415. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1457. 
 416. Novo Indus. Inc. v. Micro Molds Corp., 350 F.3d 1348, 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 417. Id. at 1350-52, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129-31. 
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apart stop members formed on said frame.”418  The words “a rotatable 
with” did not appear in the original application.419  Novo argued that 
the claim contained an obvious typographical error that could be 
corrected.420 
Micro Molds argued that the “addition of the words ‘rotatable with’ 
indicated that the applicant had abandoned coverage of a stop means 
on the support finger itself and, therefore, the claim could not be 
construed to include a stop means on the support finger.”421 Rather, 
according to Micro Molds, the stop means had to be located on a 
separate “rotatable.”422  “Because the ‘rotatable’ is not identified, 
Micro Molds argued, the claim is invalid for indefiniteness.”423 
The district court instructed the jury that “[t]he claim language 
includes an obvious typographical error, ‘a’ should be read as—
and—.”424  With that construction the district court did not reach the 
indefiniteness issue, and the jury found that Micro Molds had literally 
infringed the patent. 425 
The Federal Circuit observed that Novo never sought nor obtained 
a certificate of correction from the PTO pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 255 
and formulated the issue as whether a district court can correct an 
error in a patent by interpretation, where no certificate of correction 
has been sought nor obtained.426 
Noting that nothing in the enactment of §§ 254 and 255 suggests 
that Congress intended to deny limited correction authority to the 
district courts, the court reasoned that “for causes of action that arise 
before the correction becomes effective, the patent must be 
considered without the benefit of correction.”427 
The court stressed that the district courts do not have the authority 
to correct “any and all errors that the PTO is authorized to correct 
under §§ 254 and 255.”428  If the district courts were allowed to 
correct those errors that are correctable under §§ 254 and 255, “[t]he 
                                                          
 418. Id. at 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (emphasis added) (reciting section 
“g” of the list). 
 419. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130-31. 
 420. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131. 
 421. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131. 
 422. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131. 
 423. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131. 
 424. Id. at 1353, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131. 
 425. See id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1131 (finding by the jury that the defendant 
was guilty of “willful infringement”). 
 426. Id. at 1355-56, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133-34. 
 427. Id. at 1356, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1133 (citing Southwest Software, Inc. v. 
Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280, 1297, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)).  
 428. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134. 
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district court always would apply its own corrections retroactively in 
the action before it, unlike the certificates of correction issued by the 
PTO, which apply retroactively only in actions brought after the 
certificate of correction is issued.”429  The court concluded that the 
district court can only correct two types of errors, “(1) [where] the 
correction is not subject to reasonable debate based on consideration 
of the claim language and the specification, and (2) the prosecution 
history does not suggest a different interpretation of the claims.”430 
Applying that rule to the present case, the court noted that not 
only did Novo itself suggest two different corrections: (1) deletion of 
“a rotatable with” and (2) deletion of “with said;” but the district 
court, by changing “a” to “and,” raised a third possibility.431  
Recognizing this, the Federal Circuit noted that “since we cannot 
know what correction is necessarily appropriate or how the claim 
should be interpreted, we must hold [the] claim . . . of . . . [the] 
patent invalid for indefiniteness in its present form.”432 
2. “Vivid color” 
In a case involving metallic, vivid color sunglass lenses, the Federal 
Circuit in Oakley, Inc. v. Sunglass Hut International,433 analyzed each of 
the factors involved in the grant of a preliminary injunction: 
irreparable harm, balance of hardship, public interest, and likelihood 
of success on the merits.434 
Predictably, the major issue on appeal was likelihood of success on 
the merits.  Here the Federal Circuit considered and rejected each of 
defendant Sunglass Hut’s invalidity defenses, finally agreeing with the 
district court that none raised a substantial question of invalidity.435 
Two interesting aspects of this case are that the preliminary 
injunction was sustained even though the Federal Circuit arrived at a 
slightly different claim construction than the district court and that 
the issue of claim indefiniteness under § 112, ¶ 2 focused on the 
claim term “vivid colored appearance,” which the Federal Circuit 
opined must be construed as it would by one of skill in the art and in 
light of the specification.436  In doing so, the Federal Circuit used the 
                                                          
 429. Id. at 1357, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134 (citing Southwest Software, 226 F.3d 
at 1297, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1171).  
 430. Id. at 1357, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134 (referring to these as “Essex type 
errors” from I.T.S. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429 (1926)). 
 431. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134. 
 432. Id. at 1358, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. 
 433. 316 F.3d 1331, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 434. Id. at 1338-39, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25. 
 435. Id. at 1340-42, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326-27. 
 436. Id. at 1340-41, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
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associated concept of “differential effect” and the numerical 
examples and ranges from the specification to decide when a 
differential effect qualifies as “vivid.”437 
3. Claim term which signifies a condition dependant, variable                 
value is definite 
In a heavily fact dependent case, the Federal Circuit, in BJ Services 
Co. v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.,438 turned back a determined 
written description and claim indefiniteness assault by Halliburton.439 
In the underlying action, BJ Services sued Halliburton for 
infringing claims of a patent directed to a method of fracturing 
subterranean formations to stimulate oil and gas wells.440  Halliburton 
argued that the patent was invalid for, inter alia, lack of adequate 
written description and lack of enablement.441  At trial, the jury 
rejected these arguments, found Halliburton to have infringed, and 
awarded damages of $98.1 million.442 
On appeal, Halliburton argued that the patent specification was 
not enabling as it failed to quantify or state how to obtain a particular 
value recited in the claims, the so-called C* value,443 defined in the 
patent as the “concentration necessary to cause polymer chain 
overlap.”444  At trial, “Halliburton merely showed that the value of C* 
could vary depending upon the chosen conditions; it did not call its 
expert to testify about the measurement conditions one of skill in the 
art would employ.”445  According to the Federal Circuit, this showing 
was insufficient to undercut the jury’s finding of enablement.446  As to 
Halliburton’s contention that the claim limitation “about 0.06” was 
not sufficiently definite, the court held that substantial evidence 
supported the jury’s conclusion that one of ordinary skill in the art 
would understand what is claimed when the claim is read in 
argument that the term “about” is intended to encompass the range 
of experimental error that occurs in any measurement and that one 
of skill in the art would readily understand the range that “about 
0.06” was intended to include. 
                                                          
 437. Id. at 1341-42, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326-27. 
 438. 338 F.3d 1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 439. Id. at 1370-71, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693-94. 
 440. Id. at 1370, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693. 
 441. Id. at 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 442. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 443. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 444. Id. at 1370-71, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693-94. 
 445. Id. at 1372, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695. 
 446. Id. at 1373-74, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1696. 
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Halliburton also argued that the patent in suit was invalid for 
failing to name the proper inventors, specifically the person who 
allegedly invented the CMG polymer used in practicing the claimed 
invention.  The court held that Halliburton had failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that the omitted “inventor” had 
conceived any of the claimed invention, which involved a method of 
fracturing a subterranean formation (and not the polymer itself).  
The patentee presented evidence at trial that the omitted “inventor” 
had no knowledge of the method, how the polymer would be used, 
or the C* value. 
4. How much disclosure of “corresponding structure” is needed to avoid 
rendering a means-plus-function claim element indefinite? 
In Intel Corp. v. VIA Technologies, Inc.,447 a case exploring how much 
corresponding structure must be disclosed to prevent a means-plus-
function claim element from being subject to § 112, ¶ 2 invalidity,448 
the Federal Circuit predictably set an objective standard based on the 
knowledge of one of skill in the art.449 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the claims at 
issue were not invalid for indefiniteness for failure to disclose 
adequate structure corresponding to the function recited in a means-
plus-function claim element.450  The Federal Circuit posed the test as 
whether VIA had proven, “by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
specification lacks adequate disclosure of structure, to be understood 
by one of skill in the art as able to perform the recited functions.”451  
Answering in the negative, the Federal Circuit held that the patent “is 
not indefinite merely because no specific circuitry is disclosed” to 
show how the core logic is modified to perform the recited Fast Write 
function.452  The court reasoned that “[h]ow to modify the core logic 
to perform Fast Write on the circuitry level may . . . be properly left to 
the knowledge of those skilled in the art, and need not be specified 
in the patent.”453 
The Federal Circuit noted that the specification of the patent 
included three diagrams, “35 signal charts and a detailed written 
description explaining the invention . . . [and a] generic description 
of the core logic, as adapted to practice Fast Write pursuant to the 
                                                          
 447. 319 F.3d 1357, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1934 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 448. Id. at 1359, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 449. Id. at 1365-66, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 450. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 451. Id. at 1366, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1940. 
 452. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 453. Id. at 1366-67, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
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specification.”454  Thus, the court found sufficient corresponding 
structure notwithstanding the absence of circuitry.455 
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected VIA’s argument that absent a 
disclosure of structure regarding circuitry, the scope of what 
constitutes corresponding disclosed structure plus equivalents is 
indefinite, making it impossible for competitors to design around the 
patent.456  The Federal Circuit held that even if there are multiple 
ways to implement the claimed function in circuitry, the claim was 
not invalid simply because the universe of such implementations is 
undefined.457  Rather, the court noted that the “novelty of the 
invention . . . lies  in the signal protocol for implementing Fast 
Write . . . not in unclaimed circuitry for carrying out the specified 
protocol.”458  “Thus, one may design around the invention by using 
another signal protocol.”459 
I. Reexamination—Substantially New Questions of Patentability 
In a case of historical more than prospective interest, the Federal 
Circuit in In re Bass considered the application of an amended 
reexamination statute to a prior reexamination proceeding and 
affirmed a rejection by the Board.460  The court clarified that only 
prior art from a prior completed reexamination proceeding 
completed before the November 2, 2002 amendment to the 
reexamination statute461 is prohibited from being relied upon to 
establish a “substantial new question of patentability” in the 
subsequent reexamination proceeding.462 
The decision in Bass comes on the heels of amendments to the 
reexamination statute,463 which effectively overruled In re Portola 
Packaging464 for any reexamination declared after November 2, 2002, 
by codifying that “a substantial new question of patentability is not 
precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was 
                                                          
 454. Id. at 1366, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 455. Id., 65 U.S.Q.P.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 456. Id. at 1367, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 457. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 458. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 459. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 460. In re Bass, 314 F.3d 575, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 461. 35 U.S.C. § 302. 
 462. In re Bass, 314 F.3d at 577, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157 (citing In re 
Borkowski, 505 F.2d 713, 718, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 29, 32-33 (C.C.P.A. 1974) for the 
proposition that reexamination must be completed). 
 463. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000). 
 464. 110 F.3d 786, 791, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1295, 1300 (BNA) (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(interpreting the pre-amendment § 303 to prohibit raising a substantial new question 
of patentability). 
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previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”465  
Thus, the holding in Bass only applies to reexaminations that were 
declared prior to November 2, 2002.466 
J. Interference 
1. Interference-in-fact—the two-way test 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Board of Regents of the University of Washington,467 
the Federal Circuit confirmed that it is within the discretion of the 
PTO to apply a two-way unpatentability test as a threshold for 
declaring an interference.468 
Eli Lilly successfully requested the PTO to declare an interference 
for its reissue application of a patent assigned to the University of 
Washington.469  The reissue application recited a species claim to a 
cDNA sequence that codes for human protein C.470  Lilly proposed a 
genus claim construction and a species claim construction for claim 1 
of the University of Washington patent.471  As Judge Lourie pointed 
out in dissent, neither claim construction met the two-way test for 
declaring an interference472 even though the genus construction met 
the one-way test.473 
The Board granted the University of Washington’s motion to 
dismiss due to no interference-in-fact.474  Relying on prior Board 
precedent Winter v. Fujita475 and the 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(n) 
requirements of a two-way unpatentability test, the Board held that 
regardless of whether the patent was construed to have a genus claim 
or a species claim, the Lilly reissue application did not define the 
same patentable invention as required by regulation to declare an 
                                                          
 465. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2003). 
 466. In re Bass, 314 F.3d at 577, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1157. 
 467. 334 F.3d 1264, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 468. Id. at 1272, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 469. Id. at 1265, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 470. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 471. See id. at 1266, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162 (discussing Eli Lilly’s motion to 
redefine the subject matter of Claim 1 after the University of Washington successfully 
won on a motion of no interference-of-fact regarding Claim 3). 
 472. See id. at 1271-72, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-67 (noting that neither the 
species or genus claim established an interference-in-fact in relation to the University 
of Washington because Lilly’s claims did not “teach or suggest the cDNA sequences 
claimed in the corresponding claims”). 
 473. See id. at 1272-74, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167-68 (Lourie, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that under the one-way test of 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(n) there would be an 
interference-in-fact). 
 474. Id. at 1272, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 475. No. 104-523, 1999 WL 1327616, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d  (BNA) 1234 (Bd. Pat. App. & 
Interferences 1999). 
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interference.476  In the 1999 Winter decision, the Board defined the 
two-way unpatentability test as satisfied when claim A is anticipated or 
rendered obvious by claim B if claim B were prior art to claim A and 
claim B is anticipated or rendered obvious by claim A if claim A were 
prior art to claim B.477  Lilly appealed.478 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that the PTO 
has discretion to choose between the two-way unpatentability test and 
the one-way unpatentability test.479  The court noted that the one-way 
unpatentability test is over-inclusive since, if the genus were ultimately 
determined to have priority over the species, separate patents could 
properly issue to each and the interference would have been in 
vain.480  The court also noted that the two-way test is under-inclusive 
since it would prevent the canceling of genus claims that did not have 
priority to the species.481  However, the court determined that neither 
test was inconsistent with § 1.601(n), and the PTO could reasonably 
choose one over the other.482 
Judge Lourie dissented on the grounds that the two-way test is not 
consistent with the plain language of § 1.60(n).483  Judge Lourie 
noted that the Board’s decision in Winter, which established the two-
way unpatentability test, is not binding on the court and is also 
“unsupported by any reasoning.”484  Judge Lourie reasoned that the 
mere fact that an interference may be conducted in vain and 
potentially increase the burden on the PTO in doing so should not 
permit the PTO to shy away from its duty of determining priority to 
ensure that only one patent issues to the first inventor.485  Judge 
Lourie also noted that the two-way test will simply shift the burden 
from the personnel at the PTO with expertise in interference practice 
to the already overburdened district courts that do not have 
expertise.486 
In Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., another case involving the two-way 
test for an interference-in-fact, the Federal Circuit held that the 
standard for an interference between two patents, even in a district 
                                                          
 476. Eli Lilly, 334 F.3d at 1272-73, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Lourie, J., 
dissenting). 
 477. Winter, No. 104-283, 1999 WL 1327616, at *11, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243. 
 478. Eli Lilly, 334 F.3d at 1266, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162. 
 479. Id. at 1272, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167. 
 480. Id. at 1268, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164. 
 481. Id. at 1270, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 482. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165. 
 483. Id. at 1273, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 484. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 485. Id. at 1273-74, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
 486. Id. at 1274, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (Lourie, J., dissenting). 
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court § 291 proceeding, should mirror PTO regulations.487  The court 
vacated the district court’s priority determination for failure to meet 
the jurisdictional limitation of interference-in-fact using the proper 
analysis.488 
The parties involved, Medichem and Rolabo, manufacture  
loratadine, the active antihistamine ingredient in Claritin®.489  
Medichem appealed from a decision brought under 35 U.S.C. § 291 
of no interference-in-fact between the claimed inventions of 
Medichem’s and Rolabo’s respective patents.490  Each patent claims a 
process for the preparation of loratadine.491  The claims in the 
Medichem patent claimed the process in the presence of a tertiary 
amine.492  The claims in the Rolabo patent were silent as to this 
element but were otherwise substantially the same.493  The lower court 
awarded priority to Medichem but found the absence of a tertiary 
amine in the Rolabo patent claims to be not obvious over the 
Medichem patent.494  Medichem appealed.495 
The Federal Circuit held that the first step in any district court 
interference proceeding between two patents is the evaluation of 
whether an interference-in-fact exists.496  Establishing the existence of 
interference-in-fact between two patents is a jurisdictional limitation 
under § 291.497  Citing Eli Lilly498 and Albert v. Kevex Corp.499 the court 
reiterated that analyzing the existence of an interference-in-fact 
under the two-way test is a prerequisite for jurisdiction to make a 
priority determination.500  While the PTO regulations do not bind a 
district court, the court noted that a district court must nevertheless 
define the subject matter of an interference between two patents in 
the same manner as would the PTO, which is to apply the two-way 
test.501  By PTO regulation, the underlying analysis for the 
interference-in-fact inquiry is whether invention A is anticipated 
                                                          
 487. Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 932, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1283, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 488. Id. at 936, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289. 
 489. Id. at 930, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284. 
 490. Id. at 930-31, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285. 
 491. Id. at 930, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284. 
 492. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284. 
 493. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284-85. 
 494. Id. at 930-31, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285. 
 495. Id. at 931, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1285. 
 496. Id. at 934, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287. 
 497. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287. 
 498. 334 F.3d 1264, 1265, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 499. 729 F.2d 757, 760, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 202, 205 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 500. Medichem, 353 F.3d at 934, 935, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287-88, 1288-89. 
 501. Id. at 934, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287. 
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under § 102 or meets obviousness under § 103 by invention B, 
assuming invention B meets the first step of prior art.502 
The court held that, properly construed, the claims of the Rolabo 
patent could include additional steps such as tertiary amines, because 
the claims use the transitional term “comprising.”503  Based on this 
claim construction, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court, 
holding that the species claims of the Medichem patent fell within 
the scope of, and, therefore, anticipated the genus claims of the 
Rolabo patent under § 102.504  However, because the lower court 
made no findings regarding the second leg of the test of whether 
invention B is anticipated by or obvious in view of invention A, the 
court remanded for further determination on whether the genus 
claims of the ‘827 patent anticipated or rendered obvious the species 
claims of the ‘100 patent.505 
2. Priority proofs 
In In re Jolley,506 the Federal Circuit declined to adopt a rule that a 
research proposal is not evidence of conception or that “evidence of 
diligence that must be excluded if there is any possibility that it could 
be construed in support of an invention beyond the reach of the 
[interference] count.”507 
Senior party Jolley appealed from a decision of the Board awarding 
priority to junior party McGraw in a five-way interference.508  The 
interference count was directed to a liquid composition comprising a 
hydrofluorocarbon refrigerant (“HFC”) and a soluble organic 
lubricant comprising an effective amount of an ester.509  The Board 
determined that McGraw had an earlier conception date than Jolley 
based on an e-mail from McGraw’s co-inventor, Ward.510  Even though 
Jolley was found to have reduced his invention to practice earlier 
than McGraw, the Board determined that McGraw was entitled to the 
priority award based on his prior conception coupled with 
diligence.511 
                                                          
 502. Id. at 932, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286 (citing Eli Lilly, 334 F.3d at 1267-69, 
67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-65). 
 503. Id. at 933, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287. 
 504. Id. at 934-35, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288. 
 505. Id. at 935, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288. 
 506. 308 F.3d 1317, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 507. Id. at 1328, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 508. Id. at 1319, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902-03. 
 509. Id. at 1320, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 510. Id. at 1321, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904. 
 511. Id. at 1326-29, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908-10. 
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In the e-mail, Ward suggested the possibility of using blends of 
polyglycol with esters as lubricants for HFC, a suggestion consistent 
with research for air compressor lubricants, which were 
polyglycol/ester blends.512  Jolley argued that McGraw’s initial 
conception was not directed to a two component system of HFC and 
ester, in the interference count, but to a three component system of 
HFC, polyglycol, and ester.513 
The court held that although the evidence of conception indicated 
overlapping inventions, an invention within the count and an 
invention outside the count, it is open to other ingredients, such as a 
polyglycol, because the count uses the term “comprising.”514  The 
court noted that: 
The question of whether an alleged conception discloses the 
subject matter of the interference count with sufficient particularity 
is a fact-intensive inquiry, based on whether the evidence of 
conception fairly suggests to one of ordinary skill in the subject 
matter of the count, without the need for extensive 
experimentation to ascertain whether the matter encompassed by 
the disclosure suggests the desirable features of compositions 
belonging to the count.515 
The court dismissed Jolley’s argument discounting the e-mail as a 
“research proposal,” stating that “the conception inquiry is fact-
intensive and no per se rule excludes ‘research proposals’ as evidence 
of conception.”516  According to the court, “[t]he determinative 
inquiry is not whether McGraw’s disclosure was phrased certainly or 
tentatively, but whether the idea expressed therein was sufficiently 
developed to support conception of the subject matter of the 
interference count.”517  While the e-mail largely referred to ester in 
general terms, it also referenced the polyglycol/ester blends found in 
certain air compressor lubricant patents.518  The court found this 
reference to be of sufficient specificity to support the Board’s finding 
of a conception.519 
The evidence also showed that “McGraw reduced to practice a two-
component (ester/refrigerant) system meeting all limitations of the 
count . . . and reduced to practice three-component (polyol/ester/ 
                                                          
 512. Id. at 1326, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 513. Id. at 1327, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908-09. 
 514. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909. 
 515. Id. at 1323, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906. 
 516. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906. 
 517. Id. at 1324, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906. 
 518. Id. at 1321, 1324, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904, 1906. 
 519. Id. at 1324, 1326, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906, 1908. 
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refigerant) systems.”520  Jolley argued that the Board cannot make a 
determination of diligence based on evidence that includes an 
invention inside the count, such as the two component system, and 
an invention outside the count such as the three component 
system.521 
The court declined to adopt a rule that evidence of diligence must 
be excluded if there is any possibility that it could be construed in 
support of an invention beyond the reach of the count: “[W]here two 
different, inconsistent conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the 
evidence in record, an agency’s decision to favor one conclusion over 
the other is the epitome of a decision that must be sustained upon 
review for substantial evidence.”522 
3. Actual reduction to practice 
In affirming the priority award of the Board, the Federal Circuit in 
Taskett v. Dentlinger523 held that an inventor is not required to test an 
invention under conditions of actual use to establish that an 
invention will work for its intended purpose.524 
In the interference proceeding before the Board, Taskett was 
named senior party based on filing the application six days prior to 
the filing date of Dentlinger’s application, the junior party.525  The 
count in the interference covered a process for the automated 
purchasing of prepaid telephone services.526  While Taskett relied on 
its filing date, Dentlinger presented evidence of an earlier conception 
and actual reduction to practice, the latter in the form of a test using 
a dummy checking account and an internal switch.527  In the test, an 
ATM device received a request to purchase a specified amount of 
telephone service, “withdrew” money from the dummy account 
through the internal switch, and printed a receipt.528  Based on that 
evidence, the Board found that Dentlinger established conception 
and actual reduction to practice prior to Taskett’s filing date and 
awarded Dentlinger priority of invention.529 
Taskett appealed, arguing that Dentlinger did not prove a 
successful actual reduction to practice prior to Taskett’s priority 
                                                          
 520. Id. at 1326, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908. 
 521. Id. at 1328, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 522. Id. at 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910. 
 523. 344 F.3d 1337, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1472 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 524. Id. at 1342, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476. 
 525. Id. at 1338, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473. 
 526. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473. 
 527. Id. at 1338-40, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473-75. 
 528. Id. at 1341, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1475. 
 529. Id. at 1338-39, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1473-74. 
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date.530  Taskett argued that since only a dummy account and an 
internal switch were used in the test, no financial transaction 
occurred and, therefore, the test did not establish that the invention 
would work for its intended purposes.531 
The Federal Circuit rejected Taskett’s argument, holding that 
Dentlinger was not required to test the invention under conditions of 
actual use to determine that the invention would work for its 
intended purpose:  “to hold otherwise would be to require an 
inventor to have created a viable commercial embodiment before the 
Board or a court could find reduction to practice.  This the law does 
not require.”532 
K. Inventorship—Misjoinder and Nonjoinder 
In Board of Education ex rel. Board of Trustees of Florida State University 
v. American Bioscience, Inc.,533 the Federal Circuit emphasized that “the 
burden of showing misjoinder or nonjoinder of inventors is a heavy 
one and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.”534 
The Board of Education (collectively “FSU”), sued American 
Bioscience, Inc. (“ABI”) and Tao to add three FSU inventors and 
remove three named ABI inventors.535  The claims of the patent 
covered three compounds that were analogs of taxotere (docetaxel), 
a compound that differs from taxol, a natural compound that is an 
effective chemotherapeutic agent.536  ABI filed an application for the 
subject patent with broad claims, but limited the claims for issue and 
determined the named inventorship was proper.537 
The district court found that ABI inventors contributed to the 
claimed invention and that the presumption that the named 
inventors are the true and only inventors was overcome by “clear and 
convincing evidence,” which demonstrated that the inventors 
contributed to the patented compound.538 
In conducting de novo review of the inventorship determination, 
the Federal Circuit found that there was no evidence on record that 
the idea of making taxol analogs came from anyone other than the 
named ABI inventors who contributed to the conception of the 
                                                          
 530. Id. at 1339, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1474. 
 531. Id. at 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374-75. 
 532. Id. at 1342, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1476. 
 533. 333 F.3d 1330, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 534. Id. at 1337, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257. 
 535. Id. at 1332, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253. 
 536. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253. 
 537. Id. at 1335-36, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255-56. 
 538. Id. at 1337, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) as 1257. 
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invention.539  In relying on Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,540 
the court stated that “invention requires conception, and ‘conception 
does not occur unless one has a mental picture of the structure of the 
chemical . . . or whatever characteristics sufficiently distinguish it.’”541 
According to the Federal Circuit, FSU’s arguments fell short of 
meeting the “clear and convincing” evidence standard because there 
was no evidence of conception by anyone at FSU of the three 
compounds covered by the limited claims of the patent.542  The 
Federal Circuit discounted allegations that Tao learned of FSU’s 
“secret” methods to make the claimed compound in the patent, 
noting that only the ABI inventors were in possession of both the 
structure and the operative method of making the claimed 
compounds.543 
L. Ownership: State Law Issues 
Applying state law to a breach of contract issue involving a 
university patent policy concerning ownership of patents, the Federal 
Circuit, in Regents of the University of New Mexico v. Knight,544 found that 
university faculty members were contractually bound by the patent 
policy and that their patent applications, including a series of CIP 
applications, were owned by the university.545  In doing so, the Federal 
Circuit dismissed as irrelevant the requirement for new assignments 
insofar as CIP applications are concerned546 and held that under 
principles of inherency, the “in part” subject matter (a chemical 
structure) would not have been “new matter” vis-à-vis the original 
application, which described the chemical and physical 
characteristics of the compounds.547  In any event, the Federal Circuit 
reasoned that the CIP applications “only clarified and corrected the 
erroneous characterization of the already disclosed inventions,”548 and 
the chemical structure was not separable from the properties of the 
compound; rather, it was just another way of describing the same 
invention.549 
                                                          
 539. Id. at 1339, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259. 
 540. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 541. Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d at 1340, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259 (quoting Amgen, 
927 F.2d at 1206, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1021). 
 542. Id. at 1341, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260. 
 543. Id. at 1341-42, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260-61. 
 544. 321 F.3d 1111, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 545. Id. at 1119-20, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1006-07. 
 546. Id. at 1121, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 547. Id. at 1121-22, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008-09. 
 548. Id. at 1122, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 549. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
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III. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
A. The Plain and Ordinary Meaning of the Claim Terms 
In 2003, the Federal Circuit’s perception of the plain meaning of 
the claims reigned.  Many of the court’s decisions devoted substantial 
effort to developing the claim construction rules set forth the 
previous year in CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.550 and in Texas 
Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.551  Given this trend, it was not 
surprising that the Federal Circuit issued numerous decisions 
overturning district courts that relied upon either the specification or 
the prosecution history to construe the scope of the claim terms at 
issue. 
For example, in Sunrace Roots Enterprise Co. v. SRAM Corp.552 the 
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a declaratory judgment of 
non-infringement of a patent relating to bicycle gear-shifting devices, 
holding the district court erred in its construction of the claim term 
“shift actuator.”553 
In Sunrace, the patent at issue contained “both method and 
apparatus claims related to gear-shifting on multi-speed bicycles 
through the use of a shift actuator” designed to control the 
derailleur.554  Multi-speed bicycles utilize indexed shifting by 
employing a cam mechanism, in which “a cylindrical cam member fits 
over the bicycle’s handlebar and a cam operating face interacts with a 
cam pin as the shift actuator is rotated.”555  The method claims of the 
patent included the limitation “shift actuator” without reference to a 
cam.556 
The district court concluded that “the plain and ordinary meaning 
of the term ‘shift actuator’ is ‘a mechanism that controls the 
changing of gears.’”557  However, the district court ruled that in light 
of the specification and prosecution history, “the term ‘shift actuator’ 
as used in the ‘291 patent is limited to ‘a mechanism for controlling 
the changing of gears that contains a cam configured with a series of 
lobes and valleys that rotate so as to engage a cam follower.’”558  The 
                                                          
 550. 288 F.3d 1359, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 551. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 552. 336 F.3d 1298, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 553. Id. at 1299, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 554. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 555. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 556. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1439. 
 557. Id. at 1302-02, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 558. Id. at 1302, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
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parties stipulated that, under the district court’s interpretation, the 
accused devices did not infringe.559  SRAM appealed.560 
The Federal Circuit first noted that claim terms “must be given 
their ordinary and accustomed meaning unless the patent expresses 
an intention to impart novel meaning to the claim terms.”561  The 
court found that since the cam structure was recited in other claims, 
the doctrine of claim differentiation supported the use of the plain 
and ordinary meaning of the term “shift actuator.”562  The court 
further found that nothing in the patent’s specification or the 
prosecution history indicated the invention was directed exclusively 
to cams, or that systems not employing cams were outside the scope 
of the invention.563 Moreover, the court stated that consideration of 
extrinsic evidence was inappropriate because the intrinsic evidence 
resolved any ambiguity regarding the disputed claim term.564  
Accordingly, the court held that because the intrinsic evidence did 
not clearly narrow the disputed claim term, the ordinary meaning of 
the claim term “shift actuator” applied.565 
In Springs Window Fashions v. Novo Industries,566 notwithstanding its 
decisions in Rambus v. Infineon Technologies AG567 and Storage Technology 
Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,568 the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the time-
honored rule that saddles inventors with the errors of the lawyers 
who prosecute their patents.  It reaffirmed that arguments in the 
prosecution history distinguishing the claimed invention over prior 
art result in the surrender of patent scope, even when the argument 
turns out to have been a misstatement.569  The court observed, “[i]f 
the applicant mistakenly disclaimed coverage of the claimed 
invention, then the applicant should have amended the file to reflect 
the error, as the applicant is the party in the best position to do so.”570  
Here, the Federal Circuit, agreeing with the district court, held that 
the statements distinguishing the prior art reference cited by the 
examiner were “detailed, consistent, and repeated.”571  According to 
                                                          
 559. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 560. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 561. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441. 
 562. Id. at 1302-03, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1441-42. 
 563. Id. at 1306-07, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444-45. 
 564. Id. at 1307, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. 
 565. Id. at 1307-08, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1445. 
 566. 323 F.3d 989, 65 U.S.PQ.2d (BNA) 1826 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 567. 318 F.3d 1081, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 568. 329 F.3d 823, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 569. Springs Window, 323 F.3d at 995, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830. 
 570. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830. 
 571. Id. at 996, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830. 
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the court, “[a] reasonable competitor would have believed that the 
applicant’s disclaiming statements were not a mere mistake.”572 
In ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.,573 the Federal Circuit reiterated 
that a claim term should be construed according to its plain language 
and ordinary meaning and should be limited in scope only if the 
applicant clearly and unmistakably disavowed that ordinary 
meaning.574  Applying that principle, the Federal Circuit found that 
the claim terms “each field,” “each of plurality of fields,” “particular 
fields,” and “a plurality of specific [fields],” all have different 
meanings.575 
The claim language at issue arose from three patents asserted by 
ResQNet.576  The three patents were directed to software for analyzing 
field attributes downloaded from a mainframe computer to a PC for 
permitting multiple PC users to access one mainframe and display a 
unique graphical user interface (“GUI”) for each user.577 
The district court had analyzed claim language requiring that “said 
ID [to be] generated as a function of the number, location, and 
length of each field”578 and had concluded that claim term “every field” 
means “all fields.”579  Noting that the claim element in question was 
presented in means-plus-function format, the Federal Circuit first 
identified the claimed function and the corresponding structure, “an 
algorithm which recognizes the screen layout and fields therein.”580  
Then, considering the claim language as a whole, the Federal Circuit 
agreed with the district court “that the claimed algorithm evaluates 
attributes of each (and every) field in the information to be 
displayed.”581  The court then noted that “the specification sets forth 
only one embodiment of the algorithm”582 and that the description of 
that algorithm “suggests that characteristics of all, not just some, 
fields are inputs into the algorithm” and that “[n]owhere does the 
specification suggest otherwise.”583 
However, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s 
construction of the term “each of a plurality of fields” set forth in the 
                                                          
 572. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830. 
 573. 346 F.3d 1374, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 574. Id. at 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622. 
 575. Id. at 1382-83, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625-26. 
 576. Id. at 1375, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620. 
 577. Id. at 1375-76, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620. 
 578. Id. at 1377, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. 
 579. Id. at 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621. 
 580. Id. at 1379, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (citation omitted). 
 581. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622. 
 582. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
 583. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623. 
DEVINSKY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 7/10/2004  1:11 PM 
832 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:773 
second, related patent.584  The Federal Circuit found that in the 
context of the second patent, the claim language at issue required 
use only “of at least two fields”585—not every field.586  In this regard, 
the court noted that the slightly different algorithm disclosed in the 
second patent could select for analysis “potentially a subset of all 
fields.”587  The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s 
construal of “a plurality of specific [fields].”588  Finding no clear and 
unambiguous surrender of subject matter, the court invoked the 
plain meaning rule and construed the term “a plurality of specific 
screen identifying information” to require only “at least two pieces 
of . . . information.”589 
In Tehrani v. Hamilton Medical, Inc.,590 the Federal Circuit analyzed 
competing dictionary definitions to find that the district court erred 
in its claim construction. 
The patent at issue related to an apparatus and method that 
automatically controls a respirator used for mechanical ventilation of 
a patient who needs assistance in breathing.591 The claimed apparatus 
controls both breath frequency, which is the number of breaths 
delivered to the patient per minute, and the tidal volume or 
ventilation, which is the volume of gas delivered with each breath, by 
calculating the proper breath frequency and tidal volume.592  The 
calculations are based on data representing at least five factors: air 
viscosity in the lungs, lung elastance, barometric pressure, oxygen 
level of the patient and carbon dioxide level of the patient.593 
The accused ventilator included an adaptive support ventilation 
(“ASV”) mode in which the device evaluated the patient’s breathing 
effort.594  If the device detected no breathing effort, it provided full 
mechanical ventilation for the patient, but if it detected some patient 
effort, the device supplemented the patient’s effort to achieve the 
target ventilation.595  The device calculated the target breathing 
pattern using an algorithm for calculating the tidal volume and 
frequency of breaths needed to provide proper gas exchange.596 The 
                                                          
 584. Id. at 1382-83, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625-26. 
 585. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625-26. 
 586. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 587. Id. at 1382, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625. 
 588. Id. at 1383, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 589. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1626. 
 590. 331 F.3d 1355, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 591. Id. at 1356, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 592. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 593. Id. at 1356-57, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1016. 
 594. Id. at 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 595. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 596. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
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accused ventilator contains no sensor to measure the oxygen or 
carbon dioxide levels in the patient’s blood or expired gas.597  Rather, 
the operator of the device must measure the patient’s levels of 
oxygen and carbon dioxide manually and then make corresponding 
settings on the ventilator.598 
The district court concluded that two of the operator settings 
corresponded to the claimed means for processing data representing 
measured levels of carbon dioxide and oxygen concentration 
respectively.599  As explained by the district court, “[a]lthough the 
[setting] may not represent the actual carbon dioxide level, carbon 
dioxide must be measured by some means for proper operation of 
the [ventilator] and the dial is adjusted accordingly.”600  Similarly, the 
district court relied on an operator-controlled oxygen setting to 
satisfy the limitation regarding the processing of data representing 
the oxygen level of the patient.601 
Hamilton Medical appealed, arguing that the claims required the 
algorithm to use each of the five specified data values to calculate 
tidal volume and breath frequency.602  The Federal Circuit agreed 
that “the claims must be construed to require that the device first 
process the five data values and then use those data values to 
calculate tidal volume and breath frequency.”603 
With regard to claim terms such as “representing” and “indicative,” 
in connection with the input data, both sides relied on dictionary 
definitions.604  Looking to the ordinary meaning of the term 
“representing,” the court noted that when a term has multiple 
dictionary definitions, the intrinsic record is used “to identify which 
of the different possible dictionary meanings of the claim terms in 
issue is the most consistent with the use of the words by the 
inventor.”605  Here, the court found that the ordinary meaning of 
“representing” includes “symbolizing” or “to stand for,” but not in the 
case of two items that are related only in some attenuated way.606  The 
court asserted that “the first item must be directly related to and 
stand for, or be a reasonable proxy for, the latter item.”607  The court 
                                                          
 597. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 598. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017. 
 599. Id. at 1359, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 600. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 601. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018. 
 602. Id. at 1360, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018-19. 
 603. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019. 
 604. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019. 
 605. Id. at 1361, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019. 
 606. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019. 
 607. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019. 
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rejected Tehrani’s argument that the claim term “indicative of” is 
broader than “representing,” noting that the patent used the terms 
interchangeably, and, therefore, construed them to have the same 
meaning.608 
In AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac,609 the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s findings that the term “consisting essentially of 
aluminum,” when referring to the coating metal, meant that “the 
silicon should not exceed 0.5%.”610  The specification clarified that 
any amount of silicon greater than about 0.5% would “materially 
affect the basic and novel properties of the invention.”611  Because 
Sollac’s coating metal contained both aluminum and 8.0 to 8.5% 
silicon,612 the Federal Circuit noted that the district court found 
different constructions for similar claims from different patents that 
were supported by the same specification, a situation it regarded as 
“unusual.”613 However, according to the court, those constructions 
were a “necessary consequence” of clear statements in the 
specification, the prosecution history and the canon of claim 
differentiation.614  Accordingly, even if two sets of similar claims from 
two separate-but-related patents share the same specification, the 
claims may be properly construed differently.615 
In Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,616 the Federal Circuit upheld the 
construction of a claim to a method of treating a specific disease by 
administrating an over-the-counter formulation to a “human in need 
thereof” to require that those consuming the claimed formulation do 
so specifically intending to treat the claimed disease.617 
The asserted claims related to a method of treating macrocytic 
megaloblastic anemia, also known as pernicious anemia.618  Pernicious 
anemia is a condition caused by either vitamin B12 or folic acid 
deficiency.619  Jansen tried but failed to obtain claims to a method of 
treating any anemia with a formulation of both compounds.620  After 
twenty stubborn years of prosecution spanning seven generations of 
continuation applications, Jansen finally obtained U.S. Pat. No. 
                                                          
 608. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1019-20. 
 609. 344 F.3d 1234, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 610. Id. at 1239, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283. 
 611. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1283. 
 612. Id. at 1238, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282. 
 613. Id. at 1243, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286. 
 614. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286. 
 615. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286. 
 616. 342 F.3d 1329, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 617. Id. at 1333-34, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 618. Id. at 1330, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 619. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155. 
 620. Id. at 1331, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155-56. 
DEVINSKY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 7/10/2004  1:11 PM 
2004] 2003 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 835 
4,945,083 (“the ‘083 patent”) by a showing of commercial success for 
vitamin B12 and folic acid formulations in treating and preventing 
pernicious anemia.621 However, in order to obtain allowance, Jansen 
was forced to restrict his claims to a “method of treating or 
preventing macrocytic megaloblastic anemia”622 limited “to a human in 
need thereof.”623 
Rexall marketed a non-prescription supplement having vitamin 
B12 and folic acid in proportions claimed by the ‘083 patent.624 
However, Rexall expressly marketed the product only for the 
maintenance of blood homocysteine levels.625 Consequently, Jansen 
sued Rexall for “the inducement of and the contributory 
infringement of the ‘083 patent.”626 
The district court had not adopted Jansen’s position that all people 
are “humans in need” of treatment or prevention of macrocytic 
megaloblastic anemia.627  It had construed the claim phrase, “treating 
or preventing macrocytic megaloblastic anemia” to require that the 
human taking the claimed composition do so with the specific intent 
of treating macrocytic megaloblastic anemia.628  The court had noted 
that there was no evidence on record that Rexall’s customer had the 
required state of mind and, as such, granted its motion for summary 
judgment of non-infringement.629 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not 
add any limitation not compelled by the language of the claims 
themselves.630  First, the court held that particular emphasis should be 
placed on the limitations “treating or preventing macrocytic 
megaloblastic anemia” and “a human in need thereof” because their 
addition to the claims made the claims allowable.631  Second, because 
these limitations were simultaneously added, the court noted that the 
limitations should be read together and, therefore, the term 
“thereof” refers only to the treatment of macrocytic megaloblastic 
anemia.632  Third, the court construed the term “need” to require a 
need that is “recognized and appreciated” because “otherwise the 
                                                          
 621. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 622. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 623. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156 (emphasis added). 
 624. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 625. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 626. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 627. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 628. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 629. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1156. 
 630. Id. at 1333, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 631. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 632. Id. at 1334, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
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added phrases do not carry the meaning that the circumstances of 
their addition suggest they carry.”633  Any other interpretation would 
result in the claims covering almost any physical condition and 
would, therefore, amount to a recapture of subject matter disclaimed 
during prosecution.634 
Jansen argued that even under Rexall’s claim construction, Rexall’s 
labeling and formulation provide circumstantial evidence of direct 
infringement by Rexall’s customers and that this evidence provided 
sufficient support to defeat a motion for summary judgment.635  The 
court disagreed, indicating that the theoretical possibility that 
customers were using Rexall’s formulation for treating macrocytic 
megaloblastic anemia is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.636 
The Federal Circuit also refused to insert timing or sequence 
requirements to the claims at issue in a number of appeals this past 
year.  For example, in Bio-Technology General Corp. v. Duramed 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,637 the Federal Circuit held that infringement may 
exist if evidence establishes that a “menstrual shift” occurs after a 
woman begins taking the accused contraceptive product, such that 
the use of the accused product after an initial period of time results 
in a dosing that follows the patented method and product.638 
Duramed involved an oral contraceptive regimen marketed under 
the brand name Mircette.639  Mircette is sold in a 28-pill blister pack.640 
A woman using Mircette is instructed to sequentially take the 28 
pills.641  The first twenty-one pills comprise a combination of 
progestin and estrogen, followed by two placebos with the final five 
pills containing estrogen alone.642 
The district court granted Duramed’s motion for summary 
judgment of noninfringement because a single package of the 
Duramed product reversed the delivery sequence prescribed by claim 
1, estrogen before progestin.643  The district court reasoned that a 
woman would have to take at least two packages of the accused 
contraceptive in order to complete the claimed regimen and that 
because “the elements of the accused product are placed in a 
                                                          
 633. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 634. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158. 
 635. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1158-59. 
 636. Id. at 1334-35, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159. 
 637. 325 F.3d 1356, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 638. Id. at 1361, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1364. 
 639. Id. at 1358, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362. 
 640. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362. 
 641. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362. 
 642. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362. 
 643. Id. at 1358-59, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1362-63. 
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reversed order to achieve a different result than that obtained in the 
patented system,” there was no infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.644 
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the district court 
construed the claims too narrowly by limiting them to a particular 
arrangement of estrogen and progestin pills in a single one-month 
package.645  Instead, the Federal Circuit found that a proper claim 
construction would include estrogen pills taken at the beginning of a 
woman’s menstrual cycle, followed by progestin pills for the 
remainder of the menstrual cycle.646 
In 3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp.,647 the Federal 
Circuit again relied upon the plain meaning of the claims to hold 
that the asserted claim requiring “at least one surface that has a 
multiple embossed pattern having a first embossed pattern and a 
second embossed pattern . . . .”648 did not impose a limitation upon 
the sequence of embossing.649  In coming to its conclusion, the court 
found probative the absence of any sequential language in the claim 
at issue in contrast to the presence of similar language in an 
unasserted product-by-process claim.650  The court found less relevant 
the statements in the prosecution history that 3M’s claimed invention 
pertained to embossed patterns where the first embossed pattern 
“survives” the embossing of the second pattern.651  The court found 
that 3M’s statement did not constitute a “clear and unambiguous” 
surrender of subject matter and thus did not limit the claim.652   
B. Proper and Improper Use of the Specification During Construction 
This year, the specification’s main role in claim construction was to 
assist in determining which dictionary definitions were clearly 
inapplicable.  For example, in Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive 
Surgical, Inc.653 the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment based on its finding that the coverage a patent 
directed to robotic surgical systems having a telecommunications link 
                                                          
 644. Id. at 1359-60, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1363. 
 645. Id. at 1363-64, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366. 
 646. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366. 
 647. 350 F.3d 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 648. Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1052. 
 649. Id. at 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055. 
 650. Id. at 1373, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056. 
 651. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056. 
 652. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1056. 
 653. 334 F.3d 1294, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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permitting a surgeon to operate from a “remote location” extended 
to locations in the operating room.654  
The district court held that “remote location” meant “a location 
outside the operating room where the patient undergoing surgery is 
located”655 and granted summary judgment in favor of Intuitive.656  
Brookhill appealed, arguing that “the plain meaning of the claim 
term, the patent’s written description, the prosecution history and 
extrinsic evidence all support a broader reading that does not restrict 
the surgeon to a location outside the operating room.”657  Specifically, 
Brookhill argued that the ordinary and customary meaning of 
“remote location” means any location beyond arm’s length.658 
While noting the parties’ battle of dictionaries offered in support 
of the competing ordinary and customary meaning of the disputed 
claim term, the Federal Circuit stated that “consulting dictionary 
definitions is simply a first step in the claim construction analysis and 
is another reason why resort must always be made up to the 
surrounding text of the claims in question, the other claims, the 
written description and the prosecution history.”659  The court 
instructed that dictionary definitions “must always be compared 
against the use of the terms in context, and the intrinsic record must 
always be consulted to identify which of the different possible 
dictionary meanings is most consistent with the use of the words by 
the inventor.”660 
The court found “no specific parameters as to the distance between 
the surgeon and patient, but [found that the written description] 
teaches generally that a surgeon using the disclosed assembly may 
operate without directly touching the patient . . . regardless of the 
extent of the physical separation between [them].”661  Although the 
Federal Circuit conceded that the patent “contemplates that a 
principal use of the invention is to allow a surgeon to operate at some 
distance, possibly across the world, from the operating room in which 
the patient is located,”662 it found that such an capability is only 
posited as an advantage and does not constitute “a limitation on the 
scope of the invention.”663  Accordingly, the court, relying on 
                                                          
 654. Id. at 1304, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1140. 
 655. Id. at 1297, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. 
 656. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. 
 657. Id. at 1298, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135. 
 658. Id. at 1299, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1136. 
 659. Id. at 1300, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137. 
 660. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137. 
 661. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137. 
 662. Id. at 1301, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138. 
 663. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138. 
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dictionary definitions, construed the term “remote location” to 
“encompass not just locations that are ‘far apart’ or ‘distant,’ but also 
those locations that are merely ‘separated by intervals greater than 
usual; even if inside the operating room.’”664 
Finally, the Federal Circuit also faulted the district court for 
consulting a number of references dated after the filing date:  
They are not contemporaneous with the patent, do not reflect the 
meanings that would have been attributed to the words in dispute 
by persons of ordinary skill in the art as of the grant of the ‘003 
patent, and for those reasons are not considered in our de novo 
claim construction analysis.665 
In Resonate Inc. v. Alteon Websystems, Inc.,666 the Federal Circuit 
rejected the district court’s “level of detail” analysis667 and concluded 
that when a patent sets out novel solutions to two different problems 
in the prior art, it is not necessary for each claim to address both 
solutions.668 
The patent-in-suit related to a website system used for handling 
client requests when accessing a website that uses a server farm.669  
The specification described two problems with a prior art process for 
distributing client requests among multiple servers in the farm so that 
no single server was overloaded.670  In the prior art, a router was 
placed between the client and the servers to route all requests to a 
server.671  The first problem identified with such a system was that 
each server had to maintain a complete copy of the website.672  The 
second identified problem was that all data transfers had to go 
through the router, which could cause bottlenecks.673  The claimed 
invention pertained to a system that provided a solution to both of 
those problems, in part by permitting data transmitted from the 
server to the client to bypass the router and, in part, by distributing 
the website content among the servers.674 
At issue was the proper construction of the phrase “transmitting 
the requested resource to the client.”675 The dispute centered on 
whether, as the district court had held, the phrase required the 
                                                          
 664. Id. at 1302, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138. 
 665. Id. at 1299, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1137. 
 666. 338 F.3d 1360, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1771 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 667. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 668. Id. at 1367, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776-77. 
 669. Id. at 1361-62, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772-73. 
 670. Id. at 1362-63, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 671. Id. at 1362, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 672. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 673. Id. at 1363, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 674. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773. 
 675. Id. at 1364, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
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router to be bypassed.676  The district court based its analysis on the 
high level of detail of the other elements in the claim, including 
details of the relationship between the client, loan balancer and 
server, concluding that if the requested data were to pass through the 
load balancer on its way to the client, the claim would have detailed 
that step as well.677  The court thus concluded that while the claim 
language at issue did not recite a router, the court could infer the 
patentee’s intent to include the bypass of the router feature.678 
The Federal Circuit began its claim construction inquiry with the 
ordinary meaning attributed to the words of the claim.679  The court 
then reviewed the specification to determine if the patentee’s use of 
the term “transmitting” was consistent with the ordinary meaning.680  
Finally, the court turned to the prosecution history to determine its 
relevance to claim construction.681  The Federal Circuit concluded 
there was nothing in the claim language itself, “transmitting the 
requested resource to the client,” that limited the path of 
transmission to bypass the router.682 
The Federal Circuit criticized the district court’s level of detail 
analysis, stating that “[c]ourts may not rewrite claim language based 
on what has been omitted from a claim.”683  Although the preferred 
embodiment included the bypass feature, the court noted that 
limitations may not be read into a claim from a preferred 
embodiment “when the claim language is broader than that 
embodiment”684 and concluded the bypass feature was not included 
in the claim element at issue.685 
Alteon argued that the claim required the bypass feature because 
the bypass was one of the main inventive features.686  The court 
disagreed, noting that where an invention includes two (or 
presumably more) inventive features, each feature need not be 
addressed in every claim.687  The court found the claim at issue was 
directed to the prior art problem of storing a copy of the website on 
each server, not to resolving the bottleneck problem.688 
                                                          
 676. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 677. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 678. Id. at 1364, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 679. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774-75. 
 680. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774. 
 681. Id. at 1364-65, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 682. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 683. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 684. Id. at 1364-65, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1775. 
 685. Id. at 1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777-78. 
 686. Id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 687. Id. at 1367, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776. 
 688. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1776-77. 
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In RF Delaware, Inc. v. Pacific Keystone Technologies, Inc.,689 the Federal 
Circuit reversed the claim construction of the district court,690 which 
the lower court had adopted in part from a claim construction ruling 
on partial summary judgment in previous litigation in which the 
plaintiff, RF Delaware (RFD), had asserted the same patents against a 
different defendant.691  Pacific Keystone argued that regardless of the 
soundness of the district court’s claim interpretation analysis, the 
prior district court’s claim construction should be given collateral 
estoppel effect.692  Because earlier action ended in an extra-judicial 
settlement, however, without complete adjudication even as to 
liability, the Federal Circuit (applying regional law to this purely 
procedural issue) rejected collateral estoppel as a defense.693  Citing 
Eleventh Circuit cases, the court held that “[c]ollateral estoppel does 
not apply in the present case because no judgment, much less final 
judgment, was ever entered in the Virginia district court case.”694 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court 
“did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold RFD judicially 
estopped by its admission in a preliminary injunction proceeding 
that, in the context of that proceeding, the claim interpretation of 
the Virginia district court was binding.”695  Among other things, the 
court observed, RFD did not succeed in urging its position (its 
motion for a preliminary injunction was denied), and the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel prevents only those who successfully urge a position 
from thereafter changing it.696 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had 
improperly imported limitations from the specification and from 
narrower or dependent claims into the patents’ broad, independent 
claims.697  Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
erred in construing the claim terms “filter bed” and “first particle 
filter media” (as used in the asserted claims of the patents in suit, 
relating to the use and washing of an upflow filter in combination 
with upflow and downflow water filtration systems) unduly narrowly 
in limiting the claim to a system using multiple filter layers.698 
                                                          
 689. 326 F.3d 1255, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1593 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 690. Id. at 1268, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602. 
 691. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602. 
 692. Id. at 1260, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 693. Id. at 1261, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 694. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1596. 
 695. Id. at 1262, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
 696. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
 697. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
 698. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
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In Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap,699 the Federal Circuit vacated the 
district court’s grant of a summary judgment of non-infringement, 
finding that the district court construed the patent claims in question 
too narrowly.700 
The patent-in-suit described a “Decorative Assembly for a Floral 
Grouping.”701 The district court construed the claim term “floral 
holding material” to be limited to “a three-dimensional solid, semi-
solid, or granular material capable of giving support to individual 
flowers when their stems are inserted into the material.”702  The 
district court also required that the floral stems be “inserted into the 
floral holding material.”703  Based on its construction, the district 
court found that the product at issue did not infringe the Prima Tek 
patent, either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, because 
“the flowers and stem ends are not actually inserted into and through 
the actual plastic material of the cone.”704 
The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that the district court 
impermissibly read limitations into the claims from the 
specification.705 
[N]either the phrase “inserted into” nor “inserted through” 
appears in any of the asserted claims. Instead, all of the claims at 
issue require that the “floral holding material” be constructed of 
“material capable of receiving a portion of the floral grouping and 
supporting the floral grouping without any pot means . . . .”  The 
claim language does not require that the stem end of the flower be 
inserted into and through the floral holding material.706 
The court rejected Polypap’s attempt to limit the claim terms by 
reference to the written description and prosecution history that 
indicated that the “floral holding material” was either floral foam or 
soil.707  The Federal Court dismissed this argument as unpersuasive 
because the written description failed to “describe ‘with reasonable 
clarity, deliberateness, and precision’ the definition of ‘floral holding 
material’ proposed by Polypap.”708  The Federal Circuit pointed out 
that the written description only stated that the floral holding 
                                                          
 699. 318 F.3d 1143, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 700. Id. at 1154, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1825-26. 
 701. Id. at 1145, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819. 
 702. Id. at 1147, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820. 
 703. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820. 
 704. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820. 
 705. Id. at 1149, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822. 
 706. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822. 
 707. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1822. 
 708. Id. at 1150, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823 (citation omitted). 
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material “‘may be’ (not must be)” foam or soil.709  “[I]ndeed the many 
uses of the term throughout the ‘856 patent are consistent with a 
broader definition, one encompassing material of any shape or 
type.”710 
Citing the general rule “that claims of a patent are not limited to 
the preferred embodiment, unless by their own language,”711 the 
Federal Circuit noted that the written description used the term 
“floral holding material” at various points to refer to material of any 
shape or type, and that no “special and particular definition” had 
been created.712  Thus, the court found no reason to depart from the 
general rule.713  The court also concluded “that the prosecution 
history does not attribute a special meaning to the phrase ‘floral 
holding material,’ as there were no express representations made in 
obtaining the patent regarding the scope and meaning of the claim 
terms.”714 
In Combined Systems, Inc. v. Defense Technology Corp. of America,715 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling of summary 
judgment of non-infringement, construing a claim directed to a 
method of making a low lethality projectile based on the syntax used 
in the claim, as informed by the context of the specification.716  
Combined Systems, Inc. (CSI) sued Defense Technology 
Corporation of America (DTCA) for infringement of its patent 
directed to a method of shaping projectiles so that they are less likely 
to kill persons upon impact.717  Claim 1 recited in part the steps of 
“forming folds in [the rear of a] tubular sock-like projectile body” 
after filling the projectile body with some amount of lead shot and 
“inserting said formed folds” into the open end of a projectile 
compartment (i.e., an empty shotgun shell).718 
The district court construed the “forming folds” limitation to 
require “the deliberate and systematic creation of folds.”719  The court 
looked to the ordinary meaning of the term “inserting said formed 
folds” to conclude that the folds “are formed prior to—not during—
                                                          
 709. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 710. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 711. Id. at 1151, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 712. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 713. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 714. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1823. 
 715. 350 F.3d 1207, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 716. Id. at 1215-16, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 717. Id. at 1208, U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934. 
 718. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934. 
 719. Id. at 1209, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934 (quotations omitted). 
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insertion in the empty shotgun shell.”720  Because DTCA’s 
manufacturing process did not create folds prior to the insertion of 
the projectile into the shell, but rather only during insertion, the 
district court granted DTCA a motion for summary judgment of non-
infringement.721  The district court also found that DTCA’s folds were 
not formed in a “systematic or deliberate matter,”722 but were merely a 
consequence of inserting the projectile into the shell.723  
In affirming the district court’s decision, the Federal Circuit held 
as a matter of grammar that the recitation of “‘inserting said formed 
folds . . . into said projectile compartment’ forecloses a construction 
permitting the ‘folds’ to be formed after or during insertion.”724  The 
Federal Circuit dismissed CSI’s argument that the “forming folds” 
limitation should be construed to include “gathers in the material 
that incidentally occur” when the sock-like body is closed using a tie 
or a pull-string.725  The court held that the affirmative recitation of 
“forming folds” as a step in the claimed process was consistent with 
the lower court’s determination that when the claim limitation was 
read in the context of the entire specification, the claim required the 
“deliberate” forming of folds.726 
In response to CSI’s contention that the district court erred in its 
use of a dictionary definition of “fold” in its claim construction 
analysis, the Federal Circuit stated that if the lower court “relied 
exclusively on a dictionary definition or allowed it to overcome clear 
language in the patent itself, its methodology (although not 
necessarily its conclusion) would have been wrong.”727  The court 
further noted that the specification should not be consulted “solely 
for the limited purpose of determining whether it contradicts the 
dictionary meaning of a claim term.”728  Rather, “the written 
description must be examined in every case, because it is relevant not 
only to aid in the claim construction analysis, but also to determine if 
the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is rebutted.”729 
The Federal Circuit still defers to the specification, however, when 
it provides a specific definition of the claim term in question.730  In 
                                                          
 720. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935 (quotations omitted). 
 721. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 722. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935 (quotations omitted). 
 723. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 724. Id. at 1211-12, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937 (citation omitted). 
 725. Id. at 1214, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 726. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938. 
 727. Id. at 1215, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 728. Id. at 1215-16, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 729. Id. at 1216, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 730. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Novopharm Ltd., 323 F.3d 1324, 1330, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 
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Abbott Laboratories v. Novopharm Limited,731 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
a grant of summary judgment, finding that a generic fenofibrate 
composition did not infringe Abbott Laboratories’ patent for a 
therapeutic fenofibrate composition sold under the brand name 
Tricor and used to treat high cholesterol.732  Novopharm filed an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), seeking U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval to market a generic micronized 
formulation of fenofibrate before the expiration of Abbott’s patent.733  
Novopharm argued to the FDA that its proposed formulation would 
not infringe the Abbott patent.734  Abbott sued for infringement, 
seeking to stay FDA approval.735  In granting summary judgment of 
non-infringement to Novopharm, the district court construed the 
claim term “co-micronization” to require micronization of fenofibrate 
and a solid surfactant “in the absence of other excipients.”736  
Novopharm argued that its process did not include micronization of 
fenofibrate and a solid surfactant.737  Abbott appealed.738 
The Federal Circuit, while observing that the ordinary meaning of 
the term “co-micronization” did not necessarily exclude the presence 
of ingredients not specifically recited in the claim, nevertheless found 
that by explicitly defining the term “co-micronization” as 
“micronization of an intimate mixture of fenofibrate and a solid 
surfactant,” the inventor had “chosen to be his own lexicographer.”739  
Accordingly, the court found that claims at issue require co-
micronization of a mixture consisting essentially of only fenofibrate 
and a solid surfactant.740  “Had that term not been explicitly defined 
in the . . . patent specification, we might well agree with the 
appellants that that term . . . would not necessarily exclude the 
presence of ingredients not specifically recited in the claim.”741  Since 
it is undisputed that fenofibrate and a solid surfactant are not mixed 
in Novopharm’s process without the presence of other significant 
                                                          
(BNA) 1200, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 731. Id. at 1324, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200. 
 732. Id. at 1325-26, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201. 
 733. Id. at 1326, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201. 
 734. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201. 
 735. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1201-02. 
 736. Id. at 1328, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.  Micronization is the process of 
reducing something to particles of only a few microns in diameter.  DORLAND’S 
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1112 (29th ed. 2000).  An excipient is an inert substance used 
as a vehicle for a drug.  Id. at 631.  
 737. Abbott, 323 F.3d at 1328, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203. 
 738. Id. at 1329, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204. 
 739. Id. at 1330, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 740. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 741. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
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ingredients, the Federal Circuit held that “there is no genuine issue 
of material fact as to literal infringement in this case.”742 
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the finding of no infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents, noting particularly that the process 
described in Novopharm’s ANDA did not include any step in which 
fenofibrate and a solid surfactant were present in a mixture, 
irrespective of the presence or absence of other excipients.743  The 
Federal Circuit concluded that holding otherwise would vitiate the 
claim limitation altogether, in contravention of the all-elements rule, 
which requires all claim elements to be either literally or equivalently 
present in the infringing product or process before infringement will 
be found.744 
C. The Prosecution History—Need for “Clear and Unmistakable” Surrender 
This past year, the Federal Circuit limited the scope of the claims 
based upon the prosecution history only in the rarest of 
circumstances.  In Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Raytek Corp.,745 the 
Federal Circuit held that the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer may 
only be used to narrow the ordinary meaning of a patent claim based 
on statements during prosecution if the allegedly disavowing 
statements or actions are “clear and unmistakable.”746 
Omega Engineering involved three patents that disclosed a laser 
sighting system used to target infrared thermometer scans.747  The 
district court’s claim construction analysis focused on language in the 
patents describing the use of lasers to outline a target energy zone.748  
The district court read the means-plus-function claim language 
directed to this feature to exclude targeting that involved a laser 
beam that struck inside the target energy zone.749  The district court’s 
claim construction rested heavily on the application of the doctrine 
of prosecution disclaimer.750  The lower court found that the plaintiff 
had made numerous statements during the prosecution of the 
patents in suit that narrowed the scope of the disputed claims.751  
Based on its narrowed claim construction, the district court granted 
                                                          
 742. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 
 743. Id. at 1331, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205-06. 
 744. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206. 
 745. 334 F.3d 1314, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 746. Id. at 1325-26, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. 
 747. Id. at 1317-18, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-23. 
 748. Id. at 1318-19, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323-24. 
 749. Id. at 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 750. Id. at 1321-23, 1327, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326-27, 1330. 
 751. Id. at 1319-20, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
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summary judgment of non-infringement and, in the alternative, 
granted summary judgment invalidating two of the disputed claims.752 
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded.753  In a panel decision 
authored by Judge Clevinger, the court acknowledged the general 
rule that “where the patentee has unequivocally disavowed a certain 
meaning to obtain his patent, the doctrine of prosecution disclaimer 
attaches and narrows the ordinary meaning of the claim congruent 
with the scope of the surrender.”754  However, the court held that the 
doctrine of prosecution disclaimer does not apply “where the alleged 
disavowal of claim scope is ambiguous.”755 
Rather, the court explained that the doctrine of prosecution 
disclaimer requires that the defendant demonstrate a “clear and 
unmistakable disclaimer,” reasoning that such a disclaimer is 
necessary to maintain the balance between the need for adequate 
public notice and the right to seek broad patent coverage.756  The 
court noted in a footnote that “this is the same standard applicable, 
in the context of the doctrine of equivalents, to the doctrine of 
argument-based estoppel. . . .”757 
The Federal Circuit then found that the district court had 
mistakenly used a number of ambiguous statements in the 
prosecution history to narrow the scope of the patents in suit.758  The 
court also held that after the erroneous claims construction had been 
corrected, triable issues of material fact remained, and thus reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings.759  Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic 
Ave, Inc.,760 presents another example of the Federal Circuit’s 
reluctance to limit the scope of the claims based on the prosecution 
history.761 
In Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG,762 the Federal Circuit 
ruled, over vigorous dissent, that the plain meaning of a claim trumps 
even directly inaccurate remarks in a patent’s prosecution history 
                                                          
 752. Id. at 1320, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324. 
 753. Id. at 1336, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1337. 
 754. Id. at 1324, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 755. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 756. Id. at 1325-26, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328-29. 
 757. Id. at 1326 n.1, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 n.1. 
 758. Id. at 1330, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332. 
 759. Id. at 1328-29, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 760. 339 F.3d 1352, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 761. Id. at 1363, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884 (holding that to invoke argument-
based estoppel, as the infringer in this case attempted to do, a patent’s prosecution 
history must evince a clear and unmistakable surrender of the subject matter at issue, 
which the court could not find in this case). 
 762. 318 F.3d 1081, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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statement763 and that withholding information concerning one’s own 
patent portfolio from others in a standard-setting body is not 
necessarily actionable fraud.764 
When adding certain claims during the prosecution of the patent 
in suit, the patent attorney representing Rambus characterized the 
claims as all containing particular limitations.765  In fact, the wording 
of the claims themselves made clear that only one of the several newly 
offered claims contained each of the recited limitations.766  In 
construing the claims, however, the district court accepted Infineon’s 
invitation to read the missing limitations into the claims based on the 
patent attorney’s representations to the PTO.767  Based on the claim 
construction, the district court entered a judgment of non-
infringement.768 
The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in adopting a 
claim construction inconsistent with the plain meaning of the claim 
language, the attorney argument during prosecution 
notwithstanding: “The claim language itself controls the bounds of 
the claim, not a facially inaccurate remark during prosecution.”769  In 
a heavily criticized observation,770 the majority noted its belief that “a 
reasonable competitor would not rely on an untrue statement in the 
prosecution history over the express terms of the claims.”771 
Similarly, in Storage Technology Corp. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,772 the 
Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s narrow claim construction, 
noting that an applicant’s inaccurate statement about its pending 
claims does not override the claim language as issued.773 
The Storage Technology patent related to the efficient 
enforcement of network policies in a high-speed packet data 
network.774  As the court summarized: 
                                                          
 763. Id. at 1090, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 764. Id. at 1084, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. 
 765. Id. at 1089-90, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710-11. 
 766. Id. at 1088, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 767. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (considering Infineon’s alternate meaning 
of the term “integrated circuit device” based upon representations made during 
patent prosecution and upon the principle that “inventors may act as their own 
lexicographers” and supply alternate meanings to terms). 
 768. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709. 
 769. Id. at 1090, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 770. See id. at 1115, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1730 (Prost, J., dissenting in part) 
(accusing the majority of ignoring the broad disclosure duty set out in a standard-
setting body’s policy manual upon which a competitor-member of the body might 
reasonably rely). 
 771. Id. at 1090, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711. 
 772. 329 F.3d 823, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 773. Id. at 832, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 774. Id. at 826, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546-47. 
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In the system described in the patent, network policy information 
that is used frequently by the processor is stored in cache memory 
for easy and fast accessibility.  A processor in a network device 
implementing the invention examines the header of an arriving 
packet to determine whether, based on selection criteria, it is 
related to other packets that have been received.775 
The district court construed the claim limitation “network policy” 
to mean “a filtering or auditing rule, which determines if and why a 
PDU (Protocol Data Unit) should be forwarded.”776  The district court 
also construed the step of “caching policy identification information” 
to mean “storing information that identifies and is used to retrieve a 
separately cached instance of network policy.”777  Thus, as construed 
by the district court, the claims required two caches:  “one for storing 
information identifying a policy, and a second for storing a copy of 
the policy itself.”778  On the basis of that claim construction, the 
district court found no literal infringement.779  
StorageTek appealed, challenging the district court’s construction 
of the “caching policy identification information” and “protocol data 
unit (PDU) network policy” claim limitations.780  The Federal Circuit 
first noted that the claim at issue was “a method claim with two 
steps—determining an instance of network policy to be applied to 
related PDUs based on the contents of one PDU, and caching policy 
identification information identifying that instance of network 
policy.”781  In other words, the court found that the plain language of 
the claim did not “include any step relating to caching the instance of 
network policy or any limitation indicating that the instance of the 
network policy is stored in or retrieved from a cache.”782 
As viewed by the Federal Circuit, the district court erred by 
considering the phrase “policy caching method,” or “policy cache,” 
found in the preamble of the independent claims, to be a claims 
limitation.783  The court determined that the written description and 
claims simply use the terms “policy caching method” and “policy 
cache” to “refer to the invention as a whole, not to the specific step of 
                                                          
 775. Id. at 826-27, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547. 
 776. Id. at 828, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 777. Id. at 828, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.   
 778. Id. at 828, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548. 
 779. Id. at 829, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548-49. 
 780. Id. at 830, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549. 
 781. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 782. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 783. Id. at 831, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
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storing an instance of network policy or the cache that stores the 
instance of network policy.”784 
The Federal Circuit also admonished the district court for relying 
on the written description, prosecution history and a declaration by 
Cisco’s expert witness in limiting the claims to a cache for the 
instance of network policy.785  “In so doing, the district court 
disregarded the well-established rule that while proper claim 
construction requires an examination of the written description and 
relevant prosecution history to determine the meaning of claim 
limitations, additional limitations may not be read into the claims.”786 
Finally, the court noted that during prosecution “the patent 
applicants stated that the invention as recited in [the claims], the 
instance of network policy and the policy identification information 
are both cached.”787  The court conceded that “on its face this 
statement appears to limit claim scope.”788  However, citing to its 
recent Rambus decision, the Federal Circuit held that such a 
statement was not alone limiting.789  Rather, the court found the 
statement from the prosecution history “erroneously suggests that the 
independent claims include a cache for the instance of network 
policy.  The applicants’ inaccurate statement cannot override the 
claim language itself, which controls the bounds of the claim.”790 
In Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,791 the Federal 
Circuit reversed a finding of non-infringement based on its 
conclusion that the district court had improperly construed the terms 
“amount effective” and “amount sufficient.”792 
Abbott had accused Baxter of infringement of its patent directed to 
an anesthetic composition containing a sevoflurane and a Lewis acid 
inhibitor such as water in an amount effective to prevent degradation 
by a Lewis acid of the sevoflurane compound.793 
During prosecution of the patent, Abbott filed an Information 
Disclosure Statement (IDS) containing a reference indicating that at 
least one year before the filing date of the patent, “Abbott sold 
sevoflurane in glass bottles with a water content up to 131 ppm.”794 
                                                          
 784. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 785. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 786. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550. 
 787. Id. at 832, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 788. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 789. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 790. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551. 
 791. 334 F.3d 1274, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 792. Id. at 1276-77, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192-93. 
 793. Id. at 1276, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1192-93. 
 794. Id. at 1277, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
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Based on that IDS “admission,” Baxter asserted that its generic 
sevoflurane, with a water content of no more than 130 ppm, fell 
within the prior art and, therefore, did not infringe the patent.795  
The district court agreed and construed the claim terms “amount 
effective” and “amount sufficient” to mean amounts above 131 ppm 
of water.796  Based on this claim construction, the district court 
granted summary judgment of non-infringement, finding that the 
prior sale of sevoflurane by Abbott surrendered the subject matter of 
the sale.797 
The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that the fundamental issue 
was the construction of the term “effective amount,” a term that the 
court stated has a customary usage.798  In light of the term’s customary 
usage, the court construed “effective amount” to mean “the amount 
of Lewis acid inhibitor that will prevent the degradation of 
sevoflurane by a Lewis acid.”799  The Federal Circuit reasoned that the 
specification taught that “an effective amount of any given Lewis acid 
inhibitor will vary depending upon the conditions to which 
sevoflurane is subjected.”800 
As noted by the court, the term “effective amount” was broadly 
described in the “Summary of the Invention” as an “effective 
stabilizing amount of Lewis Acid inhibitor” that “prevents the 
degradation of the fluoroether compound by a Lewis acid.”801  
Therefore, the Federal Circuit stated that the specification supported 
the concept that “the amount of Lewis acid inhibitor depends on 
many environmental considerations.”802 
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that the district court incorrectly 
viewed the IDS as a limitation on the term “effective amount.”803  
According to the Federal Circuit, “simply disclosing a previous sale of 
sevoflurane” in an IDS, “without saying or doing anything more, did 
not disavow or relinquish all water concentrations below 131 ppm”804 
because the patent disclosed that “the effective amount of Lewis acid 
inhibitor depends on the specific storage conditions of the 
sevoflurane.”805  The court also stated that the “mere submission of an 
                                                          
 795. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
 796. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193. 
 797. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193-94. 
 798. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 799. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 800. Id. at 1278, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 801. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 802. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194. 
 803. Id. at 1279, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195. 
 804. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195. 
 805. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195. 
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IDS to the [Patent Office] does not constitute the patent applicant’s 
admission that any reference in the IDS is material prior art.”806 
In Invitrogen Corp. v. BioCrest Manufacturing, L.P.,807 the Federal 
Circuit reversed summary judgment of noninfringement after finding 
error in the district court’s construction.808  The asserted patent was 
directed to a process for producing transformable E. coli cells of 
improved competence.809  The claimed process required performance 
of three steps in a specific order, including the step of rendering said 
E. coli cells competent after growing the cells in a medium at 
temperature in the range of 18 to 32°C.810  BioCrest made and sold 
competent E. coli cell lines using a process that includes “incubating” 
the cells at 37°C and then growing the cells in a fermenter at 26°C.811 
During prosecution, the PTO examiner stated that the claimed 
range of 18 to 32°C was essential to the invention.812  The applicants 
then amended the claims to add the language “improved competence”813 
to the preamble and to replace the originally recited open range of 
“less than 37°C” with “18 to 32°C” and argued that the amendment 
distinguished the claimed invention from prior art that showed 
growth at 37°C.814 
The district court construed the claim to require that cell “growth 
must be performed at a temperature within 18 to 32°C”815 and 
rejected Invitrogen’s argument that the open-ended transition term 
“comprising” in the preamble permitted coverage over a process with 
an additional step of growing cells at 37°C before the step of growing 
cells in the recited range.816 
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the claim did not 
preclude additional steps, such as the defendant’s incubation step, 
before or after the recited steps.  Specifically, the court found that 
the transitional term “comprising” opened the claim to additional, 
unrecited steps and did not preclude growth by incubation at 37°C in 
advance of the first step.817 
                                                          
 806. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1195. 
 807. 327 F.3d 1364, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1631 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 808. Id. at 1366, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 
 809. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 
 810. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 
 811. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1632. 
 812. Id. at 1368, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 813. Id. at 1370, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635. 
 814. Id. at 1368, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 815. Id. at 1367-68, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633 (citation omitted). 
 816. Id. at 1368, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633. 
 817. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1633-34. 
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Also, the Federal Circuit noted that the district court’s claim 
construction would exclude an embodiment set forth in an example, 
a construction that is “rarely, if ever correct and [that] would require 
highly persuasive evidentiary support” not found here.818 
Finally, the Federal Circuit found that the district court claim 
construction improperly ignored the “improved competence” 
language in the preamble: “[C]lear reliance on the preamble during 
prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art 
transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such 
reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed 
invention.”819  Here, the court found that the term “improved 
competence” should have been construed “to require at least a ten-
fold competence increase” over the prior art method.820 
In a pair of related cases, Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. 
Warner Lambert Co.821 and Inverness Medical Switzerland GmbH v. 
Princeton Biomeditech Corp.,822 the Federal Circuit again emphasized 
that it will not limit claim terms by the specification823 and that 
prosecution history must be unambiguous to be limiting.824 
The appeals arose from two cases Inverness filed against Warner 
Lambert and Princeton for infringement of three patents directed 
toward a pregnancy-testing device using a strip of porous material 
that facilitated a chemical reaction between a reagent, proteins found 
in urine, and a colored label.825  After the district court granted each 
of the defendants summary judgment of non-infringement, Inverness 
appealed.826  In separate opinions, the Federal Circuit vacated the 
judgments.827 
In Princeton, the district court based its summary judgment of non-
infringement on its construction of the claim limitation “wherein 
                                                          
 818. Id. at 1369, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1634 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 
1996)) (quotations omitted). 
 819. Id. at 1370, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635 (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808-09, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1781, 1785 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). 
 820. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635. 
 821. 309 F.3d 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 822. 309 F.3d 1365, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 823. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937; Princeton 
Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d at 1371, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931. 
 824. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939; Princeton 
Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932. 
 825. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d at 1376-77, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935; 
Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d at 1367-68, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1928-29. 
 826. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935; Princeton 
Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d at 1368, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929. 
 827. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939; Princeton 
Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d at 1373, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932. 
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mobility of said labeled reagent within said test strip is facilitated 
by . . . a material comprising a sugar.”828  The court found that the 
limitation required a sugar that improved mobility of the reagent at 
the point of its release from the test strip (i.e., when the reagent 
comes into contact with urine), which did not occur in the Princeton 
product.829  Inverness argued on appeal that the facilitation of 
mobility could occur either at the time of release or during 
subsequent transit of the reagent.830 
Based on the dictionary definition and the discussion in the 
patents, the Federal Circuit found that “mobility” of the reagent 
referred to both the point-of-release from the test strip as well as post-
release, and the use of the term “mobility” in other claims 
contradicted Princeton’s construction.831 
In the Warner Lambert appeal, the same argument was presented 
regarding the term “mobility.”832  Warner Lambert also argued that 
the claim limitations “said labeled reagent is dry on said test strip” and 
“drying said labeled reagent onto a portion of said test strip” required 
surface disposition of the reagent, which was not present in its 
product.833  Inverness argued that the phrases “on” and “onto” should 
be more broadly construed to include disposition of the labeled 
reagent within the test strip.834 
The Federal Circuit noted the dictionary definitions of “on” and 
“onto” were identical and, unless limited by the specification or 
prosecution history, could refer to either a surface location or a 
presence within the test strip: “a word that has an ordinary meaning 
encompassing two relevant alternatives may be construed to 
encompass both alternatives.”835 The court then looked to the 
specification, which only discussed a surface application of the 
reagent, but found this to only be a preferred embodiment that did 
not preclude the claims from encompassing a test strip containing 
the reagent within its inner layers.836  Next, the court addressed the 
prosecution history of the patents.837  Warner Lambert argued that 
Inverness had amended its claims using the “on/onto” language in 
                                                          
 828. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d at 1368, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929. 
 829. Id. at 1368-69, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1929. 
 830. Id. at 1369, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930. 
 831. Id. at 1369-73, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930-32. 
 832. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d at 1377, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 833. Id. at 1376, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935. 
 834. Id. at 1377-78, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935-36. 
 835. Id. at 1379, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937 (citing Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram 
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1343, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1851, 1855 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 836. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 837. Id. at 1379-80, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
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response to the examiner’s finding that that scope of enablement was 
limited to surface application of the labeled reagent.838  Inverness 
argued that the examiner also had invited it to show that the prior art 
recognized alternative means, other than surface application, of 
providing mobilization.839  The Federal Circuit acknowledged that 
“failure to object to an examiner’s interpretation of a claim ordinarily 
disclaims a broader interpretation” but found that was not the case 
here.840  Rather, the Federal Circuit found that it was not clear from 
the prosecution history whether the patentee had foreclosed the 
broader dictionary definition (which encompassed both surface 
application and internal positioning of sugar) in response to the 
examiner’s rejection.841  Thus, the court stated that it would be 
“inappropriate to limit broad definition of a claim term based on 
prosecution history that is itself ambiguous.”842 
The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to rely upon the prosecution 
history worked both ways, however there was still the occasional 
exception to the rule.  In Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Laboratories, Inc.,843 a 
case involving an attempt to rely on the prosecution history to 
enlarge (rather than revisit) the claims,844 the Federal Circuit 
substantially upheld a district court’s decision that Berlex’s patent 
claims did not cover Biogen’s method of making the multiple 
sclerosis drug AVONEX.845  The court noted that “[r]epresentations 
during prosecution cannot enlarge the content of the 
specification. . . .”846 
Biogen and Berlex Laboratories make competing formulations of a 
genetically engineered protein (human ß-interferon) for the 
treatment of multiple sclerosis.847  Berlex’s BETASERON is produced 
in bacteria, while Biogen’s AVONEX is produced in cultured 
mammalian cells.848  As a result, BETASERON and AVONEX differ in 
their sugar attachments and in a minor amino acid sequence 
                                                          
 838. Id. at 1380, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 839. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937. 
 840. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937 (citing Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 
F.3d 973, 979, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 
U.S. 1066, 120 S. Ct. 1672, 146 L.Ed.2d 482 (2000)). 
 841. Id. at 1381-82, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938-39. 
 842. Id. at 1382, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. 
 843. 318 F.3d 1132, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1809 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 844. Id. at 1137, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
 845. Id. at 1140, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815. 
 846. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815 (citing Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 1369, 1371-72, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886, 1889 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) and Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 810 F.2d 1113, 1116-17, 1 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 
 847. Id. at 1132, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809. 
 848. Id. at 1136, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812. 
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variation.849  Berlex sued Biogen for infringement of two patents 
directed to methods for making human ß-interferon in mammalian 
cells, but the district court found non-infringement by Biogen.850  
After the trial, Berlex and Biogen settled, with the amount of a final 
payment by Biogen dependent upon the outcome of an appeal to the 
Federal Circuit.851 
According to the Federal Circuit, the principal issue was whether 
the claims of the patent directed to the production of ß-interferon in 
mammalian cells were correctly construed.852  The district court 
limited the claim scope to the use of a single DNA vector to introduce 
both the interferon gene and a selectable marker gene into the cells 
(so-called “linked co-transformation,” as disclosed in the 
specification).853  The scope of the claims did not cover the use of 
separate DNA vectors for the separate genes (so-called “unlinked co-
transformation” used by the Biogen method to make AVONEX).854  
The Federal Circuit agreed that the claims did not cover unlinked co-
transformation, despite arguments made by Berlex during the patent 
prosecution history that the allowed claims “do not depend on any 
particular nucleic acid construct configuration.”855 
In Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.856 the Federal 
Circuit vacated a district court’s summary judgment that Andrx 
Pharmaceuticals’ proposed generic drug did not infringe Glaxo 
Wellcome’s patent covering its antidepressant Wellbutrin SR and 
remanded for further proceedings on the issue of infringement.857 
Glaxo’s patent covered sustained release formulations containing 
the active ingredient bupropion hydrochloride.858  The claims at issue 
                                                          
 849. See Christopher Webster et al., Biologics: Can There be Abbreviated Applications, 
Generics, or Follow-on Products? Controversial Topics, BIOPHARM INT’L, July 1, 2003, at 28, 
32 (discussing the product differences between BETASERON and AVONEX).   
 850. Biogen, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1133-34, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 851. See Carey Krause, Biogen, Berlex Settle Dispute on Patent Infringement Issue, CHEM. 
MKT. RPTR., Jan. 28, 2002, at 7 (noting Biogen’s payment to Berlex of $20 million to 
license the Berlex patents at issue and explaining the parties’ agreement to specific 
settlement terms depending on the Federal Circuit court’s decision: if the court 
affirmed the district court’s decision, Biogen would pay nothing more; if the court 
reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, Biogen would pay $55 
million; if the court reversed the district court ruling entirely, Biogen would pay $230 
million); see also Randall Osborne, Biogen To Pay Schering $ 55m Bringing MS Dispute To 
End, BIOWORLD TODAY, Feb. 4, 2003, § 23 (noting Biogen’s $55 million settlement 
payment to Berlex pursuant to the Federal Circuit’s opinion).   
 852. Biogen, Inc., 318 F.3d at 1133, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1810. 
 853. Id. at 1135, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811. 
 854. Id. at 1139, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1814. 
 855. Id. at 1138, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1813. 
 856. 344 F.3d 1226, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 857. Id. at 1227, 1234, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303, 1308. 
 858. Id. at 1227, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
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recited the active ingredient, which is the controlled release agent 
hydroxypropyl methylcellulose (“HPMC”), the particular release 
rates, and plasma levels.859  Glaxo sold the corresponding tablets as 
the antidepressant Wellbutrin SR and the anti-smoking medicine 
Zyban.860  Andrx filed two abbreviated new drug applications 
(“ANDA”) seeking approval of generic counterparts of these 
medications, claiming identity of the drugs’ active ingredients and 
properties.861 
During prosecution of the patent in suit, Glaxo had limited the 
claims to the release agent HPMC and introduced an amendment 
reciting the release rate of the active ingredient.862  In granting 
summary judgment of non-infringement to Andrx, the district court 
found that, based on the recitation of a particular release rate, the 
claims could no longer encompass all grades of HPMC and construed 
the amended claims as limited to the particular grade of HPMC 
recited in the example.863  Andrx argued that its HPMC was of lower 
molecular weight and viscosity than the grade recited in the example 
of Glaxo’s patent in suit, and Andrx’s HPMC did not affect the 
release rate.864  Glaxo countered that this argument was inconsistent 
with the representation made by Andrx to the FDA that Andrx’s 
tablets are bioequivalent to the Glaxo tablets.865 
Relying on the claims, specification, prosecution history, and 
expert testimony, the Federal Circuit decided that the lower court 
erred in construing the claims as limited to a particular grade or 
molecular weight of HPMC.866  According to the Federal Circuit, the 
correctly construed claims only require that HPMC be present in the 
recited amount and that the product have the release rate and other 
properties recited in the claims.867 Pointing to the fact that the 
properties and use of HPMC to control release rates are well known, 
the Federal Circuit noted that “[w]hen a claim term has an accepted 
scientific meaning, that meaning is generally not subject to restriction 
to the specific examples in the specification.”868 
                                                          
 859. Id. at 1228-29, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304. 
 860. Id. at 1227, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 861. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303. 
 862. Id. at 1229-30, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 863. Id. at 1230, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 864. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305-06. 
 865. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 866. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 867. Id. at 1233, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08. 
 868. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
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D. Use of Extrinsic Evidence 
1. Dictionaries and learned treatises are welcome 
Consistent with its ruling in Texas Digital, dictionaries and learned 
treatises are now well-received claim construction tools—a “special” 
type of extrinsic evidence.  In Abbott Laboratories v. Syntron Bioresearch, 
Inc.,869 the Federal Circuit reversed a finding of non-infringement 
based on erroneous district court jury instructions relating to the 
construction of the claim term “non-diffusively bound.”870 
Abbott sued Syntron for infringement of two patents871 relating to 
the detection and analysis of small amounts of chemical substances in 
biological fluids.872  The asserted claims required the bonding of a 
“non-diffusively bound” reactant in a particular medium (e.g., a 
ligand or an analyte).873 
The district court construed “non-diffusively bound” to mean “a 
reactant immobilized in the reaction zone so as to provide a 
detectable signal indicating the presence or absence of analyte in the 
solution, and the reactant is not capable of detaching from the 
medium, spreading out, and moving along the test strip . . . .”874  The 
district court further found that “a reactant is non-diffusively bound 
only if it is found in such a manner that a sufficient and reproducible amount 
of reactant remains bound in the reactive zone or zones to conduct both 
quantitative and qualitative assays.”875 
On appeal, Abbott argued that the jury’s finding of non-
infringement, based on the failure to satisfy the claim term “non-
diffusively bound,” was not sustainable because the construction of 
the claim term should not have required quantitative analysis of the 
analyte.876  Abbott, instead, urged a claim construction that required 
“. . . only that the reactant be immobilized sufficiently to permit 
detection of the analyte. . . .”877 
The Federal Circuit, citing Texas Digital, stated that the first step in 
the analysis was to determine the ordinary meaning of the claim 
terms and looked to the dictionary for evidence of a claim term’s 
ordinary meaning.878  Looking to WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL 
                                                          
 869. 334 F.3d 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 870. Id. at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342-43. 
 871. Id. at 1347-48, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340. 
 872. Id. at 1346, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1339. 
 873. Id. at 1348, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1340. 
 874. Id. at 1350, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (citation omitted). 
 875. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (citation omitted). 
 876. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341. 
 877. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341 (citation omitted). 
 878. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1341-42. 
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DICTIONARY, the Federal Circuit determined that the district court 
unduly narrowed the plain meaning of the term “non-diffusively 
bound” in requiring “quantitative analysis” of the analyte, rather than 
mere detection.879 
The Federal Circuit also evaluated the disputed claim term in the 
context of the claims as a whole and found that the language of the 
disputed claim term reinforced the plain meaning, i.e., that 
“quantitative analysis should not be read as a requirement of the term 
‘non-diffusively bound.’”880 Specifically, the court noted that each of 
the asserted claims only required “detecting the presence of analyte,” 
suggesting that this language was broad enough to encompass either 
qualitative or quantitative analysis, without specifically requiring 
quantitative analysis.881 
In Boehringer Ingelheim Vet-Medica, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp.,882 the 
Federal Circuit upheld a jury verdict that Schering-Plough infringed a 
patent for a method of isolating and growing the virus that causes the 
“Mystery Swine Disease” (Porcine Reproductive Respiratory 
Syndrome or PPRS), under the doctrine of equivalents.883 
PRRS was a major killer of piglets in the 1980s.884  Using a method 
of growing the virus in pig tissue culture, inoculating cultured 
monkey cells with the virus, and incubating the monkey cells until 
scientists observed a cytopathic effect (CPE), scientists at Boehringer 
discovered that a previously unknown virus caused PRRS.885  The 
asserted patent claimed this method.886 
Both Boehringer and Schering developed and produced vaccines 
against PRRS by weakening the PRRS virus in monkey cell cultures.887  
Because Schering’s vaccine production process measured the 
incubation by elapsed time, rather than by an achieved observational 
result as claimed, the district court precluded literal infringement 
and the jury returned a verdict of infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents.888  The issue on appeal was whether the district court 
erred in its claim construction.889 
                                                          
 879. Id. at 1350-51, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 880. Id. at 1351, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 881. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
 882. 320 F.3d 1339, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 883. Id. at 1342-44, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963-64. 
 884. Id. at 1343, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963. 
 885. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963-64. 
 886. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963. 
 887. Id. at 1343-44, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1963-64. 
 888. Id. at 1344, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
 889. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
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The claimed method was one “of growing and isolating” the subject 
virus.890  The Federal Circuit construed the term “isolating,” as found 
in the claim preamble, to be limiting, indeed “the raison d’être of the 
claimed method itself.”891  The district court, citing a “common 
definition” found in the RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 
concluded that the PRRS virus was “isolated” in each serial passage 
when the virus separated from the infected cells.892  Schering, citing 
THE DICTIONARY OF MICROBIOLOGY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY, a 
technical dictionary, argued on appeal for a more microbiological 
definition of “isolation,” defining the term as the “process of 
obtaining a pure culture from a naturally occurring population.”893  
The Federal Circuit, citing negatively to the technical dictionary, 
upheld the district court’s construction, noting that the customary 
meaning of “isolating” in the field of the invention encompasses 
more than the microbiological definitions of initial isolation of a virus 
from an infected tissue sample.894 
The issue regarding the claim term “ATCC-VR2332” was one of 
scope.895  Schering argued for a definition encompassing only disease-
causing viruses, while Boehringer argued for a broader definition 
that would include any attenuated strain, disease-causing or not.896  
Based on the reference to the American Type Culture Collection 
(ATCC) in the claim term and the patentee’s failure to use a broader 
claim term, e.g., “PRRS virus,” the Federal Circuit agreed with the 
district court that the term referred to the specific “strain of PRRS 
virus . . . deposited with the ATCC.”897 
Finally, the court considered the meaning of the claimed step of 
“incubating . . . until CPE is observed” to determine whether the 
claim was limited to only a minimum incubation period or to an end 
period beyond which incubation was not permitted.898  Analogizing 
the claimed step to an instruction to cook a turkey until the skin is 
browned, the district court construed the claim as requiring a clear 
stopping point.899  The Federal Circuit did not see the initial 
observation of CPE as limiting the end of the incubation period, 
reasoning that because the utility of the claimed process “is not 
                                                          
 890. Id. at 1344-45, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964. 
 891. Id. at 1345, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964-65. 
 892. Id. at 1346, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965. 
 893. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 894. Id. at 1346-47, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966. 
 895. Id. at 1347-48, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966-67. 
 896. Id. at 1347, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966-67. 
 897. Id. at 1348, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967. 
 898. Id. at 1349, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1967. 
 899. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968. 
DEVINSKY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 7/10/2004  1:11 PM 
2004] 2003 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 861 
premised on a particular stopping point, there is no barrier to 
additional incubation periods.”900  Nevertheless, the court held that 
the error was harmless.901 
In Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablevision of 
Westchester, Inc.,902 the Federal Circuit upheld a construction of the 
claim term “high frequency” where the district court used dictionary 
definitions to supply the ordinary and customary meaning of the 
term.903 
The patent claim at issue recited a broadcasting system that 
transports signals between a central office and its various subscribers 
via a “high frequency” carrier signal.904  The parties disputed the 
range of frequencies that would qualify as a “high frequency.”905  
When the district court initially construed “high frequency,” it held 
that the term would encompass frequencies within a 54-216 MHz 
range.906  Upon reconsideration, however, the court relied on a 
dictionary definition and further limited the range of “high 
frequency” to the more narrow range of 3-30 MHz.907  Because 
Cablevision’s system operated in the 30-300 MHz range, the district 
court also granted Cablevision’s motion for non-infringement.908  IPD 
appealed, arguing that the district court erred in referring to 
extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, when “the intrinsic evidence, 
including the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution 
history, establishes that ‘high frequency’ encompasses any frequency 
at which a conventional TV receiver can receive and display a 
signal.”909 
Affirming the lower court’s claim construction and its 
determination of non-infringement, the Federal Circuit rejected the 
patentee’s argument that the lower court “‘put the cart before the 
horse’ by looking at dictionary definitions first instead of the 
specification to determine the meaning of the term ‘high 
frequency.’”910  Rather, the court reasoned that “[c]onsulting the 
written description and prosecution history as a threshold step in the 
claim construction process, before any effort is made to discern the 
                                                          
 900. Id. at 1350, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968. 
 901. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1968. 
 902. 336 F.3d 1308, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 903. Id. at 1313-14, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 904. Id. at 1311-12, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 905. Id. at 1312, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387-88. 
 906. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 907. Id. at 1312-13, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 908. Id. at 1313, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 909. Id. at 1313-14, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 910. Id. at 1315, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
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ordinary and customary meanings attributed to the words themselves, 
invites a violation of our precedent counseling against importing 
limitations into the claims.”911  In its analysis, the Federal Circuit 
created a rebuttable presumption that a definition, such as that 
found in a dictionary, is the ordinary and customary meaning of a 
claim term: “In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel 
meaning to claim terms, the words are presumed to take on the 
ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of 
ordinary skill in the art.”912 
In rejecting IDP’s argument that dictionary definitions should not 
be used in place of the patent specifications to define claim terms, 
the Federal Circuit noted that “dictionaries, encyclopedias, and 
treatises, publicly available at the time the patent is issued, are 
objective resources that serve as reliable sources of information.”913  
Citing Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit also rejected IDP’s argument 
that the use of dictionaries is inappropriate because definitions of 
“high frequency” are not consistent from dictionary to dictionary:  
“[T]he intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify which of 
the different possible dictionary meanings of the claim terms in issue 
is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor.”914 
In Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Systems, LLC,915 the 
Federal Circuit overturned a decision of non-infringement by a 
district court and found that the district court’s reliance on the 
patent specification, rather than on dictionary definitions, yielded an 
erroneous claim construction because the lower court improperly 
read into the claim language limitations found in the specification 
but not included in the dictionary definition or required by the claim 
language.916  
The patents-in-suit claimed various aspects of control systems and 
related methods used in the production of petroleum products from 
a well.917  At issue was the construction of claim language directed to a 
plunger operation used to extract and deliver liquid petroleum 
products from the well.918  Particularly, the parties disputed the scope 
of “normal” and “predetermined” in the claim elements, “normal 
                                                          
 911. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (citation omitted). 
 912. Id. at 1314, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389 (citation omitted). 
 913. Id. at 1315, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389. 
 914. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390. 
 915. 350 F.3d 1327, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 916. Id. at 1338-41, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008-11. 
 917. Id. at 1331, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 918. Id., 1333-35, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004-06. 
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plunger performance” and “predetermined plunger performance.”919  
Based on an example described in the patent specification, the 
district court had limited both claim terms to a performance that 
occurred within an independent adjustable period of time of good 
window operation and, thus, implicitly interpreted both disputed 
claim terms identically.920 
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit panel looked first to a dictionary 
to ascertain the scope of the disputed claim terms,921 and then 
reviewed the patent specification to determine if the specification 
contradicted the dictionary definitions.922  The Court reasoned: 
In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to 
the claim terms, the words take on the full breadth of the ordinary 
and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary 
skill in the art.  The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim 
term may be determined by reviewing a variety of sources.  Some of 
these sources include the claims themselves . . . dictionaries and 
treatises . . . and the written description, the drawings, and the 
prosecution history.923 
Based on the appropriate dictionary definition and consistent with 
the specification, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court 
that a “normal plunger performance” is a performance during a good 
window of operation.924  The Federal Circuit, however, found that the 
district court erred in further limiting the claim term by requiring 
that the window of operation fall within an independent adjustable 
period of time as described in the specification.925  The Federal 
Circuit reasoned that the district court erred because “it read into the 
claim a limitation of independent adjustability of the upper and 
lower values not specified or required by the claim language, as 
properly construed.”926 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s 
implicit conclusion that “predetermined plunger performance” 
necessarily has the same construction as “normal plunger 
performance.”927 The Federal Circuit reasoned: 
The coincidence of a particular predetermined window with a 
good window is irrelevant . . . .  There is no requirement, either in 
                                                          
 919. Id. at 1337, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 920. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 921. Id. at 1339, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 922. Id. at 1339-40, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009-10. 
 923. Id. at 1338, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009 (citations omitted). 
 924. Id. at 1339, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 925. Id. at 1340, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 926. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 927. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
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the claim itself or in the written description, that the values 
selected beforehand in the limitation “predetermined plunger 
performance” must represent the good window, as with “normal 
plunger performance.”  There is also nothing in the claim 
language, written description, or prosecution history to require 
that the upper and lower values that define the window of 
“predetermined plunger performance” be set independently of 
each other.  The values must just be determined beforehand.928 
In Waner v. Ford Motor Co.,929 the Federal Circuit reversed the 
district court’s claim construction and found that Ford Motor 
Company did not infringe Waner’s patent for a fender liner used on 
dual rear wheel trucks.930  Specifically, the Federal Circuit disagreed 
with the district court’s construction of the claim term “flange.”931  
Relying on a dictionary definition as well as intrinsic evidence (i.e., 
the “structure of the language of the claim”), the court decided that 
the claimed fender liner must have a “flange,” that is, a raised or 
projecting edge, and that the flange must exist prior to installation of 
the fender liner.932  Because Ford’s fender liner was a single planar 
sheet before installation, the Federal Circuit ruled that no reasonable 
jury could have found infringement.933 
2. Prior art patents—it’s a mixed bag 
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,934 the Federal Circuit 
overturned a grant of summary judgment in favor of 3Com,935 holding 
that the district court had erroneously restricted a claim limitation to 
the industry standard meaning of a term rather than giving the term 
its plain, every day meaning.936 
The case involves 3Com’s popular “Palm Pilot” personal digital 
assistant and accusations that it infringes patent claims drawn to the 
use of an “electronic multi-function card.”937  Based in part on a 
discussion in the specification, and also on the industry standard 
usage of the term “card” at the time the patent was issued, the district 
court interpreted the term “card” to mean a component having the 
dimensions of a standard credit card.938  Observing that the district 
                                                          
 928. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010. 
 929. 331 F.3d 851, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 930. Id. at 852, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 931. Id. at 854, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 932. Id. at 854-55, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1946. 
 933. Id. at 855-56, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 934. 343 F.3d 1364, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 935. Id. at 1365-66, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 936. Id. at 1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950. 
 937. Id. at 1365-67, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947-49. 
 938. Id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948. 
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court gave too much weight to the specification’s discussion of the 
“object of the invention” and too little weight to the strong 
presumption in favor of giving terms their “ordinary and customary 
meaning,” the Federal Circuit found this to be an error of 
construction and held that the ordinary meaning of the term “card” 
should apply (that is, “a flat, rectangular piece of stiff material”).939 
According to the court, there was nothing in the claim language or 
the steps of the method that suggest a size limitation, and the court 
found nothing in the industry standards to suggest that they “apply 
outside the limited area of credit cards, i.e., to cards generally or to 
electronic multifunction cards, or that either was intended to define 
the term ‘card’ or ‘electronic multifunction card.’”940  Absent a clear 
statement of intent by the inventor to narrow the meaning of the 
claim, the court determined, the claim should be given the broadest 
meaning consistent with customary usage.941 
In Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., Inc.,942 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-
infringement,943 and found that the prior art definition of the claim 
term “amorphous” preferable to the dictionary definition.944 
The patent concerned a battery that employs a certain alloy to 
store hydrogen in a rechargeable battery, overcoming the “inevitable 
fracturing associated with repeated recharging.”945  The claimed alloy 
had a molecular structure that is less ordered than prior art materials, 
and thus more immune than highly ordered structures to material 
fracture caused by repeated recharging.946  The parties disputed the 
construction of the claim term “amorphous” and whether it should 
be construed to mean “completely amorphous,” i.e., no ordering of 
molecules, or, using a prior art definition, be construed to “cover all 
partially crystalline alloys with long range order less than 100 nm.”947  
The district court found that the specification and prosecution 
history supported the plain meaning of the term “amorphous,” and 
that the patentees proposed a definition relying on a prior art 
reference that was “developed after his patent was filed, and therefore 
                                                          
 939. Id. at 1368-71, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1950-51. 
 940. Id. at 1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1949-50. 
 941. Id. at 1370, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951. 
 942. 351 F.3d 1364, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 943. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. 
 944. Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223. 
 945. Id. at 1366, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. 
 946. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. 
 947. Id. at 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222 (brackets in original). 
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[could not] be taken to describe accurately what he sought to 
patent.”948 
On appeal (where the patent owner appeared pro se),949 the Federal 
Circuit reversed.950  In its analysis, the panel (citing Texas Digital) 
looked to a dictionary to ascertain the plain meaning of the disputed 
claim term, but then considered the alternative definition found in a 
prior art reference cited and extensively discussed during 
prosecution.951  The court reasoned that “although the dictionary can 
be an important tool in claim construction by providing a starting 
point for determining the ordinary meaning of a term to a person of 
skill in the art, ‘the intrinsic record’ can solve ambiguity in claim 
language or, where clear, trump an inconsistent dictionary 
definition.”952  The court looked at the prior art cited in the patent as 
intrinsic evidence and further explained: 
. . . when prior art that sheds light on the meaning of a term is 
cited by the patentee, it can have particular value as a guide to the 
proper construction of the term, because it may indicate not only 
the meaning of the term to persons skilled in the art, but also that 
the patentee intended to adopt that meaning.953 
The Federal Circuit also considered the patentee’s own 
lexicography in defining the term “amorphous.”954  After noting that 
precedent gives significance to terms such as “completely” or 
“normally,” the court found that in this case the specification and 
prosecution history did not clearly and deliberately define the term 
“amorphous” as “completely amorphous,” and thus did not support a 
construction of the disputed term contrary to the meaning 
established in the prior art reference.955  The court noted that it 
would be inappropriate to limit a broad definition of a claim term 
based on prosecution history that is itself ambiguous.956 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Bryson agreed with the panel, but 
did so only after considering “the totality of the evidence” and 
indicated that he would expand the scope of the remand to include 
whether a person skilled in the field of amorphous solids would find 
the phrase “random atomic orientation” indicative of a particular 
                                                          
 948. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222 (emphasis in original). 
 949. Id. at 1365, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1221. 
 950. Id. at 1373, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 951. Id. at 1367-68, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222-23. 
 952. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1222-23. 
 953. Id. at 1368, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223 (citations omitted). 
 954. Id. at 1368-70, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1223-24. 
 955. Id. at 1369, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1224. 
 956. Id. at 1371-72, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1225-26. 
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class of structures, or whether the term is too indefinite to provide 
any significant guidance as to the bounds of the term “amorphous.”957 
3. Expert testimony—meaning of claim term to one of skill in the art 
In Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,958 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a lower court’s ruling of infringement, construing a 
claim directed to a treatment for bone reabsorption and urolithiasis 
to encompass the use of a pharmaceutical formulation of the active 
agent.959 
The drug Fosamax was marketed by Merck and approved by the 
FDA for the treatment of osteoporosis and Paget’s disease.960  The 
active agent of the product is formulated as a salt having the common 
name alendronate salt.961  The patent at issue contained a single claim 
directed to a method of treating bone reabsorption and urolithiasis 
through the administration of the non-salt form of the compound, 
alendronic acid.962 
When the generic drug maker Teva Pharmaceuticals filed for 
regulatory approval to sell the alendronate salt form, Merck sued 
Teva for infringement, alleging that the delivery of the acid as recited 
in the claimed method includes the delivery of the salt form.963  Teva 
defended its actions on the basis that the alendronate salt is distinct 
from the claimed acid form.964  The district court found that the 
method administering alendronic acid was infringed by the 
administration of alendronate salt.965 
In construing the claim, the Federal Circuit noted that while 
extrinsic evidence cannot change the meaning of a term as it is used 
in the specification, expert opinion can explain the meaning of claim 
language used in the patent as it would be understood by those 
skilled in the field of the invention.966  Here, the court framed the 
issue to be whether a person skilled in pharmacology would 
understand from the specification that the claimed method of 
treatment by administering alendronic acid encompassed 
administering alendronate salt.967 
                                                          
 957. Id. at 1373-74, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. 
 958. 347 F.3d 1367, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 959. Id. at 1371-72, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860-61. 
 960. Id. at 1369, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 961. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 962. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 963. Id. at 1369-70, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858-59. 
 964. Id. at 1369, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1858. 
 965. Id. at 1372, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 966. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 967. Id. at 1371-72, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
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Affirming the district court’s finding of infringement, the Federal 
Circuit found that the claimed acid form was exemplified in the 
specification in formulations that included the salt and usage of the 
active agent in the salt form for the treatment of bone disorders was 
presented in the specification.968  The court further found extensive 
evidence in the record that persons experienced in the field refer to 
the active ingredient in the form of the salt and that qualified 
witnesses in the field of pharmacology understood that the acid, 
which is administered in the form of the salt, is the active agent.969 
E. Means Plus Function Claim Elements 
The Federal Circuit actively addressed § 112, ¶ 6970 claim issues in 
2003. 
1.  The word “means” raises rebuttable presumption that                                
§ 112, ¶ 6 has been invoked 
In Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc.,971 the Federal Circuit, noted 
that use of “the word ‘means’ invokes a rebuttable presumption that 
§ 112, ¶ 6 applies”972 and that “a claim term that does not use ‘means’ 
will trigger the rebuttable presumption that § 112, ¶ 6 does not 
apply.”973  This presumption places the burden of going forward with 
rebuttal evidence on the party seeking to overcome the 
presumption.974  To overcome the burden that a claim term that does 
not use the word “means” should nevertheless be construed under 
§ 112, ¶ 6, a party must demonstrate “that the claim term fails to 
‘recite sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites a ‘function 
without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.’”975  
                                                          
 968. Id. at 1370, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859. 
 969. Id. at 1370-71, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1859-60. 
 970. Title 35, Section 112 of the United States Code provides: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or 
step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, 
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to 
cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the 
specification and equivalents thereof.  
35 U.S.C. § 12 (2000). 
 971. 325 F.3d 1364, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 972. Id. at 1371, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 (quoting CCS Fitness, Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1664 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)) (quotations omitted). 
 973. Id. at 1371-72, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 (quoting CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 
1369, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1664) (quotations omitted). 
 974. Id. at 1372, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450. 
 975. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450 (quoting CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1369, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1665). 
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The burden is met by a mere preponderance of the evidence 
standard.976 
2. Corresponding structure is limited by recited function 
In Altiris, Inc. v. Symantic Corp.,977 the court chastised as “careless” 
the way a district court applied the test of Interactive Gift Express Inc. vs. 
Compuserve, Inc.978 to require that method steps be performed in the 
order recited.979  According to the Federal Circuit, a court must 
preserve the recited order only when logic and grammar dictate it do 
so.980  Where, as in Interactive Gift, no such indications exist, a court 
may resort to the specification to determine if it “directly or implicitly 
requires such a narrow construction.”981  If not, the original sequence 
is not required.982 
In Altiris, the court also noted that when construing a means-plus-
function claim element under § 112, ¶ 6, “Structure disclosed in the 
specification is ‘corresponding’ structure only if the specification or 
prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure to the 
function recited in the claim.”983  Applying this rule, the court in 
Altirus reversed the district court’s holding that certain software 
commands used for booting a computer must be resident on a server, 
because the preferred disclosed embodiment provided possible 
alternate residences for the commands.984 
A similar result occurred in Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.985 
There, the Federal Court reversed the district court’s construction of 
two means-plus-function claim elements, finding that the 
construction improperly included not only the circuit as a 
corresponding structure, but also the signals that the circuit used to 
perform the claimed function.986 
The claims at issue in Northrop concerned a bus interface unit used 
in a computer network.987  The bus interface reactions included a 
“means for monitoring a plurality of logical signals” and a “means for 
                                                          
 976. Id. at 1372, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1450. 
 977. 318 F.3d 1363, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 978. 256 F.3d 1323, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 979. 318 F.3d at 1369, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 980. Id. at 1369-70, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 981. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 982. Id. at 1370, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 983. Id. at 1375, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874 (quoting B. Braun Med. v. Abbott 
Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1900 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 984. Id. at 1376-77, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874-75.   
 985. 325 F.3d 1346, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 986. Id. at 1352, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 987. Id. at 1347-48, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342. 
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defining the functional state of the bus interface units.”988  In 
construing each of these elements as means-plus-function limitations, 
the district court dutifully identified the function performed by each 
claim element and then identified the corresponding disclosed 
structure that performed that recited function.989 
In its analysis, the district court found that the “monitoring means” 
performed two functions:  “monitoring a plurality of logical signals 
characterizing the operational status of the bus interface unit” and 
“generating a plurality of control signals regulating a data transfer 
process.”990  Focusing on a passage of the specification to discern the 
corresponding structure, the district court identified a sequence logic 
circuit that receives a set of signals to regulate the data transfer 
process between the bus and the memory port as the corresponding 
structure.991  The district court included both a sequence logic circuit 
and a particular signal as the corresponding structure for the claimed 
defining means.992 
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the district court 
improperly included signals in the corresponding structure for 
performing the “monitoring” and “defining” functions.993  The 
Federal Circuit reasoned, “the signals that are monitored by the 
‘means for monitoring’ cannot be part of the structure that does the 
monitoring.”994  Accordingly, the Federal Circuit held that the 
sequence logic circuit was the only structure that fell within the scope 
for “means for monitoring” and “means for defining.”995 
In Medical Instrumentation and Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,996 
another software-related case, the Federal Circuit held that it was 
error to include software as an additional corresponding structure to 
a means-plus-function claim term where the specification failed to 
clearly link software as a structure to perform the identified 
function.997 
The asserted patent claim described a system for planning surgical 
treatment using a presentation of images from multiple scanning 
sources and recites a “means for converting said plurality of images 
                                                          
 988. Id. at 1349, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1343. 
 989. Id. at 1350-52, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344-45. 
 990. Id. at 1350, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344. 
 991. Id. at 1350-52, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1344-45. 
 992. Id. at 1352, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 993. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 994. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345. 
 995. Id. at 1353-54, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1346-47. 
 996. 344 F.3d 1205, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 997. Id. at 1211, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
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into a selected format” limitation.998  In construing that limitation, the 
district court applied the traditional two-step analysis.999  First, the 
court identified the particular function performed by the claimed 
means:  “converting said plurality of images into a selected format.”1000  
Then the court examined the specification to identify the 
corresponding disclosed structures for performing that function.1001  
The accused structure used a software based digital-to-digital 
conversion technique.1002  Recognizing that the only corresponding 
structures explicitly described in the specification were analog-to-
digital conversion circuits, i.e., a frame grabber video display board 
and a computer video processor, the district court nevertheless 
concluded that “because techniques for performing [digital-to-
digital] conversions were known to those of skill in the art at the time 
the application was filed, a person of skill in the art would understand 
software to be the corresponding structure for a converting 
function.”1003 
The Federal Circuit reversed, noting that rather than inquiring 
whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have been able to 
write a software program to perform the identified function, a court 
should ask whether a person of ordinary skill in the art would have 
understood the specification to encompass software for digital-to-
digital conversion as structure corresponding to the claimed 
function.1004  The court reasoned that “[i]f the specification is not 
clear as to the structure that the patentee intends to correspond to 
the claimed function, then the patentee has not paid that price but is 
rather attempting to claim in functional terms unbounded by any 
reference to structure in the specification.”1005  Because neither the 
specification nor the prosecution history clearly linked software to 
the converting means, the Federal Circuit held that the district court 
erred in identifying software as a corresponding structure for the 
“means for converting” and granted a judgment of non-infringement 
as a matter of law.1006 
                                                          
 998. Id. at 1207-08, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265-66. 
 999. Id. at 1209, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 1000. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 1001. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 1002. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266. 
 1003. Id. at 1211, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
 1004. Id. at 1212, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269. 
 1005. Id. at 1211, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268. 
 1006. Id. at 1222, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1277. 
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3. Recited claim function is not limited by patent specification 
A similar analysis of a § 112, ¶ 6 issue doomed the grant of a 
summary judgment motion in Omega Engineering, Inc. v. Raytek 
Corp.,1007 where the Federal Circuit cautioned that “[w]hen construing 
the functioned statement in a means-plus-function limitation, we 
must take great care not to impermissibly limit the function by 
adopting a function different from that explicitly recited in the 
claim.”1008  In the context of an invention directed to a laser sighting 
system for use on infrared thermometers, the Federal Circuit found 
that the district court impermissibly limited the functional statement 
of a § 112, ¶ 6 claim element.1009  The claim element in question 
recited a “means” that causes “at least one laser beam to strike the 
periphery of the energy zone. . . for visibly outlining the entire 
zone.”1010  Focusing on the word “periphery,” the district court 
construed the claim to require the laser only strike the periphery, not 
the interior of the energy zone.1011  In reversing, the Federal Circuit 
panel noted that this “negative limitation finds no anchor in the 
explicit claim language.”1012 
F. Claim Preamble:  Preamble Limiting When Method Steps Require Use of 
Structure Recited in Preamble 
In Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,1013 the Federal Circuit addressed 
the significance of the preamble of a claim directed to a method for 
automatically shifting gears in a heavy-duty truck transmission.1014  
The claim preamble recited, in part, a method for controlling “an 
automatic mechanical vehicle driveline system having a throttle 
controlled engine.”1015  The preamble went on to recite the driveline 
system in some detail, followed by two method steps.1016  Here, the 
Federal Circuit found the preamble to be limiting because the 
method steps required structure recited in the preamble.1017  Thus, 
                                                          
 1007. 334 F.3d 1314, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1008. Id. at 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326 (quoting Generation II Orthotics, 
Inc. v. Med. Tech., Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1364-65, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919, 1926 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 1009. Id. at 1321-23, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1325-27. 
 1010. Id. at 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 1011. Id. at 1322-23, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326-27. 
 1012. Id. at 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326. 
 1013. 323 F.3d 1332, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1014. Id. at 1335, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273. 
 1015. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273. 
 1016. Id. at 1335-36, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1273-74. 
 1017. Id. at 1342, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278. 
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the court concluded that both the preamble and the recited steps 
defined the claimed invention.1018 
IV. INFRINGEMENT 
A. Infringement:  All Elements Rule and Claim Element Vitiation 
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Space Systems/Loral Inc.,1019 on remand for 
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Festo 
VIII,1020 the Federal Circuit sidestepped the Festo issue and decided the 
case based on the “all elements” rule which holds that “there can be 
no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents if even one 
limitation of a claim or its equivalent is not present in the accused 
device.”1021 
The patented system compensated for angular drift of 
geosynchronous satellites by manipulation of speed and angular 
momentum of a momentum wheel, having an axis parallel to the yaw 
axis of the satellite (pointing toward the center of the earth), so as to 
tilt the satellite and keep it continuously pointed at a target on the 
earth’s surface.1022  The claimed system included an element specified 
as a “means for rotating said wheel in accordance with a predetermined 
rate schedule, which varies sinusoidally over the orbit at the orbital 
frequency of the satellite.”1023  The Federal Circuit’s decision on 
remand focused on two functional limitations on this “means” 
element: the predetermined rate schedule and the sinusoidal 
variation.1024 
The lower court interpreted the sinusoidal variation limitation to 
mean that the speed variation passed through zero and changed 
direction or sign.1025  The parties apparently did not dispute this 
interpretation.1026  While the wheel in the SSL satellite varied its 
speed, it did so with respect to a bias speed and, consequently, did 
not pass through zero, i.e., did not change direction or sign.1027 
The Federal Circuit adopted the lower court interpretation of the 
“predetermined” limitation requiring that the sinusoidal control 
                                                          
 1018. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1278. 
 1019. 324 F.3d 1308, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1020. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 62 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (2002). 
 1021. 324 F.3d at 1321, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1022. Id. at 1311-12, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1284-85. 
 1023. Id. at 1315, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286 (emphasis added). 
 1024. Id. at 1318-21, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289-92. 
 1025. Id. at 1316-17, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288-89. 
 1026. Id. at 1317, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1289. 
 1027. Id. at 1321, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. 
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function “not include any unfixed real-time inputs, such as those 
from an earth sensor.”1028  The rate schedule used in the SSL satellite 
control responded “to an actual real-time error sensed by the earth 
sensor.”1029  Over arguments by Lockheed regarding the open-ended 
nature of the claim, the Federal Circuit concluded that the accused 
satellite control did not utilize a “predetermined” rate schedule.1030 
Finally, despite expert testimony as to the overall equivalence 
between the recited function as construed by the Federal Circuit and 
the function performed by SSL satellite, the court concluded that 
there was no element that performed the properly construed 
function, and, therefore, the claimed “means” element was entirely 
missing from the SSL satellite.1031  The Federal Circuit held that a 
finding of infringement by equivalents, in the absence of operations 
that literally satisfied the two functional requirements, would 
“entirely vitiate the limitations” of the “means-for rotating” claim 
element.1032 
B. Doctrine of Equivalents 
1. Cases remanded after the Supreme Court decision (Festo VIII) 
a.    Canceling broader claims constitutes a narrowing amendment 
In Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp.,1033 a post-Festo VIII case 
decided on remand from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit 
held that an inadvertent limitation of a claim by a patent lawyer is not 
a defense to prosecution history estoppel.1034  If related to 
patentability, even a voluntarily added limitation may reduce or 
eliminate the available range of equivalents.1035 
In this case, the accused devices had only “non-switching [analog] 
multiplier” circuits which the plaintiff attempted to prove were 
equivalent to a claimed “switching” analog multiplier circuit.1036 
The “switching” limitation appeared in a dependent claim added 
after filing.1037  The examiner had rejected the original claims as 
                                                          
 1028. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. 
 1029. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. 
 1030. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292 
 1031. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1292. 
 1032. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291. 
 1033. 330 F.3d 1352, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1859 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1034. Id. at 1356, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 1035. Id. at 1357, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862. 
 1036. Id. at 1355-56, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 1037. Id. at 1355, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860-61 (discussing the addition of the 
“switching” limitation to claim 1, which incorporated by reference the original claims 
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anticipated even though the patent number that the examiner used 
as a reference did not disclose a “switching” multiplier.1038 
When amending the claims, the Pioneer Magnetics’ lawyer 
imported the “switching” limitation from the dependent claim into 
new independent claim 1.1039  Contrary to the remarks accompanying 
the amendment, new claim 1 included all the limitations of the 
original claims, plus the “switching” limitation.1040  The dependent 
claim still included, inter alia, the “switching” limitation.1041 
The district court ruled that because the switching limitation was 
added to overcome a cited reference, Pioneer Magnetics was not 
entitled to a range of equivalence on this element.1042 
The Federal Circuit, citing Festo VI,1043 originally affirmed the 
district court’s claim construction and grant of summary judgment.1044  
Upon Pioneer Magnetics’ petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari, the Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision and 
remanded the case, along with a number of others, for further 
consideration in light of Festo VIII.1045 
Pioneer Magnetics fared no better under Festo VIII.  The Federal 
Circuit noted that because the amendment in question narrowed the 
claim, Pioneer Magnetics had the burden of showing that the 
amendment was not related to patentability.1046 
Relying on a mea culpa declaration from its patent lawyer, Pioneer 
Magnetics argued that it added the “switching” limitation through 
“inadvertence.”1047  Emphasizing the importance of the prosecution 
history, the Federal Circuit rejected this evidence because it was not 
part of the public record of the patent.1048  Pioneer Magnetics also 
pointed to a discrepancy between the amendment and the 
accompanying remarks to suggest that it only amended claim 1 to 
                                                          
not containing this limitation). 
 1038. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860.  Pioneer Magnetics did not object to the 
examiner’s rejection but instead proceeded to amend the original claims.  Id., 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860. 
 1039. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860-61. 
 1040. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860-61 (noting that Pioneer Magnetics never 
explained why the new amended claim added the “switching” limitation). 
 1041. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1860-61. 
 1042. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 1043. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 1044. Pioneer Magnetics, Inc. v. Micro Linear Corp., 238 F.3d 1341, 1346-47, 57 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1045. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 1046. Pioneer Magnetics, 330 F.3d at 1356, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 1047. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 1048. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861-62. 
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incorporate certain limitations from the original claims.1049  Pioneer 
Magnetics argued that the remarks were evidence that the 
amendment was inadvertent.1050  The court disagreed, pointing out 
that it was equally likely that the mistake was in the remarks and the 
amendment was intended.1051 
The Federal Circuit then considered whether Pioneer Magnetics 
could prove that the particular equivalent at issue, a “non-switching” 
multiplier, was unforeseeable at the time of the prosecution of the 
patent.1052  Since the prior art in the case showed a “non-switching” 
multiplier, the Federal Circuit concluded that Pioneer Magnetics 
could not meet its burden that such a structure was not 
foreseeable.1053 
In Genzyme Corporation v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc.,1054 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed a district court’s summary judgment that 
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc, (TKT) did not infringe a patent on 
methods of producing a therapeutic human enzyme,1055 despite an 
“after final” amendment on which Genzyme relied to broaden the 
claims.1056 
The patent-in-suit claimed “a method of producing human α-
galactosidase A (α-Gal A) and cells engineered to express and secrete 
active human α-Gal A,” which is useful for treating patients suffering 
from Fabry disease.1057  The claimed method encompassed “culturing 
a mammalian cell containing a chromosomally integrated nucleotide 
sequence encoding human α-galactosidase A.”1058  TKT’s allegedly 
infringing product utilized a technique known as gene activation and 
involved insertion of a regulatory DNA sequence into a human host 
cell to activate expression of the endogenous human α-Gal A protein 
from the endogenous human cellular gene.1059  Neither of the parties 
disputed that TKT’s technique did not introduce an exogenous α-Gal 
A gene into human host cells.1060 
TKT argued that the term “chromosomally integrated” required 
the action of inserting a human α-Gal A gene into the host 
                                                          
 1049. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 1050. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1861. 
 1051. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862. 
 1052. Id. at 1357, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862. 
 1053. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862. 
 1054. 346 F.3d 1094, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1055. Id. at 1096, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597. 
 1056. Id. at 1102, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602. 
 1057. Id. at 1096, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1597-98. 
 1058. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598. 
 1059. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598. 
 1060. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598. 
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chromosome.1061  Genzyme countered that the claims encompassed 
TKT’s gene activation techniques involving activation of an 
endogenous α-Gal A gene because the origin of nucleotide sequences 
inserted into a target cell’s chromosome was not specified.1062  
According to Genzyme, the claims required only that a chromosome 
in the cell contain a nucleotide sequence that encoded human α-Gal 
A enzyme.1063  After the district court rejected Genzyme’s position on 
the meaning of the term “chromosomally integrated,” Genzyme 
conceded it could not prevail on infringement.1064 
The Federal Circuit, noting that the specification did not expressly 
define “chromosomally integrated,” initially looked to the ordinary 
and accustomed meaning of the term and found that the claim 
language suggested the incorporation of exogenous genetic code 
into the chromosomal material of the host cell.1065 
The remaining issue was whether the exogenous sequences had to 
come from outside the host cell or could derive from within the host 
cell but outside the critical chromosome.1066 
The court rejected Genzyme’s argument that a supplemental, after 
final amendment broadened the claims to eliminate the requirement 
for inserting an exogenous gene into a host cell.1067  The court noted 
that the prosecution history here was silent about the broadening 
amendment in contravention of applicable PTO rules requiring that 
after-final claim amendments altering the substantive scope of claims 
be accompanied by an explanation about the necessity of the 
amendment.1068  The court refused to accept Genzyme’s position that 
the examiner vastly broadened the claims upon entering the 
supplemental after final amendment to embrace the over-expression 
of human α-Gal A sequences endogenous to a host cell.1069  The court 
found that the combined weight of an applicant’s submission of 
exogenous vector sequences (in compliance with the deposit 
requirement), the specification, the arguments made to distinguish 
prior art, the examiner’s responses, and a third-party declaration 
touting the inventiveness of the recombinant expression scheme 
                                                          
 1061. Id. at 1097, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598. 
 1062. Id. at 1098, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599. 
 1063. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599. 
 1064. Id. at 1097, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1598. 
 1065. Id. at 1098, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599. 
 1066. Id. at 1098-99, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1599-1600. 
 1067. Id. at 1103, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
 1068. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
 1069. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
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outweighed an eleventh-hour amendment unaccompanied by an 
explanation.1070 
b.     If it is in the prior art—it is foreseeable 
In another post-Festo VIII decision, Talbert Fuel Systems Patents Co. v. 
Unocal Corp.,1071 the Federal Circuit affirmed a district court decision 
and held that a plaintiff patentee was precluded from proving 
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents due to prosecution 
history estoppel.1072 
Talbert sued Unocal for the infringement of a patent directed to 
certain reformulated gasolines that reduce emissions while 
maintaining their performance boundaries.1073  The infringement 
issue focused on a limitation found in all of the claims requiring the 
gasoline boiling point to be within of a range of 121°F to 345°F.1074  In 
the original suit between Talbert and Unocal,1075 the court relied on 
the absolute bar established by Festo VI1076 to deny Talbert access to the 
doctrine of equivalents.1077  The Supreme Court’s vacatur of that 
decision1078 led to the remand of this case on the issue of prosecution 
history estoppel.1079 
As initially filed, claim 1 recited no temperature range and was 
rejected based on references that showed gasolines of various 
hydrocarbon contents and boiling ranges with an upper boiling 
range of 390°F to 420°F.1080  Unocal’s accused fuels had a boiling 
point range of 373.8°F to 472.9°F.1081  Finding that the “temperature 
limit was placed in the claims at the examiner’s insistence, to 
distinguish over prior art that . . . showed hydrocarbon fuels with an 
endpoint ‘within the range of 390°F and about 420°F,’”1082 the court 
                                                          
 1070. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603. 
 1071. Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 347 F.3d 1355, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1072. Id. at 1360, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695. 
 1073. Id. at 1356-57, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.  Talbert’s claim, as initially filed, 
stated that the reformulated gasoline would “substantially eliminate evaporative loss 
and . . . raise the burn rate of the remaining hydrocarbons.”  Id. at 1358, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693. 
 1074. Id. at 1357, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1075. Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 275 F.3d 1371, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 1076. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoko Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 56 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 1077. Talbert Fuel Sys., 275 F.3d at 1377, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367. 
 1078. Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 537 U.S. 802 (2002). 
 1079. Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 347 F.3d 1355, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1080. Id. at 1358, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693. 
 1081. Id. at 1357, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692. 
 1082. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693. 
DEVINSKY.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 7/10/2004  1:11 PM 
2004] 2003 PATENT LAW DECISIONS 879 
found there was no “reasonable explanation” of how the “designated 
endpoint of 345°F is correctly construed to include fuels with 
endpoints of 373°F and higher”1083 and held that there was no literal 
infringement.1084 
Talbert requested a remand to the district court for retrial on the 
issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in view of 
Festo VIII and argued that the 345°F limit does not describe the actual 
composition that is distilled, at least for carbonated fuels, and would 
be so recognized by one of skill in the art.1085  Talbert further argued 
that the evidence would show it did not disclaim coverage of 
gasolines having an endpoint higher than 345°F, except for gasified 
fuels.1086  The court had little trouble finding that Talbert’s 
amendment was a “presumptive surrender of gasolines boiling in the 
range” between Talbert’s endpoint and the endpoint taught in the 
prior art that had been cited and applied by the examiner.1087  The 
court also noted that the record demonstrated that Talbert could not 
meet the “rebuttal criteria” as articulated by the Supreme Court to 
avoid the Festo presumption.1088 
The court noted that the Unocal fuels were foreseeable at the time 
of the application since the accused gasolines’ boiling point 
(373.8°F) fell between the highest range of the ‘356 patent (345°F) 
and the prior art (endpoint 390°F).1089  Moreover, the court noted 
that by amending the claim during prosecution, Talbert specifically 
disclaimed fuels at higher boiling points to get its patent approved, 
and it could not be credibly argued now that it was unforeseeable 
that fuels with higher boiling ranges than 345°F would be equivalent 
to the fuels as limited by the amendment.1090 
The court further noted that the amendment was not tangential to 
the alleged equivalent (the Unocal fuel) because the boiling point 
range of the patented fuels was at issue during prosecution (i.e., it was 
the direct, not tangential reason for narrowing).1091  Finally, the court 
found Talbert proffered no “other reason” for avoiding estoppel.1092 
                                                          
 1083. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693. 
 1084. Id. at 1357-58, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1693. 
 1085. Id. at 1358-59, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 1086. Id. at 1359, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 1087. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 1088. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694. 
 1089. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694-95. 
 1090. Id. at 1359-60, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1694-95. 
 1091. Id. at 1360, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695. 
 1092. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1695. 
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2. Festo IX 
In the ninth judicial decision in a lawsuit that was originally filed 
about fifteen years ago, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc after sifting 
through no less than fifteen amicus briefs, laid down a new set of rules 
for determining the scope of a prosecution history estoppel.1093  As 
recently affirmed by the Supreme Court (in Festo VIII), whenever an 
applicant for a patent narrows the scope of his or her claims by 
amendment and the patent owner later tries to rely on the doctrine 
of equivalents to establish infringement, in order to avoid 
prosecution history estoppel, the patent owner must demonstrate 
that the amendment was not made for a reason “relating to 
patentability.”1094 
If the applicant cannot demonstrate that he or she amended the 
claims for reasons unrelated to patentability, the application of 
prosecution history estoppel will prevent the scope of a patent claim 
from being expanded under the doctrine of equivalents to embrace a 
product or process that is only insubstantially different from the 
element that was amended.1095  Once a court determines that estoppel 
does apply, the insubstantially different element in the accused 
product or process will only be embraced as an equivalent if the 
patent owner can prove that “one skilled in the art could not 
reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have 
literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.”1096 
In Festo VIII, the Supreme Court said the patent owner can meet 
this test if “the rationale underlying the amendment [bears] no more 
than a tangential relationship to the equivalent in question,”1097 or 
“there [is] some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not 
reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute 
in question.”1098 
The Federal Circuit in Festo IX reaffirmed these principals and went 
on to set forth guidelines as to when each of these tests could be 
met.1099  Before addressing the guidelines, the Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 1093. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Festo IX]. 
 1094. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41, 
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713-14 (2002). 
 1095. Id., 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713-14. 
 1096. Id. at 741, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 1097. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 1098. Id. at 740-41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 1099. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368-
70, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating: (1) that the 
“unforeseeable at the time of the amendment” test is an objective inquiry into the 
knowledge of those of ordinary skill in art at the time of the amendment; (2) that 
amendments made to avoid prior art that contains the equivalent in question are not 
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addressed an overarching issue, holding that it is up to the court, not 
the jury, to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to overcome 
estoppel:  “Questions relating to the application and scope of 
prosecution history estoppel . . . fall within the exclusive province of 
the court.”1100 
Then, directing its attention to the first test—when the equivalent 
would have been unforeseeable at the time of the amendment—the 
Federal Circuit said the demarcation of such evidence “is best left to 
development on a case-by-case basis.”1101  Nevertheless, the court 
provided “general guidance,” noting that unforseeability must be 
determined from the perspective of a hypothetical person of ordinary 
skill in the art.1102  The court said that an allegedly equivalent element 
that was not known at the time of the amendment “would not have 
been foreseeable.”1103  An allegedly equivalent element that was 
known at the time of the amendment “would more likely have been 
foreseeable.”1104  If the element was also known in the field of the 
invention at the time of the amendment, the court said that the 
equivalent “certainly should have been foreseeable.”1105 
The Federal Circuit pointed out that the second test—the 
“tangential relation” test—examines “whether the reason for the 
narrowing amendment was peripheral, or not directly relevant, to the 
alleged equivalent.”1106  While the court did not define the scope of 
this test any more precisely, it did state that an amendment made to 
avoid prior art that contains the equivalent is not tangential.1107  The 
court said that the tangential relation test must be determined solely 
based on the prosecution history record.1108  Still, the court left the 
door open to testimony from those skilled in the art “when necessary” 
to explain the meaning of the record.1109 
                                                          
tangential under the “rationale underlying the narrowing amendment” test; and 
(3) that the “some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be 
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question” test must be 
applied narrowly, only being satisfied when there is some reason, such as the 
shortcomings of language, why the patentee was prevented from adequately 
describing the alleged equivalent). 
 1100. Id. at 1368, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1101. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1102. Id. at 1368-69, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1103. Id. at 1369, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1104. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327. 
 1105. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1106. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1107. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1108. Id. at 1370, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1109. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
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The Federal Circuit observed that the third test—the “some other 
reason” inquiry—“while vague, must be a narrow one.”1110  The court 
said the test may be satisfied by proof that there was “some reason, 
such as the shortcomings of language, why the patentee was 
prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it narrowed 
the claim.”1111  Proof that the equivalent was an “inferior and 
unacceptable design,” however, is insufficient to meet this 
requirement.1112  The court also said that the proof should be limited 
to the prosecution history record “[w]hen at all possible,”1113 but did 
not explain when extrinsic proof would be permitted. 
3. Doctrine of equivalent cases after Festo IX:  Canceling broad claims and         
leaving narrow ones remains a Festo-type narrowing amendment 
In the first post Festo IX case decided by the Federal Circuit (on 
remand from the Supreme Court after Festo XIII), Deering Precision 
Instruments, L.L.C. v. Vector Distribution Systems, Inc.,1114 the Federal 
Circuit ruled that canceling broader claims and retaining narrower 
ones re-written in independent form is effectively a Festo-type 
narrowing amendment and presumptively results in no range of 
equivalents for the narrowed limitation.1115 
Deering’s patent was directed to a compact pocket scale.1116  An 
important aspect of the invention was a sliding counterweight that 
could move closer to the plane of the scale’s fulcrums, thereby 
minimizing the overall weight of the scale.1117  In the application 
originally filled with the PTO, independent claim 1 was the broadest, 
with no limitation drawn to the exact location of the 
counterweight.1118  Claim 3 of the application, dependent on claim 1, 
included an additional limitation concerning the location of the 
sliding weight (a limitation that the parties referred to as the “Zero 
Position Limitation”).1119  In response to a PTO rejection of claim 1, 
                                                          
 1110. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1111. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1112. Id. at 1373, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331. 
 1113. Id. at 1370, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328. 
 1114. 347 F.3d 1314, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1716 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1115. Id. at 1325-26, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723-24. 
 1116. Id. at 1317, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717.   
 1117. Id. at 1318, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718. 
 1118. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719.  The court stated the claim as defining 
a light-weight portable scale having a base, a beam with a substance holder at 
one end and a scale extending in an opposite direction, a sliding weight 
movably carried by the beam for movement along the scale, a pair of metallic 
fulcrum posts projecting upwardly from the base, and a pair of metallic 
bearing inserts in the beam for cooperation with the fulcrum posts. 
Id. 
 1119. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719. 
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the applicants canceled claim 1 and submitted a new claim 11 which 
was the original claim 3 rewritten in independent form.1120 
Vector conceded that the accused product literally met every 
limitation of the asserted claims other than the zero position 
limitation.1121  Vector argued that the zero position limitation was 
absent literally because the key claim term (substantially) required 
the weight to actually penetrate the plane of the fulcrums.1122  
Moreover, based on the prosecution history, Vector argued that the 
zero position limitation was entitled to no range of equivalents under 
Festo VI.1123 
The district court adopted Vector’s construction and its view of the 
prosecution history, entering a summary judgment of non-
infringement.1124 
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s claim 
construction and analysis that Festo applied to the case.1125  However, 
in light of the ruling in Festo XIII that the presumption is not 
absolute, the Federal Circuit remanded for the district court to 
consider whether Deering could rebut the Festo presumption that it 
gave up the right to claim as an equivalent everything between the 
narrower claims granted and the broader ones canceled.1126 
V. DEFENSES 
A. Experimental Use 
1. Experimental use is a narrow infringement defense 
In a case brought by a former research professor against Duke 
University for infringing two patents relating to free electron laser 
technology, the Federal Circuit held that “experimental use” lives on 
as a narrow defense to a claim infringement.1127 
The Federal Circuit held that, despite the Supreme Court ruling in 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.1128 that intent plays no 
role in the application of the doctrine of equivalents,1129 the defense 
                                                          
 1120. Id. at 1319, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1719. 
 1121. Id. at 1321, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
 1122. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
 1123. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
 1124. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1720. 
 1125. Id. at 1324, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1723. 
 1126. Id. at 1327, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1725. 
 1127. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 1128. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997). 
 1129. Id. at 36, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874. 
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of “experimental use” is not an “inescapable” intent inquiry1130 and 
the defense persists, “albeit in the very narrow form articulated by this 
court in Embrex . . . .”1131  The Federal Circuit further explained that 
experimental use is not necessarily an affirmative defense and need 
not be raised as such, i.e., in the answer to the complaint, in order to 
be preserved.1132  Finally, the court noted that the accused infringer 
must establish the defense, if available.1133 
In this case, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment that Duke University’s use of the patented 
technology was experimental, holding: 
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged 
in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in 
furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not 
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow 
and strictly limited experimental use defense.  Moreover, the profit 
or nonprofit status of the user is not determinative.1134 
In a widely discussed landmark case of first impression, Integra 
Lifesciences, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA,1135 the Federal Circuit affirmed a lower 
court’s finding of infringement for drug development activity 
directed to identifying improved compounds for clinical trials, 
finding that Merck’s biomedical experimentation does not qualify for 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) exemption.1136  The 
Integra decision significantly clarifies the scope of the FDA 
exemption. 
Integra sued Merck for infringement of five patents related to 
RGD-containing peptides which can be used in medical devices and 
therapeutic treatments.1137  Integra asserted that the acts of identifying 
the best of several candidates for clinical development constituted 
infringing commercial activities.1138  As part of its defense, Merck 
argued that its drug development activities fell within the FDA 
exemption of the Hatch-Waxman Act1139 which provides a safe harbor 
for patents infringement for activity “solely for uses reasonably 
                                                          
 1130. Madey, 307 F.3d. at 1360-61, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 1131. Id. at 1361, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.  See Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. 
Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
 1132. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1361, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745. 
 1133. Id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 1134. Id. at 1362, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746. 
 1135. 331 F.3d 860, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1136. Id. at 862, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866. 
 1137. Id. at 862-63, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866-67. 
 1138. Id. at 863, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867. 
 1139. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
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related to the development and submission of information” to the 
FDA.1140 
The issue decided by the Federal Circuit was whether pre-clinical 
research identifying the best drug candidate to subject to the FDA 
approval process was exempt from infringement under the provisions 
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).1141  Interpreting the statutory language, the 
court found that the exemption is limited to the uses “reasonably 
related to the development and submission of information” for FDA 
safety and effectiveness approval processes.1142  The Federal Circuit 
indicated that activities that do not directly produce information for 
[the] FDA strain the boundaries of this relationship and noted that 
the exemption should be confined to activity that “‘would contribute 
(relatively directly)’ to information the FDA considers in approving a 
drug.”1143  The court held that Merck’s research activities fell outside 
of this relationship because identification of an improved drug 
candidate constitutes only general biomedical research.1144  Affirming 
the district court’s finding that Merck infringed the Integra patents, 
the court stated that the FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs, 
and Merck’s research activities failed to result in clinical testing that 
provided information to the FDA.1145 
2. Importation of the product of a patent process—§ 271(g) 
In a case of first impression, the Federal Circuit in Bayer AG v. 
Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,1146 affirmed a lower court’s order 
dismissing a counterclaim alleging infringement under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) of four U.S. patents relating to processes of 
screening for substances that inhibit or activate a protein because the 
accused drug products “were not ‘manufactured’ by a process 
claimed in the asserted patents.”1147 
In 1988 Congress passed the Process Patents Amendments Act,1148 
enacting § 271(g) which made it an act of infringement to perform a 
process in another country that would infringe a process claim of a 
U.S. patent and then import the product into the United States.1149 
                                                          
 1140. Id. 
 1141. Integra, 331 F.3d at 865-66, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1868. 
 1142. Id. at 866, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)). 
 1143. Id. at 867, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870 (quoting Intermedics v. Ventritex, 
775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 1991)). 
 1144. Id. at 866, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 1145. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1869. 
 1146. 340 F.3d 1367, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1147. Id. at 1368, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1002. 
 1148. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988). 
 1149. Id. § 271(g) (2000). 
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At issue before the Federal Circuit in this case was the meaning of 
the phrase “a product which is made by a process” as found in 
§ 271(g).1150  Housey argued that the information generated by the 
patented method fit within the statutory meaning of § 271(g), which 
should be interpreted broadly to cover any patented method, 
whether or not the method produces a physical product.1151  Bayer 
argued that § 271(g) applies only to manufacturing processes that 
result in a physical product.1152  Since Bayer had imported only 
information, there could be no infringement of the Housey patent 
claims.1153 
After analyzing the words of the statute as well as the extensive 
legislative history of the Process Patents Amendments Act, the 
Federal Circuit concluded that § 271(g) applied only to importation 
of physical objects derived from manufacturing processes.1154  The 
court also found that processes of identification and data generation 
are not steps in the manufacture of a product because they are not 
directly used in the synthesis of the product.1155  Consequently, the 
Federal Circuit held that Bayer’s importation of information derived 
from its screening activities was not an infringement of the Housey 
patents.1156 
B. Implied License:  Sale of Product by Patentee That Can Only Be Used in 
a Patented Combination is Subject to an Implied License To Do So 
In Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd.,1157 the Federal Circuit vacated a 
preliminary injunction and found that purchasers of a patentee’s 
“female plate” battery pack had an implied license to mate the battery 
pack with a “male” charging plate and thus obviated any direct 
infringement of the claimed combination of a male and female 
plate.1158 
The issue presented to the Federal Circuit stemmed from 
Anton/Bauer’s manufactured batteries which, in order to be properly 
used with a video camera or battery charger, required a specific 
connective device.1159  The patent-in-suit, a connective device allowing 
                                                          
 1150. Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1371, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1151. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1152. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1153. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004. 
 1154. Id. at 1377, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008. 
 1155. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 1156. Id. at 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009. 
 1157. 329 F.3d 1343, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1675 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1158. Id. at 1353, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681-82. 
 1159. Id. at 1346, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
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“a battery pack to be ‘quickly and efficiently replaced upon discharge 
of the batteries[,]’”  claimed: 
a combination of a female plate and a male plate, where the female 
plate contain[ed] a plurality of . . . slots and the male plate 
contain[ed] a plurality of projections that correspond[ed] to the 
female . . . slots. The claimed combination . . . formed when a 
female . . . and a male plate [were] fitted together to form a 
mechanical and an electrical connection.1160 
In the instant case, Anton/Bauer sold its female plates directly to 
the camera industry and also indirectly to end-users.1161  In addition, 
Anton/Bauer separately sold battery packs that contained male 
plates.1162  PAG, Ltd. (PAG), the alleged infringer, sold a battery pack 
with male plates compatible with Anton/Bauer’s female plates.1163  In 
the subsequent infringement suit, Anton/Bauer claimed that PAG’s 
battery pack “induced infringement of [its] patent and/or 
contributed to the infringement of [its] patent by Anton/Bauer’s 
customers.”1164 
The district court issued a preliminary injunction against PAG, 
holding Anton/Bauer’s claims likely to prevail and, in turn, rejected 
the argument “that Anton/Bauer had exhausted its patents rights” 
and “had granted its customers an implied license to practice the 
claimed invention.”1165 
On appeal, PAG argued that the Federal Circuit should properly 
apply the implied license test of Met-Coil Systems Corp. v. Korners 
Unlimited, Inc.1166 because the district court failed to do so “by 
requiring that the accused battery pack be a replacement for an 
element of the claimed combination and by requiring a showing of 
affirmative acts on the part of Anton/Bauer that would lead a 
customer to believe that an implied license had[,] in fact, been 
granted.”1167  The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that “[t]he sale of 
the unpatented female plate by Anton/Bauer [constituted] a 
complete transfer of the [plate] ownership,” extinguishing  
                                                          
 1160. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676. 
 1161. Id. at 1347, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676-77. 
 1162. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 1163. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 1164. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 1165. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677. 
 1166. 803 F.2d 684, 687, 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 474, 476 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  In Met-Coil, 
the Federal Circuit held that “[a] patent owner’s unrestricted sales of a machine 
useful only in performing the claimed process and producing the claimed product 
‘plainly indicate that the grant of a license should be inferred.’”  Id., 231 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 474, 476. 
 1167. Anton/Bauer, 329 F.3d at 1350, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679. 
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“Anton/Bauer’s right to control the use of the plate[.]”1168  The court 
held that “the plate [could] only be used in the patented 
combination and [that] the combination must [have been] 
complete[d] by the purchaser.”1169 
Because Anton/Bauer did not expressly restrict customer use of 
the female plates, the court held that “Anton/Bauer grant[ed] an 
implied license to its customers to employ the combination claimed 
in the . . . patent.  Accordingly, there [was] no direct infringement to 
support a claim of either inducement of infringement or 
contributory infringement.”1170 
VI. HATCH-WAXMAN ACT CASES § 271(E)(2) 
A. Off Label Use Not Actionable Under § 271(e); But May or May Not 
Constitute Actionable Inducement 
In Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp.,1171 the Federal Circuit upheld 
the grant of summary judgment of non-infringement of a patent 
claiming a method of using the drug gabapentin to treat 
“neurodegenerative diseases” where the defendant applied to use the 
drug for the treatment of epilepsy.1172 
Warner-Lambert (now Pfizer) sued Apotex under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(2)(a), alleging that Apotex’s filing of an abbreviated new 
drug application (ANDA) to market a generic gabapentin for the 
treatment of epilepsy infringed Warner-Lambert’s patent.1173  It was 
undisputed that the FDA has approved the use of gabapentin only for 
treatment of epilepsy and that its use in the treatment of 
neurodegenerative disease would constitute an additional use.1174 
Although Apotex never sought or received approval for the use of 
gabapentin to treat neurodegenerative diseases, Warner-Lambert 
argued that Apotex’s filing of the ANDA constituted infringement of 
Warner-Lambert’s patent because patients had used Warner-
Lambert’s product for treating neurodegenerative diseases and would 
likely use Apotex’s gabapentin for this purpose as well.1175 
The Federal Circuit rejected Warner-Lambert’s contention that 
§ 271(e) prohibits submission of an ANDA seeking approval to make, 
                                                          
 1168. Id. at 1351, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 1169. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 1170. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680. 
 1171. 316 F.3d 1348, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1172. Id. at 1351, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1173. Id. at 1353, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1174. Id. at 1352, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482. 
 1175. Id. at 1353, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
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use, or sell a drug for an approved use if any other use of the drug is 
claimed in a non-expired patent.1176  To the contrary, the Federal 
Circuit held that “it is not an act of infringement to submit an ANDA 
for approval to market a drug for a use when neither the drug nor 
the use is covered by an existing patent, and the patent at issue is for 
a use not approved [by the FDA].”1177 
In Alergen, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., Inc.,1178 the Federal Circuit, following 
the precedent set in Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., once again 
held that 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) does not permit innovator drug 
companies to enjoin ANDA filers from marketing a generic drug 
where the ANDA filer’s liability is based upon an allegation of 
inducement of infringement.1179  The Federal Circuit held that 
because defendants Alcon and Bausch & Lomb’s ANDA requested 
approval for a method of using an approved drug, but the requested 
method was not covered by the innovator’s patent, the defendants 
could not be liable for infringement under § 271(e)(2).1180  Judge 
Clevenger wrote for the panel.   
In an unusual turn of events, separate, concurring opinions were 
filed by Judges Schall and Linn.  In Judge Schall’s concurring 
opinion, in which Judge Clevenger joined, the Warner-Lambert 
opinion was well roasted, even though the panel felt constrained to 
follow it.1181  In the opinion of this panel, the statutory language of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act does permit § 271(e)(2) suits for inducing 
infringement.1182  It could seem that the rationale of Warner-Lambert is 
ripe for en banc review or possible legislative “correction.” 
B. FDA Practices Pass Federal Circuit Muster 
In a case that turned on statutory interpretation and that involved 
Apotex’s application to market a generic version of SmithKline 
Beecham Corporation’s (SmithKline) antidepressant Paxil, the 
Federal Circuit upheld various FDA practices relating to the 
implementation of the Hatch-Waxman Act.1183 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA permits companies to file 
an ANDA where the drug is “a generic version of an approved 
                                                          
 1176. Id. at 1355, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1177. Id. at 1354-55, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1178. 324 F.3d 1322, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1179. Id. at 1330, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231. 
 1180. Id. at 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 1181. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 1182. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234. 
 1183. Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1352, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1725, 
1738 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000). 
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drug.”1184  New Drug Application (NDA) applicants must identify and 
the FDA must list patents that claim either NDA drugs or “‘a method 
of using such drug [through which] a claim of patent infringement 
could reasonably be asserted’ against a party who made, used or sold 
the drug.”1185  In turn, with regard to each patent listed by the FDA in 
the Orange Book, ANDA applicants are obligated to verify either 
“that no patent information has been filed with the FDA[,]” that the 
patent has or will expire on a particular date, or “that the patent is 
invalid or will not be infringed by the . . . generic drug.”1186 
Apotex, Inc. filed an ANDA for a generic version of the drug 
Paxil.1187  At the time of filing, only one patent was listed relating to 
SmithKline’s NDA for Paxil.1188  Because Apotex’s proposed generic 
drug contained as an active ingredient an anhydrous form of Paxil’s 
active ingredient, Apotex filed a certification asserting that its generic 
would not infringe the listed patent.1189  SmithKline responded with 
an infringement action, causing the implementation of an automatic 
thirty month stay for ANDA regulatory approval.1190  SmithKline 
subsequently was issued five additional patents relating to the 
anhydrate form of Paxil’s active ingredient and submitted each for 
listing by the FDA.1191  Apotex filed certifications for each of “the 
newly listed patents” and SmithKline, in turn, responded with 
separate infringement actions, each triggering a separate thirty 
month stay.1192 
Apotex filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that the five 
subsequently issued patents did “not claim Paxil or a method of using 
Paxil as approved in the original NDA” and did not satisfy the 
statutory requirements for listing in the Orange Book; that the FDA 
must determine whether patents qualify for listing; that “the FDA’s 
practice of requiring an ANDA applicant to certify patents [listed] 
after an ANDA ha[d] been submitted violate[d] the Hatch-Waxman 
Act;” and that “the FDA’s regulation permitting the listing of patents 
as part of NDA supplements violate[d] the Act[.]”1193 
Construing the plain statutory language as well as interpreting 
congressional intent, the Federal Circuit concluded that nothing in 
                                                          
 1184. Apotex, 347 F.3d at 1338, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727. 
 1185. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)). 
 1186. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1727. 
 1187. Id. at 1339, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
 1188. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
 1189. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
 1190. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728. 
 1191. Id. at 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1728-29. 
 1192. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729. 
 1193. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1729. 
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the Hatch-Waxman Act obligates the FDA to screen Orange Book 
submissions and to refuse patent listings that do not satisfy the 
statutory requirements for listing.1194  The Federal Circuit also 
concluded that the statutory language showed clear congressional 
intent  “to require certification whenever an ANDA applicant seeks 
approval of a drug that is claimed by a [listed] patent[.]”1195  
Furthermore, it upheld the FDA’s requirement of certification of 
“patent information . . . submitted after [an] ANDA is . . . filed.”1196  
Additionally, it supported the FDA regulation that required 
supplemental NDA patents to “be listed in the Orange Book[,]” 
characterizing it as “consistent with the procedures for submitting 
patent information for both pending and approved NDAs[.]”1197 
VII.    INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
A. The Sanction for Inequitable Conduct May Be                                        
Less Than Unenforceability 
In a case where the Federal Circuit affirmed the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California’s holding of 
inequitable conduct on some, but not all, of the relied upon bases, it 
proceeded to remand the case for a determination of whether the 
incidents of inequitable conduct on which it affirmed justified the 
sanction of unenforceability.1198 
The patent in question generally was directed to enzymes used in 
DNA replication termed “DNA polymerase” or, more specifically, to a 
Thermus aquaticus bacterium enzyme, or “Taq” polymerase.1199  
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. (“Roche”) alleged that Promega Corp. 
(“Promega”) breached its licensing agreement with Roche, and 
thereby became an infringer of the patent.1200  Promega 
counterclaimed, alleging the patent “unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct[.]”1201  The district court declared the patent 
unenforceable based on eight separate material representations and 
                                                          
 1194. Id. at 1347-49, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1734-36. 
 1195. Id. at 1350, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737. 
 1196. Id. at 1350-51, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1737. 
 1197. Id. at 1352, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1738. 
 1198. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1372, 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1398 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1199. Id. at 1358, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387. 
 1200. Id. at 1359, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1201. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
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omissions, of which three were addressed in the summary judgment 
state and the remainder after a bench-trial.1202 
The panel majority reviewed the district court’s finding of 
inequitable conduct using the clear error standard, stating that the 
“findings on materiality and intent . . . [would] not be overturned in 
the absence of a ‘definite and firm conviction’ that a mistake [had] 
been made.”1203  While parsing through the eight issues one-by-one 
and evaluating the sub-issues of materiality and intent for each, the 
Federal Circuit reversed some and affirmed others.1204 
In the end, the court noted that “[o]nce the requisite levels of 
materiality and intent are shown, the district court must determine 
whether the equities warrant a conclusion that the patentee has 
engaged in inequitable conduct.”1205  The Federal Circuit remanded 
the case to the district court to determine, in its discretion, whether 
the material misstatements or omissions were “sufficiently serious in 
light of the evidence of intent to deceive . . . to warrant the severe 
sanction of holding the patent unenforceable.”1206 
Judge Newman vociferously dissented on the “clear error” standard 
of review, arguing that the majority cast aside the safeguard 
previously established by the court by requiring that material 
misrepresentation and intent to deceive be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence.1207  She noted that this requirement was 
established in response to “the past ‘plague’ of charges of 
‘inequitable conduct’” and cautioned that the decision may bring a 
similar “[n]ew [p]lague.”1208  In Judge Newman’s view, Promega’s 
arguments illustrated “litigation tactic[s]” and she insisted that the 
“clear and convincing” standard of proof should be used both at trial 
and on review.1209 
B. Acts of Foreign Patent Agent Give Rise to Inequitable Conduct and Non-
Enabling Prior Art May Still Be Material 
Reinvigorating the inequitable conduct defense, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court, which held 
                                                          
 1202. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1203. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388 (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron Inc., 48 
F.3d 1172, 1178, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1827 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 1204. Id. at 1359-60, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1205. Id. at 1359, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388. 
 1206. Id. at 1372, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398. 
 1207. Id. at 1372-73, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398 (Newman, J.,  dissenting). 
 1208. Id. at 1372, 1381, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1398, 1405. 
 1209. Id. at 1373-74, 1381, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399, 1405. 
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unenforceable patents to a method of synthesizing taxol, a cancer 
drug, because they were obtained by inequitable conduct.1210 
The patents in question stemmed from a scientific article written by 
the named inventors and published in the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN 
CHEMICAL SOCIETY (“JACS”).1211  The inventors submitted the draft 
article to a French patent agent in the employ of Rhône-Poulenc 
Rorer (“RPR”).1212  The article explained that the method the 
inventors devised used “protecting groups” to prevent particular 
hydroxyl groups from interfering with the formation of taxol.1213  Both 
the draft article and the inventor’s invention disclosure explained 
certain limitations, of which the inventors were aware, with regard to 
the protecting groups.1214  However, the draft application, prepared 
for filing in France by RPR’s agent, did not specify hydroxyl-
protecting group limitations.1215  Rather, the French application 
stated that the TMS and MOM groups, which consisted of the very 
groups that the inventors explained should not act as protecting 
groups, were permissible hydroxyl-protecting groups.1216  A U.S. 
patent lawyer, who later received the French application, had it 
translated and filed as a U.S. application.1217 
The JACS article was never disclosed to the PTO.1218  It was, 
however, uncovered as the result of a computer search performed by 
the PTO scientific library at the Examiner’s request.1219  Because of its 
non-prior art publication date, the Examiner apparently did not 
consider it.1220 
The district court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
inventors failed to provide material information by not providing the 
JACS article to the PTO, and that the Examiner did not review the 
JACS article before issuing the patent.1221 
In an opinion written by Judge Prost, which contained a fact-
specific analysis, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court.1222  
Judge Prost noted that, despite the JACS article, the patents 
                                                          
 1210. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1229, 
66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1211. Id. at 1230, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1212. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1213. Id. at 1229-30, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482-83. 
 1214. Id. at 1230, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1215. Id. at 1231, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1216. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483. 
 1217. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1218. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1219. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484. 
 1220. Id. at 1231-33, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484-85. 
 1221. Id. at 1233, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485. 
 1222. Id. at 1242, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1492. 
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“specifically recommend[ed]” using groups that resulted in an 
unstable esterification process and additionally recommended one 
group that could not be removed after the esterification.1223  Judge 
Prost agreed with the district court, finding: 
a reasonable patent examiner reviewing the subject patent 
application would have expected the use of TMS and MOM groups 
to yield more than trace amounts of taxol, but that a review of the 
JACS article would have raised doubts that the use of TMS and 
MOM would produce taxol in more than trace amounts.1224 
Thus, Judge Prost found the JACS article to be material, 
notwithstanding the fact that the district court denied Bristol-Myers’ 
summary judgment motion for lack of enablement.1225  He stated: 
The district court’s holding on inequitable conduct is not 
contradictory to its holding on enablement.  The issue of whether a 
reference would be considered important by a reasonable 
examiner in determining whether a patent application is allowable, 
including whether the invention is enabled, is a separate issue from 
whether the invention is actually enabled.1226 
The court, in affirming the holding of the district court on the 
issue of intent, stated: 
In a case such as this, where [the RPR agent] was intimately 
familiar with the article because the inventors with whom he 
worked wrote it, [where] he approved the article for publication, 
and [where] the article was in his possession while he was drafting 
the French patent application, the determination that [the RPR 
agent] knew of the significance of the JACS article in combination 
with the finding that [the RPR agent] knew of the duty to disclose 
is sufficient to establish intent.1227 
C. Failure to Disclose Rejection by Another Examiner is Material 
Although it reversed and remanded a district court summary 
judgment of inequitable conduct because of a factual dispute on the 
issue of intent, the Federal Circuit made clear that an applicant’s 
failure to disclose a rejection by a different examiner of a claim 
similar to that in issue meets the materiality prong of an inequitable 
conduct defense.1228 
                                                          
 1223. Id. at 1234, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1224. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486. 
 1225. Id. at 1238, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 1226. Id. at 1238-39, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489. 
 1227. Id. at 1240, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491. 
 1228. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1368, 66 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1808 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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The patents-in-suit claimed priority “through a string of 
continuation applications.”1229  The family of applications for the 
patents-in-suit and a related family of applications were assigned to 
two different examiners.1230  The examiner of the related family of 
applications (Examiner A) was made aware of the applications for the 
patent-in-suit.1231  However, the examiner of the patent-in-suit 
(Examiner B) was not made aware of the existence of the family of 
related applications.1232  The claims in the related family of 
applications were substantially identical to the claims of the patents-
in-suit and were rejected by Examiner A on the three separate 
occasions.1233  Examiner B was neither advised of these rejections, nor 
was the prior art cited by Examiner A brought to Examiner B’s 
attention.1234 
The district court found that Dayco committed inequitable 
conduct when it “’intentionally withheld material prior art and 
information concerning [the] co-pending [196] application from the 
patent examiner [assigned to the patents-in-suit]’” and granted 
summary judgment.1235  Dayco appealed.1236 
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded but, in doing so, 
agreed with the district court that under the “reasonable examiner” 
standard of materiality, a co-pending application is “highly material” 
where “it could have conceivably served as the basis of a double 
patenting rejection.”1237  The court rejected Dayco’s argument that its 
filing of a terminal disclaimer limiting the term of the related 
application (to the terminal date of another issued patent) obviated 
the materiality of the non-disclosure:  “a copending application may 
be material even though it cannot result in a shorter patent term 
when it could affect the rights of the patentee to assign the issue 
patents.”1238  Thus, the court reasoned that the disclosure of the 
copending application “could have led to double patenting rejections 
                                                          
 1229. Id. at 1360, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 1230. Id. at 1361, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 1231. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 1232. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 1233. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1803. 
 1234. Id. at 1361-62, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 1235. Id. at 1362, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 1236. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804. 
 1237. Id. at 1365, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806 (quoting Akron Polymer Container 
Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1533, 1534 
(Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 1238. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806. 
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in the applications that issued as the patents-in-suit”1239 and that the 
pending, related application was therefore material.1240 
Regarding the applicant’s failure to disclose the prior rejection, the 
court held that “a contrary decision of another examiner reviewing a 
substantially similar claim meets the Akron Polymer1241 ‘reasonable 
examiner’ threshold materiality test of ‘any information that a 
reasonable examiner would substantially likely consider important in 
deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent.’”1242  
The court reasoned that “[a]lthough examiners are not bound to 
follow other examiners’ interpretations, knowledge of a potentially 
different interpretation is clearly information that an examiner could 
consider important when examining an application.”1243  However, 
the court remanded the case for a determination of a finding 
regarding intent to deceive.1244 
D. Commercial Test Results Not Material to Patentability 
In CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int’l Corp.,1245 the Federal Circuit vacated a 
district court’s summary judgment of lack of enablement and 
reversed its finding of inequitable conduct, holding instead that an 
applicant does not necessarily have a duty to disclose disappointing 
test results.1246 
The two patents in suit were directed to systems for cleaning 
semiconductor wafers.1247  While the applications were still pending, 
the inventors tested the patented machine at a Texas Instruments 
(TI) facility, where it failed to meet TI’s cleanliness standards for 
removing particulates.1248  In response, the inventors came up with 
improvements for which they sought and obtained another patent.1249 
The district court found the claims of the patents in suit were not 
enabled because the claimed invention failed to remove 
particulates.1250  The court also held that the issuance of the 
improvement patent showed that undue experimentation was 
                                                          
 1239. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 1240. Id. at 1365-66, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807. 
 1241. Akron Polymer, 148 F. 3d at 1380, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 1242. Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1368, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808 (quoting Akron Polymer, 
148 F.3d at 1382, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534). 
 1243. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1244. Id., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808. 
 1245. 349 F.3d 1333, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1940 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1246. Id. at 1342-43, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 1247. Id. at 1335, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1941. 
 1248. Id. at 1336, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 1249. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942. 
 1250. Id. at 1336-37, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
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required to practice the patents in suit.1251  The district court further 
found the inventors had committed inequitable conduct by failing to 
disclose the negative TI test results to the PTO.1252 
Construing the claims to require any level—not some specific 
level—of contaminant removal, the Federal Circuit found the claims 
were enabled by the specification because the inventors’ prototype 
removed penciled grease marks.1253  The Federal Circuit observed that 
the enablement requirement “does not require that a patent 
disclosure enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use a 
perfected, commercially viable embodiment absent a claim limitation 
to that effect.”1254  Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that even if 
the prototype did not achieve “complete cleaning,” the claimed 
invention would not be inoperative on that ground alone.1255  The 
Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s holding that the 
improvement patent demonstrated that undue experimentation was 
required to enable the claims of the two patents in suit.1256 
As to unenforceability, the Federal Circuit held the negative TI test 
results were not material to the patentability of the claimed invention 
because the TI data “reflects a commercial, not a statutory, standard 
for enablement.”1257 
E. Payment of Maintenance Fees at Small Entity May Constitute Inequitable 
Conduct—But Not Patent Expiration 
In a case involving multiple payments of maintenance fees at the 
small entity rate, even after the patent had been licensed to non-
qualified licensees, the Federal Circuit applied its traditional 
“inequitable conduct” analysis in vacating and remanding a summary 
judgment ruling that a patent owner engaged in inequitable conduct 
by falsely claiming small entity status.1258 
When the patent in suit was assigned to Lex Computer, it qualified 
as a small entity.1259  Lex later signed a non-exclusive license with 
Adobe Systems, a company having more than 500 employees.1260  Lex 
subsequently submitted a petition to the PTO to accept late payment 
                                                          
 1251. Id. at 1337, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 1252. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943. 
 1253. Id. at 1338-39, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 1254. Id. at 1338, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944. 
 1255. Id. at 1339, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 1256. Id. at 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1945. 
 1257. Id. at 1342, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947. 
 1258. Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1150, 69 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1259. Id. at 1142, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1260. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
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of the second maintenance fee at the reduced (small entity) amount 
and a verified statement, signed by its president, claiming small entity 
status.1261  The petition was granted and the patent was reinstated.1262  
Lex paid the third maintenance fee (this time the petition was signed 
by its patent lawyer in a similar manner).1263  During litigation, when 
the maintenance issue fee issue was raised, Lex Computer paid the 
fee difference, submitting its payments under 37 C.F.R. § 1.28(c).1264 
Ulead sought declaratory judgment that the subject patent is 
invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed and filed a motion for 
summary judgment urging that Lex’s false claim of small entity status 
renders the patent unenforceable or invalid, and that Lex’s failure to 
pay the correct maintenance fee and payment of the incorrect small 
entity fee without “good faith” caused the patent to expire.1265 
Lex’s president testified that when he signed this declaration, he 
was unaware that a non-exclusive license could result in the forfeiture 
of small entity status.1266  Lex’s patent lawyer explained that when he 
paid the third maintenance fee, he was unaware that Lex had 
finalized license agreements with any companies having more than 
500 employees.1267 
The Federal Circuit, applying its traditional inequitable conduct 
analysis from the en banc, Kingsdown decision,1268 an analysis based on 
materiality and intent factors, concluded that Lex’s 
misrepresentation to the PTO regarding its small entity status was 
material because it affected the “survival of the patent” but ruled that 
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding Lex’s intent.1269  
The Federal Circuit stated that the facts might show gross negligence, 
but “gross negligence is not, in and of itself, sufficient to satisfy the 
intent element of inequitable conduct.”1270 
The Federal Circuit noted that § 1.28(c) is the only provision 
“governing expiration for failure to pay the full maintenance fee 
because of an erroneous claim to small entity status,” and that the 
regulation does not require or authorize an inquiry into “good faith” 
by the PTO or by the district court when determining whether a 
                                                          
 1261. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1262. Id. at 1143, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1263. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099-1100. 
 1264. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1265. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1099. 
 1266. Id. at 1147, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
 1267. Id. at 1147-48, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103. 
 1268. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 9 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 1269. Ulead Sys., 351 F.3d at 1146, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101-02. 
 1270. Id. at 1148, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102. 
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patent has expired for failure to pay maintenance fees.1271  However, 
this does not mean inequitable conduct cannot be found in 
connection with such a payment.1272  The Federal Circuit reasoned 
that if a patent owner knew that it did not qualify as a small entity 
when it paid a maintenance fee at the reduced, small entity rate, but 
attempts to submit the correct payment using the vehicle of § 1.28(c) 
to pay the difference, “the patentee may be found to have engaged in 
inequitable conduct.”1273 
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Newman asserted that the majority had 
made it easier to revoke a granted property right.1274  She argued that 
the majority’s rationale changes the standard applied to revoking a 
patent due to incorrectly paying maintenance fees from the higher 
fraud standard to the lower inequitable conduct standard.1275 
VIII.   REMEDIES 
A. Reasonable Royalties 
1. Sale of non-infringing products may be relevant                                      
to reasonable royalty damages 
In Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc.,1276 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the trial court’s admission into evidence of expert testimony 
regarding sales of non-infringing products that were promoted by 
making the infringing product available free of charge as relevant to 
a reasonable royalty determination.1277 
In an effort to promote sales of their animal health products, 
Micro Chemical and Lextron provided their feedlot customers with 
computerized medical records systems for tracking health histories 
and medical treatments of livestock.1278  Micro Chemical’s medical 
records system was the commercial embodiment of the invention 
described and claimed in the patent in issue.1279 
Lextron’s co-defendant, Turnkey Computer Systems, supplied 
accounting system software to feedlots, including an animal records 
                                                          
 1271. Id. at 1149, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104. 
 1272. Id. at 1150, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 1273. Id., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 1274. Id. at 1155, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 1275. Id. at 1150-51, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105. 
 1276. 317 F.3d 1387, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1532 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1277. Id. at 1389, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 1278. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 1279. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
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module that tracks health and treatment histories of livestock.1280  
Turnkey allegedly underpriced its animal records module in order to 
support sales of its accounting system.1281 
Prior to trial, the defendants unsuccessfully sought to exclude 
testimony that a reasonable royalty for Lextron’s infringing computer 
systems should be based on revenues from sales of its animal health 
products.1282  The district court ruled that while Micro Chemical could 
not recover a royalty on the animal health products themselves, it 
could present testimony that sales of animal health products were 
relevant to a reasonable royalty determination based on Micro 
Chemical’s allegation that the defendants used their infringing 
system as a loss leader to promote animal health product sales.1283 
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendants’ argument that the 
trial court failed to exercise its gatekeeping function:  “When, as 
here, the parties’ experts rely on conflicting sets of facts, it is not the 
role of the trial court to evaluate the correctness of facts underlying 
one expert’s testimony.”1284 
2. Post-judgment interest calculated from date of order under appeal 
A no doubt red-faced Federal Circuit corrected an obvious 
oversight in Tronzo v. Biomet,1285 finding that post-judgment interest on 
a $20 million punitive damages award should be calculated from the 
date of the district court’s amended judgment after appeal and not 
from the date of its original judgment.1286 
The plaintiff sued Biomet for the patent infringement, fraud, and 
breach of confidential relationship.1287  In 1996, a jury awarded 
Tronzo almost $4 million in compensatory damages, which the 
district court enhanced by almost $2 million based on the jury 
finding of willful infringement.1288  The plaintiff was also awarded 
punitive damages of $20 million.1289  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
ruled that the plaintiff’s patent was invalid and remanded the case for 
a recomputation of compensatory damages based only on the tort 
claims.1290  On remand, the district court reduced the compensatory 
                                                          
 1280. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 1281. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1533. 
 1282. Id. at 1390, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534. 
 1283. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1534. 
 1284. Id. at 1392, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1535. 
 1285. 318 F.3d 1378, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1286. Id. at 1379, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1863.  
 1287. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.   
 1288. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.   
 1289. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.   
 1290. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.   
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damages as instructed.1291  Despite the fact that the award of punitive 
damages was never appealed, the district court also reduced the 
punitive damages award to $52,000 on the grounds that the original 
award was excessive in light of the reduction in compensatory 
damages.1292  The Federal Circuit reversed the reduction in punitive 
damages, holding that the district court exceeded its mandate on the 
remand by disturbing the unappealed punitive damages award.1293  
The district court entered yet another amended final judgment and 
awarded the plaintiff post-judgment interest from August 6, 1996, the 
date of the original judgment on the punitive damages award.1294 
Biomet appealed, arguing that the calculation of interest on the 
punitive damages award should run from July 27, 2002, not from 
August 6, 1996.1295  The Federal Circuit, recognizing that it erred in 
not instructing the district court on the interest calculation (as it was 
required to do by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b)), called 
its prior decision an appellate lapse and gave the interest issue 
plenary review.1296  Applying the law of the regional circuit, the court 
used a “meaningful ascertainment” test for determining when post-
judgment interest should begin to run and held that because the 
plaintiff’s initial compensatory and punitive damages award was 
modified when the plaintiff’s patent was held invalid, and because 
the full punitive damages award was not reinstated until after the 
Federal Circuit’s mandate, post-judgment interest should run from 
the district court’s July 2001 judgment.1297 
B. Attorney Fees 
In addition to the McNeil-PPC case discussed supra, the following 
cases are of interest: 
1. Pre-litigation conduct not germane to attorney fees 
In Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,1298 the Federal Circuit, 
finding that conduct that gives rise to an equitable estoppel defense is 
not an appropriate basis for awarding attorney fees, reversed a district 
                                                          
 1291. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.  
 1292. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.   
 1293. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.   
 1294. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.   
 1295. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862.   
 1296. Id. at 1379-80, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1862-63.   
 1297. Id. at 1381-82, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1864.   
 1298. 339 F.3d 1324, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1682 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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court in finding that a case was “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 285.1299 
The Abbott case concerned two patents, licensed by Abbot, that 
were directed to a lung surfactant composition for treating 
respiratory distress syndrome in premature babies (the Tanabe 
patents).1300  Pursuant to its license, Abbott developed a commercial 
product known as Survanta®.1301  ONY developed its own product, 
Calf Lung Surfactant Extract (CLSE), which was further developed 
and marketed by Forest Laboratories under the trade name 
Infasurf®.1302 
Throughout the 1980s, Abbott and ONY discussed the 
development of CLSE.1303  Abbott informed ONY that it had opted not 
to develop CLSE.1304  In 1984, after conducting a patentability search, 
Abbott told ONY that CLSE was likely not patentable in light of two 
“pertinent references,” but did not mention the Tanabe patents.1305  
Abbott and ONY discussed future collaboration and the possibility of 
joint development of CLSE.1306  Abbott monitored the development of 
CLSE while internally expressing concern that ONY might receive 
FDA approval for its Infasurf® product before Abbott could receive 
approval for Survanta®.1307 
However, in 1991, Abbott received FDA approval and orphan drug 
status for Survanta®.1308  Abbott subsequently informed ONY and 
Forest that it had reason to believe that Infasurf® would infringe the 
Tanabe patents if it were marketed.1309  When ONY filed a new drug 
application in 1995 for approval to market Infasurf®, the FDA 
notified ONY that Infasurf® was the “same drug” as Survanta® under 
the Orphan Drug Act, and it therefore could not be approved for sale 
until Abbott’s seven-year market exclusivity period expired.1310 
ONY and Forest sued Abbott seeking a declaratory judgment of 
non-infringement and invalidity of the Tanabe patents.  Abbott 
counterclaimed for infringement.1311  The district court granted ONY 
and Forest a judgment of non-infringement as a matter of law 
                                                          
 1299. Id. at 1326, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682. 
 1300. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1301. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1302. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1303. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1304. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1305. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683. 
 1306. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683-84. 
 1307. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1308. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1309. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1310. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1311. Id. at 1327, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
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(JMOL) finding that Abbott failed to present any evidence to show 
CLSE infringed the Tanabe patents and that Abbott was equitably 
estopped from asserting infringement of the Tanabe patents against 
ONY and Forest.1312  The district court based its equitable estoppel 
ruling on its finding that Abbott misled ONY and Forest to believe 
that “it would not assert infringement by encouraging their 
development of Infasurf® and by neglecting its duty to inform them 
of any possible infringement,” upon which ONY and Forest 
reasonably relied.1313 
The district court also granted ONY and Forest’s motion for 
attorney fees and expenses finding the case to be “exceptional” under 
§ 285.1314  The district court found that Abbott, in bad faith, 
encouraged ONY to develop CLSE, disregarded its duty to advise 
ONY and Forest of possible infringement, and pursued its 
infringement counterclaim with a “reckless disregard for the facts in 
an attempt to prevent Infasurf® from reaching the market.”1315 
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that “exceptional” cases 
under § 285 are those cases involving “inequitable conduct before the 
[patent office]; litigation misconduct; vexatious, unjustified, and 
otherwise bad faith litigation; a frivolous suit or willful 
infringement.”1316  Since none of those circumstances was present, it 
was error for the district court, in its “expansive reading of § 285,” to 
find the case exceptional.1317  The Federal Circuit noted, “[W]e have 
not . . . upheld a finding of exceptionality based on a patentee’s bad-
faith business conduct toward an accused infringer prior to litigation, 
and we decline to expand the scope of the statutory term 
‘exceptional’ in that manner.”1318  While equitable estoppel may be 
imposed when a patentee induces another party to believe that it will 
not be sued for infringement, the consequence of that estoppel is the 
loss of the cause of action, not attorney fees, “under the rubric of 
exceptional case.”1319 
2. Vexatious suit merits attorney fee award 
In a sharply-worded per curiam opinion, the Federal Circuit upheld 
the district court in the latest of a long series of appeals involving 
                                                          
 1312. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1313. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1314. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684. 
 1315. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684 (citation omitted). 
 1316. Id. at 1329, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685 (citation omitted). 
 1317. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1685. 
 1318. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686. 
 1319. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1686. 
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Phonometrics and its claims to telephone billing display technology 
and sanctioned the appellant.1320  The opinion is principally 
noteworthy for the court’s order that Phonometrics and its attorney, 
jointly and severally, be required to pay Westin $3,000 as a sanction 
for making frivolously unmeritorious arguments before the appeals 
court.1321 
Among other things, the court rejected attempts by Phonometrics 
to argue that an earlier, non-precedential decision was not binding 
on it (even though it was a party to that earlier case).1322  The court 
held that Phonometrics was not free to reargue positions it had lost 
on the earlier appeal.1323 
The court also rejected Phonometic’s argument that the district 
judge should have recused himself because he: 
(1) ruled against it on every issue; (2) awarded attorney fees every 
time a defendant sued by Phonometrics has requested them; 
(3) insisted on adopting a consistent claim construction and 
(4) disagreed with Phonometrics’ proffered construction of the 
phrase ‘substantially instantaneous’ after [the Federal Circuit’s] 
decision in [the earlier], non-precedential case.1324 
C. Sanctions:  Where District Court Misapprehended Substantive Law, 
Sanction Award Reversed 
In Waymark Corp., et al. v. Porta Systems Corp.,1325 a case decided more 
on substantive issues than damages issues, the Federal Circuit 
reversed a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees imposed on 
plaintiffs for pursuing claims that, according to the district court, 
presented “no basis for recovery.”1326  The Federal Circuit found the 
district court sanctioned the plaintiffs based on its own 
misunderstanding of the governing law.1327 
Waymark and the Caravello Family Limited Partnership sued Porta 
Systems Corp. for patent infringement as well as the infringement of 
the trademark “Battscan.”1328  The complaint alleged the partnership 
was the owner of the patent, and Waymark was the exclusive 
                                                          
 1320. Phonometrics, Inc., v. Westin Hotel Co., 319 F.3d 1328, 1329,  65 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1949, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1321. Id. at 1334, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1954. 
 1322. Id. at 1332, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952. 
 1323. Id., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1952-53. 
 1324. Id. at 1333, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1953. 
 1325. 334 F.3d 1358, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1326. Id. at 1362, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1327. Id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 1328. Id. at 1360, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304-05. 
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licensee.1329  The district court granted summary judgment of non-
infringement for Porta Systems on the patent count and dismissed 
the trademark and trade dress count for lack of standing.1330  While 
that decision was on appeal to the Federal Circuit, the district court 
granted a motion by Porta Systems for attorneys’ fees.1331  The court 
based its sanction on its finding that there was not basis for the 
plaintiffs’ trademark infringement claim due to the fact the plaintiffs’ 
trademark had not been registered until more than a year after the 
suit was filed.1332  The district court further found that there was no 
written exclusive patent license agreement from the partnership to 
Waymark and, thus, Waymark did not have standing to file suit for 
patent infringement.1333  Finally, the court found the plaintiffs 
“provided a misleading response” to Porta Systems’ discovery request 
for a copy of the written patent assignment to Waymark and the 
district court’s order to show cause as to the legal sufficiency of the 
oral license agreement.1334  The district court found the case 
“exceptional” and held that “had Plaintiffs conducted a proper pre-
filing investigation, Defendant would not have incurred the 
substantial attorney[s’] fees and costs it now claims.”1335  The district 
court also based its sanction on the 28 U.S.C. § 1927 prohibition 
against vexatious litigation.1336 
The Federal Circuit applied the law of the Eleventh Circuit to the 
sanction order.1337  The Federal Circuit found that the district court 
erred in basing its sanction order on the fact the plaintiffs’ trademark 
was not registered at the time the action was filed.1338  The court 
explained that because the complaint sought relief under § 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, which provides a remedy for infringement of both 
registered and unregistered trademarks, the district court’s award of 
sanctions was based on a misunderstanding of the governing law.1339 
The Federal Circuit also found that the district court did not 
correctly state the Law relating to the plaintiffs’ standing to bring 
their patent infringement claims, explaining that only assignments 
                                                          
 1329. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 1330. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305. 
 1331. Id. at 1361, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1332. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1333. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1334. Id. at 1361-62, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1335. Id. at 1362, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306 (alteration from original) (citation 
omitted). 
 1336. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1337. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306. 
 1338. Id. at 1363, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
 1339. Id. at 1363-64, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307-08. 
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need be in writing; licenses may be oral.1340  While a holder of an oral 
license can sue for patent infringement “only in extremely limited 
circumstances,” the court noted that one of the plaintiffs here 
claimed a written assignment of the patent and clearly had standing 
to sue.1341 
Finally, the court reversed the imposition of sanctions under 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, explaining that § 1927 must be strictly construed, and 
sanctions under that statute are to only be assessed against counsel 
“who willfully abuse the judicial process by conduct tantamount to 
bad faith.”1342  The court held that Porta Systems was required to show 
more than lack of merit to the plaintiffs’ claims to serve as a basis for 
sanctions under § 1927.1343 
D. Punitive Damages:  $50 Million Punitive Damage Award Comports  
with Due Process 
The Federal Circuit previously affirmed a verdict that DeKalb 
Genetics Corp. fraudulently induced Rhône-Poulenc Agro, S.A. 
(RPA) to enter into a 1994 license agreement relating to an 
optimized transit peptide (OTP) genetic material useful in growing 
herbicide-resistant corn plants, and approved a $50 million punitive 
damage award.1344  On remand from the Supreme Court to reconsider 
the reward in light of the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements 
regarding due process constraints on punitive damages awards,1345 the 
Federal Circuit found DeKalb’s conduct was sufficiently 
reprehensible to support the punitive damages award.1346 
The case arose from RPA’s claims that DeKalb fraudulently 
induced RPA to enter into the license agreement by failing to share 
certain successful field test results with RPA which were the result of 
collaborative efforts between the two companies.1347  Instead of 
sharing those results, DeKalb allegedly used them to backcross the 
successful OTP-containing corn plants with commercial corn 
                                                          
 1340. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
 1341. Id., 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308. 
 1342. Id. at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1308-09 (quoting Malautea v. Suzuki 
Motor Co., Ltd., 987 F.2d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 1343. Id. at 1366, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1309. 
 1344. Rhône-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1345. See State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (prohibiting grossly excessive 
punitive damage awards as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment because they 
further no legitimate state purpose and constitute an arbitrary deprivation of 
property). 
 1346. Rhône-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1347. Id. at 1368, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1315-16. 
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varieties, thus gaining an advantage on any potential competition.1348  
RPT alleged that by withholding its knowledge of the successful field 
test results, DeKalb was able to negotiate a more advantageous license 
agreement with RPA.1349 
At trial, the jury awarded RPA $1 in nominal damages, $15 million 
in unjust enrichment recovery, and $50 million in punitive 
damages.1350  In its 2001 opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed, finding 
that the jury’s award of punitive damages was not unconstitutionally 
excessive.1351  The court based its decision on the factors set forth by 
the Supreme Court in the 1996 BMW vs. Gore1352 decision, and found 
“DeKalb’s conduct was sufficiently reprehensible to support the 
award of punitive damages.”1353 
The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit decision1354 and 
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of its recent punitive 
damages opinion in State Farm.1355  In its decision on remand, the 
Federal Circuit found that DeKalb’s conduct fell within the specific 
State Farm factors that weighed in favor of sustaining a punitive 
damages award.1356  The Federal Circuit noted that the State Farm 
court explicitly listed “intentional malice, trickery, or deceit” as 
factors to consider in determining whether a party’s conduct was 
“reprehensible” for purposes of imposing punitive damages, and 
asserted:  “The Supreme Court’s addition of ‘intentional malice, 
trickery, or deceit’ as a specifically identified criterion for 
determining reprehensibility directly supports [our prior] 
holding.”1357 
The Federal Circuit also rejected DeKalb’s claim that under State 
Farm, the $50 million in punitive damages unconstitutionally 
exceeded the $15 million in compensatory damages awarded by the 
jury.1358  As noted by the Federal Circuit, under State Farm “an award 
                                                          
 1348. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
 1349. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
 1350. Id. at 1369, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316. 
 1351. Rhône-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335, 1352, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769, 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 1352. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (listing the three 
factors as:  (1) the degree of responsibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the 
disparity between the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; 
and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the 
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases). 
 1353. Rhône-Poulenc Agro, 272 F.3d at 1349, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777. 
 1354. DeKalb Genetics Corp. v. Bayer Crop Sci., S.A., 123 S. Ct. 1828 (2003). 
 1355. State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 1356. Rhône-Poulenc Agro, S.A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 345 F.3d 1366, 1371, 68 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1314, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 1357. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317-18. 
 1358. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318. 
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of more than four times the amount of compensatory damages might 
be close to the line of constitutional impropriety,”1359 but found that 
here “the proportion of punitive damages to compensatory damages 
does not even approach the possible threshold of constitutional 
impropriety.1360 
                                                          
 1359. Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318 (citation omitted). 
 1360. Id. at 1372, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318. 
